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ABSTRACT
Containment is a policy most often associated with 
the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and RATO and of 
course the prevention of Soviet expansionism. The policy's 
success in Europe has often overshadowed the fact that it 
has also been the foundation of America's Asian policy since 
the outset of the Korean War. A study of the evolution of 
the United States Asian containment policy shows that it 
has created rather than solved problems in American rela­
tions with Asia. The present tragedy in Vietnam, a product 
of the policy; is the prime example.
Containment was formulated as a policy for Europe, 
based on the conditions in Europe. It was hastily extended 
to Asia to cover the Korean War and was continued in the 
post-Korean War period without proper consideration for 
Asian needs and wants. The differences in opinion between 
American policy-makers and many Asian leaders concerning 
these vital factors has greatly handicapped the policy.
The fact that American official rhetoric, originally a 
device used to "sell” the policy to the American public, 
became at times the basis for actual policies, has further
o
hindered the containment policy.
iii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In Asia, containment has evolved into an open-ended 
commitment to defend every nation against communist pres­
sures regardless of /the fact that the cost was at times 
out of proportion to the American interest involved.. 
American policy-makers have overextended' the principles of 
containment, valid in Europe, and misapplied them in Asia. 
As a result, Americans now find their country in a
catastrophic situation in Vietnam, and their efforts to(
achieve a balance of power in Asia complicated.
iv
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PREFACE
The United States today faces many serious foreign 
policy issues; Vietnam, the Middle East and the question­
able status of RATO in Europe to mention "but a few. The 
most pressing and divisive issue, of course, is the war in 
Vietnam. Yet, while the debate has centered on Vietnam, 
many leading Americans are questioning almost all aspects 
of American policy in Asia. The debate on Vietnam has 
come to express the "even more basic divisions and doubts
1
about American purposes and interests in Asia generally." 
Thus numerous questions have arisen, such as: What is
America's Asian policy; what are its objectives; do the 
objectives reflect the national interest of the United 
States; has the policy been successful; if so, why is the 
United States involved in the Vietnam War; if the policy 
has been unsuccessful, why?
These questions are difficult ones, and some may 
have no single absolute answer, but the Vietnam War has 
brought out the need to at least attempt to find the 
answers.
^Bernard K. Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia:
A Strategy for American Foreign Policy, (Englewood Cliffs, 
1969), pT 1.
v
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In order to begin to answer some of the questions, 
it is necessary to go beyond Asia as the area of study, 
lor example, to understand the basic underlying principle 
in America’s Asian policy for most of the postwar period - 
containment, it is necessary to begin at its roots in 
Europe.
The study of American policy in Asia is clouded 
by the overriding ambiguity of Asia's relation to the U.S. 
national interest. While America has since the days of 
the Open Door Policy and the acquisition of the Philippines 
always expressed an interest in Asia, American leaders 
have failed to clearly define what this is. It has been 
said that "beneath the confusion, reversals, of policy and 
moralistic generalities which have made up the surface of 
the Asiatic policy since McKinley, one can detect an under­
lying consistency which, however vaguely, reflects the 
permanent interests of the United States in Asia. This
2
principle is ... the maintenance of the balance of power." 
However, since Hans J. Morgenthau made this claim in 1951, 
it may be asked today whether the containment policy in 
Asia has been based on this principle; and, if so, whether 
the policy has been able to achieve the maintenance of the 
balance of power.
It will be the purpose of this thesis to analyse
o
^Hans J.. Morgenthau, "Policy of the U.S.A.", 
Political Quarterly, January, 1951, p. 43.
vi
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the evolution of containment as a policy for Asia. Chapter 
I is an introductory chapter which discusses the concept 
of containment itself in its original European context.
This is done in order to convey what is meant by the term 
"containment" and also to provide the basis of a comparison 
with containment as it evolved as an Asian Policy.
The following chapter deals with the Korean War. 
Korea, as will be shown, is the place where containment was 
first applied in Asia. However, the war's importance goes 
beyond the fact that it marked the beginnings of contain­
ment in Asia; for it was during the Korean War and at its 
conclusion that perceptions were acquired by American leaders 
which were to serve as guide lines for the containment policy 
up to and into the Vietnam War.
Next there is a chapter devoted to a general 
discussion of the instruments of containment at work in 
Asia between the Korean War and the Vietnam War.
And finally, Vietnam is used as a case study of 
containment . While the United States has admittedly made 
many mistakes in its specific Vietnam policy, I will attempt 
to prove to the reader that the failures in Vietnam are 
representative of the failures in the entire Asian contain­
ment policy.
James Burnham writing in 1953 on containment said 
that "to review the record of the containment policy is not 
to perform an autopsy but to diagnose the conditions of a
vii
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3
still breathing organism." I believe that his words are 
still valid today, but ponder the question whether it might 
not better serve American interests if this were not so.
•z
James Burnham, Containment or Liberation, (New 
York, 1953), p. 72.
viii
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ITHE CONCEPT OE CONTAINMENT 
Europe 1947 - 1950
It is clear that the United States cannot expect 
in the foreseeable future to enjoy political 
intimacy with the Soviet Regime. It must continue 
to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a 
partner in the political arena. . . .
. . . the United States (warrants) entering with 
reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm contain­
ment, designed to confront the Russians with unalter­
able counter-force at every point where they show 
signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful 
and stable world. 1
These words are taken from George Kennan's famous 
article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" which appeared in 
Eoreign Affairs July, 1947- It marks the first time the 
word "containment" is used to refer, to American foreign 
policy objectives. Twenty-two years later, containment is 
still a most appropriate word to describe American foreign 
policy objectives, although its present ambiguous meaning 
has brought the United States into the Vietnam War.
Mr. Kennan's article while it is responsible for 
naming the United States postwar policy, it does not mark 
the actual beginnings of the policy. Actually the initial
^"George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", 
Eoreign Affairs, xxv, No. 4, July, 1947, pp. 566-82.
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
program of the containment polipy was the Truman Doctrine 
(March, 1947) which preceded the Kennan exposition. The 
famous writing of Mr. Kennan was not an official statement 
of U.S. policy, hut an academic endeavor to describe the 
realities of the then existing Soviet-American relations,
J
with a personal suggestion of how the (Jnited States could 
meet the situation.
The Truman Doctrine was to usher the United States 
into a position of international involvement to an extent 
previously unknown in that nation's history, outside of the 
two World Wars. Some students of American foreign policy 
have claimed that it was inevitable that the United States 
become a dominant force in international affairs after 
World War II. This assumption seemed to be based on the 
fact that the power positions of the nations of the world 
had altered as a result of World War II and the United 
States had emerged from this shuffle as the strongest nation 
on the face of the globe. However, while it may have appeared 
inevitable to most of the world leaders and some American 
statesmen at that time, it was not inevitable to the 
majority of the American people.
The United States in the immediate postwar years
(1945 to mid-1946) had entered into a phase that Gabriel
2
Almond describes as "utopian romanticism". It was a time
2
Gabrien Almond, The American People and Foreign 
Policy, (Hew York, I960), p. xii.
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in -which most Americans believed that a lasting peace had 
at last been secured and thus there was no reason why the 
world would not settle back into normalcy and order. Pew 
Americans among the general populace were in the mood to 
pay attention to world problems at the close of World War II. 
Por those few who were concerned about the problems of a 
bankrupt and devasted Europe, and the possible consequences 
of atomic weaponry, they believed that such problems could 
be adequately resolved by the United Nations through 
programs of relief and rehabilitation and peaceful negotia­
tions .
While the Truman Administration was-.- dismayed in 
the immediate post-war period by the expansionist tendencies 
displayed by the Soviet Union, most Americans did not realize 
that the Soviet actions would complicate the cooperation 
both nations had enjoyed in their war-time alliance. They 
could not foresee the future problems of negotiating with 
the Soviet Union that were to occur in the United Nations. 
Instead, many Americans retained an image of the Soviet 
Union as the land "of the heroic Soviet people", a nation 
lead by Joseph Stalin, a great patriot, whom Americans 
viewed as "a tough bargainer- but still a bargainer."^
With this perception of the Soviets, the American people 
had little reason to conclude, that the Soviet Union had
o
3
Ibid., p. xiii.
4
Ibid., p. xiii.
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embarked upon a policy for world domination.
The belief in the lasting nature of the peace won 
by the allies and their preoccupation with the settling of 
domestic problems lead the American public to demand a 
speedy demobilization. In the eight-month period, May,
1945 to March, 1946, the United States reduced its armed 
forces from 3-5 million to 400,000 men. This program was 
carried out despite the continual warnings from the British 
Government that deliberate and unilateral disarmament was 
exceedingly dangerous until the Soviet Union had been made 
to live up to its Yalta obligations. When the Truman 
Administration seemingly disregarded the British warnings, 
former Prime Minister Churchill appealed directly to the 
American public. Churchill had little immediate success in 
changing the American people's attitude, but in the process 
he did coin the phrase "iron curtain", a phrase that has 
since come to dominate the American imagination.
Thus, if one was to draw conclusions based on the 
temper of the American people at that time, one would not 
reasonably conclude that the United States was on the 
threshold of a new phase in its foreign policy.
Many men in the Truman Administration and some U,S. 
Congressmen, however, did not share their constituents' 
optimism. These men maintained a watchful eye on the Soviet
5
John W. Spanier, American Poreign Policy Since 
World War II, (New York, i960)j p. 23.
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post-war actions and were becoming increasingly concerned
by them. Their decision to act, however, was not prompted
by a direct Soviet action, but rather came in response to
a decision by Great Britain.
In February, 1947, the British government informed
the United States that Britain could no longer afford to
continue the economic and military burden of insuring Greek
independence. Greece at the time was in the midst of civil
war between the conservative government and the Greek
Communists. All intelligence reports indicated that with
the British withdrawal, "the Communist insurgents would
succeed in seizing control 'within a matter of weeks’ unless
the Government of Greece received prompt and large-scale 
&aid." Truman believed if the Communists were successful
in Greece, it would only be a matter of time before Turkey
7
and Iran would also crumble before the Soviet power. The 
possible results of a Communist victory in Greece had even 
wider implications than these nations losing their independence. 
Britain had long theorized that Russian control of Greece and 
the Dardanelles would constitute a threat to the European 
balance of power. If this balance was to be upset, the 
very security of Europe would be threatened, and it had
g
Seyom Brown, The Faces o_f Power, Constancy And 
Change In Unite_d_ States_ Fo_reign Policy From Truman "To 
Johnson, (hew York, 1968)’, "p." 40."*
7
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of Trial 
And Hope, (Garden City, 1956), p. 100.
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always been an assumption of American foreign policy that 
European security was vital for its own security. It had 
"been a proven fact that when the European balance had been 
disrupted, as it had twice in the previous three decades, 
the United States had found itself in war. Truman inter­
preted the Greek crisis in such a way that the maintenance 
of the pro-Western regime in Greece was essential if vital 
American interests were to be secured.
Britain's admission that it could no longer meet 
the task of preserving Greek independence, placed before 
the United States the cold fact of a bipolar world. Then 
Undersecretary of State Acheson in explaining the Greek 
crisis to a bipartisan group of Congressional leaders 
stated:
Only two great powers remain in the world, the United 
States and the Soviet Union. ... and it was clear that 
the Soviet Union was aggressive and expanding. Eor 
the United States to take steps to strengthen countries 
threatened with Communist subversion ... was to protect 
the security of the United States .... 8
Acheson concluded that the Truman Administration had no
real alternative but to meet this perceived Soviet threat
in Greece. In stating the Administration's position, the
Undersecretary said that America had a choice, either to
act "with energy" to meet the situation or lose by default.
America's decision to meet the challenge posed by
8Brown, op. cit., pp. 40-41.
q
Ibid., p. 41. Also see Truman, op. pit., p. 105*
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"Soviet expansion", was stated in President Truman's message
to Congress on March 12, 194-7. The message contained a
request for a Congressional appropriation of $4-00 million
for economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey. In
explaining the necessity for such aid, Truman did not
identify America's direct interest in Greece and Turkey or
their importance in the maintenance of the European balance
of power. Instead, Truman's request was explained in terms
of "a vague and indeterminate commitment to the support of
freedom everywhere. Underlying the President's message
seemed to be the acknowledgment of a long-held American
belief, that they were a chosen people and the time had once
more come for the United States to save the world, as it
had been compelled to do in the previous World Wars. Explicit
in the message was the acknowledgment of a basic conflict
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Truman
defined this conflict in broad ideological terms. In his
Congressional message he stated:
At the present moment in world history, nearly every 
nation must choose between alternative ways of life.
One way of life is based upon the will of the majority 
and is distinguished by free institutions, representa­
tive government, free elections, guarantees of indi­
vidual liberty, freedom of speech and religion and 
freedom from political oppression.
The second way of life is based upon the will of a 
minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It 
relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled 
press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression
■^'Norman A. Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, 1945-1960, 
(New York, 1962), p. 41.
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of personal freedoms. 11
President Truman, in announcing his administration's
global commitment to support freedom, went far beyond the
immediate crisis in Greece. It is at this point that "the
12Truman Doctrine merges into the policy of containment."
The containment policy, as expressed in the Truman 
Doctrine, gave the impression, either intentionally or 
unintentionally, that the United States had embarked upon 
a "Holy Crusade" against communism. Such an impression was 
instrumental in aligning Congressional support and the 
support of the American people for this "new" policy.
Truman, in appealing to America's human emotions, brought 
before the American public a sense of danger and moral 
obligation, that a "factual" explanation of the Greek civil 
war by itself could not have accomplished. The American 
people's previous reluctance to become involved in world 
affairs was transformed into support for a policy of involve­
ment, because they felt such a policy was necessary if the 
American way of life was to be preserved. This messianism 
or crusading spirit was not an innovation in American foreign 
policy; it had been periodically evident in previous policies. 
However, since the Truman Doctrine, this emotionalism has
■^From a message of the President to a joint session 
of Congress, March 12, 1947. Department of State Bulletin, 
xvi, March 23, 1947, pp. 536-537.
12Hans J. Morgenthau, "The American Tradition In 
Foreign Policy," in Foreign Policy In World Affairs, ed.
Ray C. Macredis, (Englewood Cliffs, 1967), p. 249.
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come to be a dominant aspect of American foreign policy, 
often times obstructing American decision-maker's percep­
tion of a situation.
The immediate programs of the containment policy 
■were not of the same vague general nature and the ’’open- 
ended" commitment Truman expressed. On the contrary, the 
principal programs of the containment policy up until 1950, 
the Marshall Plan and NATO, which followed the Truman 
Doctrine, were designed specifically to fortify Western 
Europe economically and militarily, so that, that area 
would be able to resist a Soviet threat.
In 1947 "the picture of Europe was one of mammoth 
15slow-moving crisis." W.W. Rostow in his book The United
States In The World Arena writes that
There was a growing awareness (on the part of the 
Truman Administration) that something big had to be 
done in Europe to avoid a disaster to the American 
interest; that a substantial program of economic 
aid addressed constructively to the problems of 
economic recovery was required to deal with the 
multiple threats to the Eurasian power balance. 14
The Truman administration had become especially con­
cerned with the internal situations in Prance and Italy.
In both these nations domestic communist parties had shown 
increased strength. The American policy-makers feared that 
unless the internal instability of these nations and all of
15W. W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena, 
(New York, I960), p. 209.
14Ibid., p. 209-
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Western Europe was corrected the Communist would exploit 
the crisis, and W'estern Europe would fall under Communist 
control from within. Although the Truman Administration was 
fully aware of the potential external threat the Soviet 
Union posed to Western European security,, they maintained 
that the economic instability of the region posed a much 
more immediate threat.
President Truman reasoned that the rise in communist 
appeal in Prance and Italy was due, for the most part, to 
the increasing despair among their working classes. This 
despair was caused by these nations' inability to rebuild 
their economies after the War. Hunger, poverty and despera­
tion, not ideological beliefs, were considered by U.S. policy 
makers, to be the conditions which laid Western Europe inter­
nally vulnerable to Communist domination. American leaders 
held the belief that once these internal problems were 
rectified, Western Europe would be able to insure its own . 
security. However, the United States recognized the fact 
that the countries of Western Europe were not able to solve 
their internal problems alone; American assistance would be 
necessary. In a response to Western Europe's needs, the 
Truman Administration devised a program of economic 
assistance.
The assistance program, known as the Marshall Plan, 
was named, after the then American Secretary of State, George 
Marshall. . The program offered economic aid to all nations 
who were willing to cooperate and to take the initiative in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
determing their respective needs. The Marshall Plan
■was intended to he a program directed toward the countries
of Western Europe, hut Secretary Marshall in announcing
the program was careful in his choice of words, so as not
to exclude the countries of Eastern Europe and its leader,
the Soviet Union, from possible participation. Marshall,
in his initial announcement of the program, declared, "Our
policy is directed not against any country or doctrine, hut
15against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos." The 
announcement of the Marshall Plan was worded in such a way 
that it could he interpreted as an American effort to heal 
the split between Communist and non-Communist Europe through 
economic assistance and collaboration. Marshall was keenly 
aware of the political repercussions that a verbal restric­
tion on participation would have brought about. Had the 
program been limited to just the Western European countries, 
the United States would have been vulnerable to verbal attacks 
from the restricted nations. America could then have been 
accused of reinforcing the division of Europe and intensify­
ing the cold war. Additionally, a program which distinctly 
excluded the Soviet dominated Eastern European nations from 
participation might have alienated the Communist workers in 
Prance and Italy, whose numerical strength was in part 
responsible for the program's being. "One of the purposes of 
the Marshall Plan had been to gain the political allegiance
15Graebner, _op. cit. . p. 44.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of the working class" and thus "render them immune to the 
blandishments of Communism.1,16
Marshall never really anticipated Russian or East 
European participation in the program. Noting the Congress­
ional feeling of animosity toward the Soviet Union, he 
fully realized that participation by the Soviet Union or 
its satellites in the program would have insured the 
assistance program's defeat in the Congress. The American 
Congress, in fact, had become so anti-Soviet that a program 
which would assist this "Soviet enemy" could have been 
interpreted as being an act of treason. However, since 
Russian refusal to participate in the program seemed assured 
Marshall felt that in extending an open invitation to all 
nations,' the Soviet Union, in refusing, could be accused of 
continuing and aggravating the cold war.
Russian refusal to participate in the Marshall Plan 
seemed inevitable due to the program's construction. The 
United States had devised the program in such a way, that 
had the Soviet Union decided to participate, it would have 
had to disclose information concerning its economy as well 
as allowing the United States some control in its future 
economic planning and that of its satellites. Russia, if 
it had participated would have found itself to be involved
16 ^Spanier, op. cit., p. 44.
17Truman,- op. cit., p. 114-115.
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13
in a program that was assisting the stabilization of 
European capitalism and thus such an offer was naturally 
declined by the Soviet Union. In stating its reason for 
refusing to participate in the assistance program, the 
Soviet Union claimed that the Marshall Plan "would repre­
sent an intolerable interference in the internal affairs
of the European countries," and therefore was no more than
18a plan to increase United States imperialism. The Soviet's
vocal denunciation of the program, assured Congressional
approval for the Marshall Plan.
The Marshall Plan was eagerly welcomed by the
countries of Western Europe, especially Great Britain and
France. In all, seventeen nations of Western and North
19Western Europe participated in the program. The United 
States asked the participating countries to present a plan 
for their common needs that were necessary for recovery.
The plan, the members devised, became the basis of the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation. The members 
of the Organization pledged to "cooperate in reducing 
tariffs and other barriers to trade and to promote with 
vigor the development of productivity through (the)
18Jules Davids, America And The World of Our Time, 
(New York, I960), p. 411.
19Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, Denmark, France, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Western Germany and 
Trieste.
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20efficient use of the resources at their command." In
the first four year period (1948 to 1952) American assis-
21tance through the program amounted to $13 billion. '
Marshall Plan aid was a massive success in restoring
economic stability to Western Europe. .By 1950, that area
was already exceeding its pre-war production rate by 25 per 
22cent. The "dollar gap", a term used in the post-war years 
to describe Europe's inability to obtain enough dollars for 
the purchase of commodities required for its economic
2'3recovery, was soon reduced from $12 billion to $2 billion. 
The economic assistance provided through the Marshall Plan 
enabled the countries of Western Europe to establish a 
stable economic basis from which future progress and social 
reform would be possible.
American policy-makers made the Marshall Plan the 
cornerstone of their new containment policy. In assisting 
Western Europe rebuild its economy, American policy-makers 
felt the end product would be the strengthening of free 
institutions in these countries, which they believed was a 
necessity, if Western Europe was to meet the internal threat 
of communism. The importance the United States placed on
20Spanier, ojo. cit. , p. 42.
21Truman, op. cit., p. 119.
22Spanier, £p. cit., p. 43.
25Ibid., p. 43.
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strengthening free institutions abroad was stated in the. 
preamble of U.S. Public Law 472, April 3, 1948. The pre­
amble described the Law, of which the Marshall Plan was a 
part, as an act
;.. to promote world peace and the general welfare, 
national interest and foreign policy of the United 
States, through economic, financial and other measures 
necessary for the maintenance of conditions abroad 
in which free institutions may survive and be con­
sistent with the maintenance of the strength and 
stability of the United States. 24
President Truman, on signing this Law, called it
25
America's answer to the challenge facing the free world,."
American policy-makers were to find, however, that 
a program of financial assistance alone was not a sufficient 
instrument for deterring the Communist threat in Western 
Europe.
In February, 1948, the Soviets engineered a coup 
d' etat in Czchoslavakia. News of this event was received 
with great alarm by American leaders but Western European 
leaders were even more concerned because of their proximity 
to the area. To some members of the West, Truman and 
Churchill in particular, the event resembled Hitler's
26actions concerning Czechoslavakia prior to World War II.
Pour months later, in June, 1948, the Russians imposed a
^Burnham, ojo. cit. , p. 52.
25Ibid., p. 52.
26Edmund Sallman states that in "reviewing the 
evidence of the Czechoslovak coup d' etat twenty years
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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blockade on West Berlin. The Soviet's attempt to dislodge 
the West from Berlin, following closely behind the "fall" 
of Czechoslovakia to Communism, instilled such a sense of 
insecurity in Western Europe, that a heavy strain was put 
on their economic recovery programs. The peoples of Western 
Europe, faced with what they considered to be a Soviet 
threat to their security, began to despair. ' They feared 
that Soviet power would one day come to dominate the entire 
European continent. Therefore, many Europeans felt that 
the sacrifices they were asked to make to achieve economic 
stability were in vain, for they would not be able to reap 
the benefits of such a recovery, if they were under Soviet 
domination. It became apparent to Western European leaders 
that economic recovery could not be achieved, until their 
nations were militarily secured.
afterward, it is evident that in the elections of 1946 the 
Communists and their left-Socialist puppets had an absolute 
majority in the Czechoslovak parliament of 50.8 per cent 
(and a commanding one of 55-67 in the key provinces of 
Bohemia and Moravia). While there is some suggestion 
that this majority would have been reduced in the forthcoming 
elections, in 1948, the majority of political activists in 
Czeckoslovakia were in the Communist Party or its satellite 
organizations; the population was apathetic and, if may be, 
even generally approving the coup." Edmund Stillman,
"The Political Issues: Pacts and Bantasies" in Can We Win
In Vietnam? by Prank E. Armbruster, Raymond D. Gastil,
Herman Kahn, William Pfaff and Edmund Stillman, (Hew York, 
1968), p. 143 fn. Also see Edmund Stillman, "The Pall of 
Czechoslovakia", The Hew York Times Magazine, February 18, 
1968.
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Five European nations, noting their need for 
military security, took the initiative and formed a 
military alliance. In March, 1948, Great Britain, France, 
the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg signed the Brussels 
Pact, a collective defense alliance. According to the 
provisions of the alliance the contracting parties pledged 
to come to the assistance of any member country that was 
attacked, with military and any other aid in their power 
to produce.
President Truman immediately announced America's
approval of the Brussels Pact. In speaking to the Congress
Truman said, "The determination of the free countries of
Europe will be matched by an equal determination on (the
27part of the United States) to help them to do so."
Truman was especially pleased with the multilateral design 
of the alliance, which he viewed as a notable step towards 
European unity. However, for all its good intentions, the 
alliance, because of the individual military weaknesses of 
its members, was an ineffective force if faced by a Soviet 
challenge. If Western Europe was to be militarily secured, 
an alliance in which the United States was a member would 
be necessary. The United States was the only nation in 
the world which had the military strength to successfully 
meet a Soviet attack.
Following the Brussels Pact, the United States
27Davids, ojd. cit. , p. 413.
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Senate passed the Vandenberg Resolution which went on
record as being in favor of regional arrangements of
collective security based on continuous and effective
28self-help and mutual aid. The Congress overwhelmingly 
approved the resolution, a factor which was to greatly 
assist the Truman Administration in forming a similar 
security alliance.
Although Congress had approved the basic premise 
of a security alliance, the Truman Administration realized 
that it was still not prepared at that time to accept 
American membership in a purely military alliance during 
peace time. Thus, the Administration faced a dilemma; the 
needs of Europe were military, and yet, there was some 
Congressional disapproval of a strictly military alliance.
In its final draft for a collective defense alliance,
American policy-makers attempted to skirt the problem of 
Congressional opposition by emphasizing the common heritage 
and civilization shared by the United States and Western 
Europe and the need of continuing cooperation between the 
two while de-emphasizing the basic military structure of 
the alliance.
The resulting alliance is known as the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) “7^  After some heated debating,
28Ibid, p. 422.
29The original members of NATO were Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, France,' Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portgual and the United States. 
Greece and Turkey joined in 1952 and West Germany in 1954.
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the U. S. Senate in April, 1949, ratified the alliance.
The heart of the alliance is found in Article 5 in the
text. It states:
The parties agree that an armed attack against one 
or more of them in Europe or North America shall be 
considered an attack against them all; and conse­
quently they agree that, if such an armed attack, 
each of them in exercise of the right, of individual 
or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 
of the Charter of the United Nations will assist 
the Parties so attacked by taking forthwith indivi­
dually and in concert with other Parties, such action 
as it deems necessary, including the use of armed 
force, to resolve and maintain the security of the 
North Atlantic Area. 30
Despite the claims made by the advocates of NATO
that the alliance was of a unique nature, it was basically
an old-fashioned military alliance. While the text of
the alliance was so worded that cooperation could be
extended beyond the military sphere, there was no doubt
among the contracting parties that the alliance's primary
function was military. There seems to be two main reasons
why the Truman Administration intentionally blurred the
dominant military aspects of the alliance; first, the need
to gain Senate approval of the alliance and secondly, the
Administration's reluctance "to abandon their high idealis-
31tic way for a descent into power politics." American
30Pull text of North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
signed April 4, 1949 in Hearings, "North Atlantic Treaty," 
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1st Session, 
Part (Washington, 194971 PP* 1-3-
31Roland N. Strombeg, Collective Security And 
America.n Foreign Policy, (New York, 19&3), p- 193-
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policy-makers refused to admit that NATO was essentially
a "traditional device, one strictly in the European tradi-
32tion, worked essentially hy European rules." Although 
the United States refused to concede this fact, it was 
this very same fact that made the alliance possible and 
initially successful. American officials spoke of NATO 
as an alliance "embodying the concept of containment," 
which it indeed did, however, "they might more accurately 
have said the Western Powers had put together in NATO a 
balance of power coalition, hopeful of holding a military 
line in Europe."
NATO, with its basic military orientation, was in 
fact to make the division between East and West more pro­
nounced. Although NATO, prior to the Korean War, had not 
yet evolved into its present complex structure, with a 
unified command structure, and there were then no American 
military bases in Europe outside of Germany, the alliance 
made it quite clear to the Soviets that the United States 
was willing to meet, "by force if necessary," a Soviet 
challenge, at every point where the Soviet Union showed 
signs of encroaching upon West European interests.
.American leaders firmly believed that such a commitment 
would deter the Soviet Union from launching an attack on 
Western Europe. The Truman Administration viewed NATO as
■^Coral Bill, "The Containment of China," The Year­
book of World Affairs 1968, (London, 1968), p. 134.
^Ibid. , p. 133•
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an instrument which would assist the United States in 
avoiding all-out war.
During the 1948-1949 period, the West envisaged
its greatest security danger "in terms of an overt Soviet
34attack in Europe that might lead to global war." NATO's 
defense strategy was, therefore, based on this assumption, 
and thus relied on the United States' strategic air-defense, 
the only Western defense which could overcome the Soviet 
combat power. In 1949, after the Soviet Union exploded its 
first atomic device, the NATO strategy was seriously 
questioned. Nonetheless, the strategy remains the same 
today, although conventional weapons and combat forces have 
been added to the defense structure. NATO marked the 
beginning of the military aspect of the containment policy, 
an aspect which for the most part has dominated the policy 
ever since.
The policy of containment in its initial years 
(1947-1949) was essentially a policy designed to meet the 
threat of Soviet expansion into Western Europe. Eor 
President Truman and the members of his administration a 
Communist threat and a Soviet threat were identical and 
they used the terms interchangeably. In announcing the 
containment policy Truman said the United States must 
support the cause of freedom everywhere against the evils 
of Communism, yet his early policy suggests that Truman
34Davids, ojo. cit. , p. 423.
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really meant the United States would support any nation, 
faced with a Communist threat, that was considered vital 
to European security and thus vital to American security.
This interpretation seems valid if one compares the Ameri­
can response to the Communist threat in Europe to the 
American response to Communist activity in China during 
the same period.
China, after World War II, was engulfed in a civil
war. The Nationalist regime, under the leadership of
Chiang Kai-shek, a wartime ally of the United States, had
been greatly weakened by the effects of the extended war
with Japan. On the other hand, the strength of the
Communists had increased. Though probably of marginal
significance the Soviet Union lent military support to the
Communists by placing at their disposal surrendered 
■55
Japanese arms. By early 1949, it became apparent to the 
Kuomintong that it would be defeated by the Communists, 
unless it received massive outside assistance, which the 
American leaders rightly interpreted to mean American 
intervention. The Truman Administration refused, and indeed, 
was, because of demobilization, in no position to give that 
degree of assistance, though it had already supplied sub­
stantial military and economic aid.to the Nationalists. In 
the fall of 1949, Chiang Kai-shek was forced to flee from 
Mainland China to the island of Formosa. Mao Tse-tung, leader
■^Tang Tsou, America's Failure In China 1941-50, 
(Chicago, 1963), pp. 330-331.
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of the Communist forces claimed victory and on October 1,
1949 formally announced the establishment of the People's 
Republic of China.
The news of a Communist victory shocked and enraged 
many Americans. They could not believe- that their "long­
time friends," the Chinese, were to be ruled by a Communist 
regime. Heavy demands were placed on the Administration to 
explain how such an event had been allowed to occur. Some 
American Congressmen, especially the so-called "China bloc", 
demanded to know what policy the Administration intended to 
pursue in regards to the new regime on mainland China. The 
Administration replied that because they believed the situa­
tion in China was still unstable, their immediate policy 
would be one of "wait and see." The Government of the 
United States had just recently taken upon itself heavy 
commitments in Europe and was not prepared, at that time, 
to do the same in Asia. American policy-makers, therefore, 
intended to keep a watchful eye on the Chinese situation and 
any further developments that might occur, and when they felt 
the situation had stabilized itself, they would make a deci­
sion as to what policy to pursue there.
During World War II, American policy-makers antici­
pated a friendly China which after the war would become the
~56"mainstay of a new emerging balance of power in the Ear East."
Robert Blum, The United States And China In World 
Affairs, (Hew York, 1966), p. 5.
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To further this desire, the United States initiated actions
which conferred upon China the status of a great power.
It was primarily through the efforts of the American
Government that China was awarded one of the five permanent
seats on the United Nations Security Council; China was
thus granted equal status on that Council with the Soviet
Union, Great Britain, France and the United States.
However, despite America's war-time efforts to make
China a leading Asian power, they were for naught, for China
was not even a unified nation in the immediate post-war 
37years. The United States, during the waning years of 
World War II and up until 1947, supported the Nationalist 
regime politically, economically and within limits militarily, 
in an effort to estahlish peace in China. In 1947, President 
Truman sent George Marshall to China in an attempt to mediate 
a settlement in the Chinese civil war hut Marshall's efforts 
failed. Marshall in explaining his failure to achieve a 
settlement, stated the main obstacle had been a lack of cooper­
ation by both parties. Marshall's report indicated that the 
Nationalist regime was in need of reform and that the United 
States could do little to settle the struggle between the 
two factions. Further reports brought out the fact that 
Chiang Kai-shek's Government was corrupt, inefficient and
■Z Q
reactionary. This type of Government "did not provide a
o
37Truman, ojo. cit. , p. 62.
^Tang Tsau, ojo. cit., pp. 438, 454.
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politically effective instrument through which to carry 
out the social and economic reforms China needed," if 
China was to he a stable nation, let alone an effective 
leader in Asia.
By late 1948, Secretary of State Marshall in effect 
abandoned the Kuomintong regime, although his policy was 
not one of total or prompt disengagement.4® Because of 
some Congressional opposition to its China policy and in 
order to insure full authorization of its Economic Recovery 
Program, the Truman Administration was forced to accept a 
heavy Congressional appropriation for aid to Chiang under 
the Marshall Plan.44 Such action was to complicate later 
attempts by the United States to disengage itself from 
the Chinese civil war, for it tied American policy to the 
Kuomintang.
During 1948, and early 1949, the position of the 
Nationalist regime steadily deterioriated to the point that 
a Communist victory seemed assured. On July 30, 1949, in 
anticipation of an imminent Communist victory, the United 
States State Department issued a "White Paper" on United 
States relations with China. In this document the Adminis­
tration's position was summed up thus:
Spanier, ojo. cit., p. 80.
4®Tang Tsau, ojo. cit., pp. 492-493*
41Ibid., p. 493*
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The unfortunate hut inescapable fact is that the 
ominous results of the civil war in China was beyond 
the control of the United States. Nothing that this 
country did or could have done within reasonable 
limits of its capabilities could have changed that 
result; nothing that was left undone by this country 
has contributed to it. It m s  the product of internal 
Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to 
influence but could not. A decision was arrived at 
within China, if only a decision by default. 42
After the People's Republic of China came into 
existence, the Truman Administration continued its efforts, 
which began in earnest in January, 1949 to disengage itself 
from the Kuomintang regime, despite some heated Congression­
al objection. In January, 1950, Truman stated:
The United States Government will not pursue a course 
which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict 
in China. Similarly, the United States Government 
will not provide military aid or advice to the Chinese 
forces on Formosa. 45
In addition to disengaging itself from the immediate conflict
in China, the Administration felt it could do little else
but sit and wait, until the conflict was resolved. The
probability of extending formal recognition to the People's
Republic of China, while the Nationalists remained in power
on Formosa, was remote. The Truman Administration was
already under heavy Congressional attack because of its China
policy, and any official proposal to recognize the Communist
regime would only intensify the furor of its opponents, who
42letter of Transmittal, accompanying The China White
Paper, August, 1948, (Stanford, 1962), p. xvi.
45Department of State Bulletin, xxii, January 16, 
1950, p. 20.
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were already accusing the Administration of selling Chiang
Kai-shek "down the river." Under these circumstances
the Administration's only recourse was to wait until the
Communists gained control of Formosa, which they believed
44was inevitable. Once the Communist had control of the
r%
mainland and Formosa the civil war would end and China
would be a unified nation under one government. American
policy-makers hoped that as soon as this had taken place,
45recognition would follow in due time. However, before 
such a situation was to occur, the Korean War broke out, 
and as a result American policy toward Formosa was 
drastically altered.
The United States' policy toward China, during the 
period 1947-50, was based on the realities of the situation 
as viewed by the Truman Administration. A pblicy of contain­
ment was not pursued in China, although such a policy was 
being pursued in Europe, because Truman did not believe a 
policy of containment could be successful in China. Ameri­
can policy-makers stated that all their information indicated 
nothing short of a full-scale American intervention would 
have saved the nationalist regime, and it was questionable
A C
whether even such an intervention would have been successful.
4 4Blum, ojo. cit., pp. 109-110.
45Ibid., p. 110.
46Ibid., p. 107.
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She United States faced an entirely different situation in 
China then it did in Europe. In Europe there was every 
indication that American objectives, the economic recovery 
and military security of the region, could be achieved, 
whereas in China no such assurance offered itself. In 
Western Europe, most of the people viewed' Communism as an 
external force that was seeking domination. In China, 
however, according to Dean Acheson "the foreign domination 
had been masked behind the facade of a vast crusading move­
ment which apparently (was seen by) many Chinese to be
47wholly indigenous and national." Under these circumstances 
a policy of containment would have been to no avail. The 
policy of containment to function successfully, had to have 
the people's support in resisting Communism; this was not 
the case in China.
The Containment Policy, therefore, for all intents 
and purposes, during the period 1947-1949, was a policy that 
applied exclusively to Western Europe. Its objective was 
the security of Western Europe which involved the stemming 
of Soviet expansion in that area. In practice, containment 
was a regional policy, based on a balance of power concept 
rather than an ideological conflict despite the rhetorical 
flourishes. The concept of an ideological conflict seems 
to have been introduced in an attempt to obscure the reality 
of a balance of power strategy, a strategy condemned and
47The China White Paper, op. cit., p. xv.
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detested by a large segment of the American people and 
blamed for causing the First World War.
The globalization of containment in terms of 
operational commitments as well as rhetoric was to begin 
with the outbreak of the Korean War.
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CONTAINMENT EXTENDED TO ASIA:
The Korean War
The decision,by President Truman and his advisers
to disengage the United States from the Chinese Civil War,
made it clear that his administration intended to make the
security of Western Europe the prime objective of their
efforts. In order to meet the heavy demands of their
European commitment, American policy-makers, felt that
the U. S. commitment in Asia had to be limited."*' In early
1950 the Truman Administration made their desire to limit
.American commitments in Asia known publically in a series
of announcments. Early in January, 1950 Truman announced
the United States would not protect the island of Formosa.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson on January, 12, 1950, in a
speech before the National Press Club, amplified Truman's
earlier announcement. In this speech Acheson defined the
United States defense strategy in the Far East. He stated:
(The United States) defensive perimeter runs along 
the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. 2
Davids, oj d. cit. , p. 436.
02
Full text of speech in Department of State Bulletin, 
January 23, 1950, pp. 111-119.
‘ 30
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The Philippines because of its special relationship was 
accorded special mention in the American strategy. The 
"defensive perimeter" defined by the then Secretary of 
State, noticeably excluded, both Formosa and South Korea.
Some critics of the Truman Administration later claimed 
that this statement of American security interest in Asia, 
excluding South Korea, encouraged the Forth Koreans to 
attack, because it led the latter to believe that the 
United States would make no response. Acheson's speech, 
however, merely reflected the Truman Administration's 
belief that the next war would be a world-war and that 
Europe was likely to be its site. Under such circumstances 
Formosa and South Korea were not considered to be strate- 
gically important to the United States. In no way did 
Acheson insinuate that the areas omitted from the "defensive 
perimeter" were to be automatically forfeited to the Com­
munists. On the contrary, he made it perfectly clear that 
any Communist aggression in the area should be met, but
that it would have to be met by the nation attacked and the
United Nations. Further on in the speech Acheson had stated
It must be clear that no person can guarantee these 
areas against military attack. But it must also be 
clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or 
necessary within the realm of practical relationships. 
Should such an attack occur - one hesitates to say 
where such an armed attack could come from - the 
initial reliance must be on the people attacked to
^David Rees, Korea: The limited War , (New York,
1964), p. 23.
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resist it and then upon the commitments of the 
entire civilized world under the Charter of the 
United Nations which so far has not proved a 
weak reed to lean on by any people who are 
determined to protect their independence against 
outside agression. 4
The North Korean attack on South Korea, June 24,
1950, cauised American policy-makers to reevaluate their 
stated position in the Ear East. In early 1950 the United 
States had primarily thought of Korea in terms of its 
strategic significance in the context of America's military 
concept of "total-war." The military leaders concurred, 
with the policy-makers' belief that the next war involving 
the United States would be a global war, in which case 
"Korea would be of relatively minor importance." American 
military strategists had further concluded that Korea in 
a global war, would be almost impossible to defend in any 
event.^ The security of South Korea thus was viewed pri­
marily, from the point of military strategy, with the poli­
tical significance of its security never seriously considered. 
No thought was given to the possible repercussions on Ameri­
can policy if the Communists were to expand its control over 
South Korea, because American policy-makers never anticipated 
an isolated Communist attack but rather thought in terms of 
a global confrontation. The invasion of South Korea led to 
a re-appraisal by American policy-makers of both the situation
^Department of State Bulletin, op. cit., Jan. 23> 1950.
5 i
Mathew B. Ridgeway, The Korean War, (Garden City, 
1967), p. 7."
- 6Ibid., p. 7.
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of South Korea and their Asian policy in general.
The United States originally viewed the attack on
South Korea as the first explosion in a far greater con- 
7
flict. In the spring of 1950, American intelligence 
reports had claimed "that the Communists in many parts of 
the world were preparing a pattern of conquest for (that)
g
summer." Based on the information they had received the 
aggression in Korea was viewed hy American decision-makers 
as merely a first step in a greater Communist onslaught. 
Inherent in the United States' interpretation of the North 
Korean attack was the assumption that the Kremlin was
Q
ultimately responsible for the aggression. This interpre­
tation rendered the political importance of South Korean 
security in American policy unquestionable.• The Truman 
Administration felt that the Kremlin was using Korea as a 
testing site, in which American determination and will power
7
Michael Donelan, The Ideas of American Foreign 
.Policy, (London, 1963), p. 149.
g
Hanson Baldwin, New York Times, July 2, 1950 quoted 
by Alexander George, "American Policy-Making and the North 
Korean Aggression" in Korea And The Theory of Limited War, ed. 
by Allen Guttman, (Boston, 1967), p. 67. See also Truman, 
Memoirs, Vol. II, ojo. cit., p. 331. In Baldwin's account the 
word "Communist" is used while Truman in his account uses the 
term "Soviet". It is evident, however, both men meant the 
Soviets.
q
Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II, ojd. cit. , p. 336, Rees, 
op. cit. , p. 19, Alexander George, ojo. cit., p. 67, John W. 
Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy And The Korean War, 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1959), in 23•
For a statement of the opposite view, see Wilbur H. 
Hitchcock, "North Korea Jumps the Gun," Current History,
March, 1951, pp. 136-144.
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to resist Communist military expansion was being tested.
The Administration felt if the U.S. failed to make an
appropriate response to the situation, there would be far-
ranging repercussions. Truman and his advisers concluded
that if the United States did not meet this Soviet challenge,
the Soviets would succeed:
... in demonstrating to the world their (Soviet) own 
strength and resolution, and conversely, American 
fear and unreliability; in disintegrating the Western 
alliance; in forestalling the creation of a situation 
of strength in the Pacific; and in frightening the 
leaders of the neutralist nations of Southeast Asia 
and the Middle East. The resulting power vacuums 
would provoke further acts of aggression and render 
World War III inevitable ... 11
Korea, therefore, was regarded by American decision-makers
as an extension and related to the "dangerous conflict of
Russo-American power politics"in Europe. In viewing the
Worth Korean aggression in this context, President Truman,
his political advisers and his military advisers were in
12complete agreement - the Soviet challenge had to be met.
The first action the United States took was to alert 
the Security Council of the United Nations of the North 
Korean aggression. The American desire to see U.N. partici­
pation in meeting the Korean situation seems to have been
^Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy And The 
Korean War, op. cit., p. 29, Tang Tsftu, op. cit., p. 557.
■^Spanier, Ibid., p. 29-
^Carl Berger, The Korean Knot, (Philadelphia, 1957),
p. 108.
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three fold: first, the aggression was thought to be a
direct challenge to the whole system of collective security, 
and thus it fell under the auspicies of the United Nations.
It was also consistent with the earlier stated position 
of the United States, that any Communist aggression in an 
area not included in the United States' "defensive perimeter" 
should be met by the United Nations. Secondly, the United 
Nations was already involved in Korea. Ernest Gross, Ameri­
can deputy representative at the United Nations stated, "the 
North Korean attack was an 'invasion upon a state which the 
United Nations, itself, by action of its General Assembly, 
had brought into being. It is armed aggression against the 
Government elected under United Nations supervision.1" ^
And finally, the "American depreciation of power and un­
willingness to recognize and accept power as a factor in 
human affairs (made) it psychologically necessary to ration­
alize actions in the international arena in terms of ideo-
15logical objectives and universal moral principles."
On June 25, 1950, the United Nations Security Council 
adopted a resolution, drafted by the United States, which 
declared,
~^Ibid., p. 108., Leland M. Goodrich, Korea A Study of 
U.S. Policy in the United Nations, (New York, 1956), 
pp. 102-103.
“^ Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy And The 
Korean War, op. cit., p. 39.
15Ibid., p. 40.
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that the action of the North Korean forces constituted 
"a breach of the peace," called for "the immediate 
cessation of hostilities," called upon the North 
Korean authorities "to withdraw forthwith their armed 
forces to the thirty-eighth parallel," requested the 
United Nations Commission to submit its recommendations 
and to keep the Council informed of the execution of 
the resolution, and called upon all Members "to render 
every assistance to the United Nations in the execution 
of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance 
to the North Korean authorities. 16
This U.S. resolution made it clear-that the desired objective
in Korea was the re-establishment of the status quo*ante bel'lum.
American leaders pessimistic about the probability 
of North Korean compliance with the U.N. resolution, under­
took some unilateral action in meeting the Korean crisis.
In a press statement on June 26, it was announced that
American arms and equipment would be sent to the South
17Korean forces from American bases in Japan.• On the follow­
ing day, June 27, President Truman announced additional 
American action. The President declared that American naval
and air forces had been ordered "to give the Korean Govern-
1 ft
ment troops cover and support " and the Seventh Fleet had 
been ordered into the Formosa Straits to neutralize the 
island of Formosa. The Seventh Fleet was to prevent, if
Goodrich, ojd. cit. , pp. 105-106. The resolution 
was passed by a 9 to 0 vote with Yugoslavia abstaining.
The Soviet Union's representative was absent at the time, 
in a protest, which had begun in early January, against the 
Council's refusal to unseat the Chinese Nationalist 
representative.
17Goodrich, ojd. cit. , p. 107.
■^Truman', Memoirs, Vol. II, ojo. cit. , p. 339-
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ne’cessary, ""both a Chinese Communist invasion of the
1 9island and Nationalist forays toward the mainland." In 
addition Truman announced he had directed that the Ameri­
can forces in the Philippines "be strengthened and that 
military assistance to the Philippine Government be accel-
*7
erated," and similarly, "the acceleration of American
military assistance to the forces of Prance and the Associa-
20 . . ted States in Indochina." A U.S. military mission was
21
also ordered to Indo-China to work with those forces.
The decision to neutralize Formosa, was explained
by Truman as an effort ."to prevent Communist action that
22might enlarge the area of conflict." While this was 
the intention of.'the action, in effect it "enlarged the 
struggle in Asia from one of resisting North Korean aggres­
sion to one of frustrating the ambitions of Red China with
23respect to Formosa." The American action with respect
19Rees, 0£. cit., p. 23., Truman, Ibid., p. 339.
20Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II, ojd. cit., p. 339.
21Ibid., p. 339.
22Rees, ojd. cit., p. 23. Tang Ts6u:, suggests that a 
memorandum on Formosa, by MacArthur prior to the North 
Korean aggression, which stressed the strategies interests 
of the United States in denying Formosa to the Communist 
might have had some influence on Truman's decision although 
the degree of influence cannot be determined, (Tang Tsau, op. 
cit., pp. 559-561). Goodrich observed: "It is quite
possible that the neutralization of Formosa was a condition 
set by the Joint Chiefs for their consent to the State Depart­
ment's proposal to come to the assistance of the Republic of 
Korea with armed forces." (Goodrich, ojd. cit., p. 111.)
23Davids, ojo. cit. , p. 439.
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to Formosa, with its possible consequences alarmed many
U.N. members. They felt the United States had not presented
any concrete evidence "that the action was necessary to the
attainment of the limited objective set forth in the
24Security Council's resolution." Some U.N. members feared
that Truman's decision to connect the 'question of Formosa
to the Korean crisis might, broaden the scope of the action
25and be a gratuitous offence to Communist China. However, 
in view of the importance of whole-hearted American support 
for U.K. efforts to meet the North Korean aggression, dis­
gruntled members could do little but voice their fears to 
each other and the United States, though their disagreement
with American action regarding Formosa was to create "serious
2 6rifts in the conduct of the Korean War."
Communist China's response to the presence of the 
Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Straits was immediate. Cho.u 
En-lai, Prime Minister as well as Foreign Minister of Commun­
ist China, on June 28th, denounced American action "as armed
aggression against the territory of China in total violation
27of the United Nations Charter." While the Feting regime 
24Goodrich, o£. cit., p. 110.
*^Ibid., p. 110.
26Davids, ojd. cit., p. 439.
27Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, The 
Decision to Enter The Korean War, (New York, 19&0), p. 58.
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was infuriated there was no indication at that time that 
Communist China would actively support the' North Koreans 
in their fight against the American "imperialists." However, 
it is quite evident that the neutralization of Formosa was 
the first in a series of developments which subsequently
T
5
led to the Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean 
War. The final decision by the Chinese to enter the war 
was not based on the Formosa question, but. having been 
frustrated by the United States in their desire to gain 
control of Formosa, the Peking regime later became more
Op
concerned with events in Korea.
The American main effort in meeting the North Korean
aggression was carried out in the name of the United Nations.
29While this was done for reasons already mentioned, it is 
quite clear that the United States had been willing, if it 
had had no alternative, to act unilaterally in meeting the 
Communist challenge in Korea. This is supported by the 
fact that President Truman announced that American naval 
and air support would be given to ROK forces ten hours 
before the U.N. resolution was passed endorsing American 
action and providing for an international military effort
28Communist China's decision to enter the Korean 
War is discussed later in this chapter.
o
^Vide Supra, p. 35.
30Abbreviation for Republic of Korea. Hereafter 
referred to as ROK.
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3 1to aid South Korea. Undoubtedly, had the United Nations 
decided not to act in Korea, the course of American action 
taken would have been altered, but the fact remains the 
United States would have made the commitment anyway.
Arnold Wolfers states that even with U.N. participation,
*7
3
the character of the action in Korea must be 
judged by the decisions and acts of the United 
States and its associates. It would seem 
permissible, in fact, to concentrate on the 
conduct of the United States because the other 
nations which made contributions to the defense 
of South Korea might conceivably have done so 
as friends and allies of the United States ... 32
On June 27th President Truman,hoping that American 
action had convinced the Kremlin of American determination 
to meet the challenge in Korea,sent a note to the Soviet 
Government in an effort to bring a quick halt to the Korean 
crisis. The message asked the Soviets to disavow any 
responsibility for the aggression and "to use its influence 
with the North Korean authorities to withdraw their invad­
ing f o r c e s . T h e  Kremlin did not comply with the American 
request but it is doubtful it was because they questioned 
American determination. In fact before the Soviets did
31 ^Referring to U.N. resolution passed on June 27, 
Truman's announcement came at 12 noon, the U.N. resolution 
was passed at 10:45 P.M. (Goodrich, ojd. cit. , p. 113).
32Arnold Wolfers, "Collective Security And The War 
In Korea", in Arnold Wolfers, Discord And Collaboration, 
(Baltimore, 1962), p. 172.
•2*2
Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy And 
The Korean War, _op. cit., p. 32.
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reply to the Washington petition the U.N. had also rein- 
forced its earlier resolution in passing a second resolu­
tion on the Korean crisis recommending "that members of 
the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic
of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and
» 3 4
restore international peace and security in the area."
The Soviet reply on June 29th, stated "that it considered
the events in Korea to be part of the internal affairs of
Korea, and declared Soviet opposition to foreign inter- '
35
vention in the domestic concerns of other nations."
The Soviets therefore opposed both American action and 
U.N. policy.
Washington was relieved by the Soviet note, despite
the fact that the Soviets were clearly opposed to American 
36policy. Acheson interpreted the Soviet reply to mean
37
that the Soviet Union, itself, would not interfere in Korea. 
That ended the Truman Administration's fear that the attack
70
on Korea was merely a Soviet diversionary act. Prior to
3 4
Hearings Before The Committee On Armed Services And 
The Committee On Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress, 
1st Session "TEe Military Situation in the Far East", 
(Washington, B.C., 1951), p. 5371.
3 5
Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy And The 
Korean War, op. cit., p. 33.
56Ibid., p. 33.
37Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 342.
7Q
Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy And The 
Korean War, op. cit., p. 33.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
that time, President Truman had displayed a great reluctance
to commit American ground forces to Korea, despite General
MacArthur's insistence that ground forces were necessary
if the Republic of Korea was to he saved. Truman, in his
Memoirs recalls his reluctance at the time:
I wanted to take every step necessary to push the 
North Koreans hack behind the 38th parallel. But 
I wanted to he sure that we would not become so 
overly committed in Korea that we could not take 
care of such other situations as might develop. 39
However, once Truman, greatly influenced by Acheson's 
evaluation of Soviet intent, was convinced that the Soviets 
did not intend to become directly involved in Korea, he 
immediately followed MacArthur's recommendation and dis­
patched U.S. ground forces.
American response to the North Korean aggression 
signalled the beginning of the active pursuance of the 
containment policy in Asia. While there was the need to 
meet the aggression if the validity of concept of collective 
security established in the United Nations was to be pre­
served, American decision-makers seemed to have based their 
Korean decision in the context of the East-West power struggle. 
Up until that time the containment policy had been based on 
the belief that this struggle was to be carried out in
Europe. After the North Korean aggression, while Europe
£
still remained the primary center of the struggle as fpr 
39Truman, Memoirs Yol. II, op. cit., p. 341. The 
"other situations" that Truman referred to were primarily 
in Europe. Ibid., p. 341.
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most American leaders were concerned, the U.S. came to
believe that the power struggle could be won or lost in
secondary theaters, which for the United States meant 
40Asia. Again referring to Truman's Memoirs it states:
We let it be known that we considered the Korean 
situation vital as a symbol of the strength and 
determination of the West, firmness now (in Korea) 
would be the only way to deter new actions in 
other parts of the world. Not only in Asia but 
in Europe, ... the confidence of people adjacent 
to the Soviet Union would be adversely affected 
in our judgement, if we failed to take action ... .
If, however, the threat to South Korea was met 
firmly and successfully, it would add to our 
successes in Iran, Berlin and Greece a fourth 
success in opposition to the aggressive moves of 
the Communists. And each success, we suggested 
to our allies, was likely to add caution to the 
Soviets in undertaking new efforts of this kind. 41
It is apparent then, that Truman had come to believe that 
if containment was to be successful in Europe, it would 
have to be a global policy as announced initially in the 
Truman Doctrine. This conviction differed from the Presi­
dent's previous position with regard to the Chinese Civil 
War. The Korean War, for the United States, therefore, 
became first a war to contain communist expansion and 
second, a war to uphold the principle of collective 
security. American policy-makers, however, did not make a 
clear distinction between the two.
^Brown, op. cit., p. 59*
^Truman, Memoirs, Yol. II., ££. cit., pp. 339-340.
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42By the time U.S. forces reached South Korea, the
military situation had deteriorated to the point where the
North Koreans seemed assured of victory. The arrival of
the U.N. forces had no immediate effect in "turning the
tide" of the war in South Koreans' favor. Only after some
weeks of continual Battle and "brilliant" military strategy
45on the part of General MacArthur, Commander of the U.N. 
forces in Korea, did the military situation swing in favor 
of the allies, finally, by September, 1950, the U.N. forces 
had successfully driven the North Korean forces back beyond 
the thirty-eighth parallel. Once the thirty-eighth parallel 
had been secured by the U.N. forces, the question of whether 
or not to cross the parallel came to the forefront.
This was a delicate question involving matters of 
both military tactics and political policy. Tactically it 
was impossible to achieve a complete defeat of the North 
Korean forces TtTT if the United Nations forces were not 
allowed to cross this line.^ Politically, there were 
other considerations.
In the early days of the Korean War, the political 
abjective of the United States and the United Nations had
42Goodrich states: At the end of 1951, close to
two-thirds of the total force in Ko^ea under the United 
Nations Command had been contributed by the United States. 
((Goodrich, ojo. cit. , p. 117).
45Rees, oj3. cit. , Chapter V.
^Tang Tsf^ u, ajL cit. , p. 569.
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had been the restoration of the status quo ante helium. 
Geographically this meant the re-establishment of the 
thirty-eighth parallel as the boundary between Worth and 
South Korea. This objective had been achieved by the end 
of September, 1950. Accordingly the next logical step 
would have been the establishment of a truce, followed by 
negotiations, in which the parties involved would have con­
firmed the boundary between the two Korean regimes. This 
was not to occur.
With the repercussions of a divided Korea before 
them, and noting the past record of failures by the United 
Nations to unite Korea through negotiations, American 
leaders, as early as the beginning of August, pondered the 
thought of going beyond the parallel and completely crush­
ing the aggressor. Starting in August, 1950, American 
officials in public statements began to speak more and more 
of a united Korea rather than a restoration of the status 
quo. American Ambassador to the United Nations, Austin, in 
a debate in the Security Council on August 17, "declared 
that the General Assembly in adopting its resolutions on 
Korea in 1947, 1948 and 1949" had sought the establishment
of a united and independent Korea, and the U.N. should not
45turn from these objectives. Austin ended his speech say­
ing: "The opportunity is here. The place is here. The
46time is at hand. Only the word and the deed are lacking."
45Ibid., p. 570.
46Ibid., p. 570
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These sentiments were reinforced in early September by 
Secretary of State Acheson, who said that crushing the
North Korean aggression was not the end of the United
47 ■'Nations' objective. Two days later, Dean Rush, then
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Ear Eastern Affairs, 
in reviewing the general lines of America's Ear Eastern 
Policy stated that "the United Nations must have an oppor­
tunity to give effect to its long-standing policy in favor 
of a free and united Korea along the lines set forth in 
the resolutions of the General Assembly over the past 
three years."48
The shift in the United States political objectives 
in Korea cannot be explained with any certainty in terms 
of one event or factor. However, it does appear that the 
optimism of General MacArthur that a united Korea was 
possible militarily without any serious threat of enlarging 
the conflict, was extremely influential. Of a much lesser 
influence, yet still a factor, were the repeated warnings 
from the South Korean government that it would not be satis­
fied with any agreement or settlement that left Korea divided. 
Additionally of course was the underlying traditional belief 
that the objective in any military conflict was total victory.
Although American officials tooh the lead in express-
47Department of State Bulletin, September 18, 1950, 
pp. 450-51.
48Ibid., p. 467.
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ing this "new” objective to he sought in Korea, they were 
not alone. Secretary-G-eneral lie, stated that "it would 
'not he enough' to hring ahout the withdrawal of the North 
Koreans to the thirty-eighth parallel and that 'the aim 
of the United Nations (was) and must be a united and inde-
t
j
pendent Korea in which all of the people of Korea are able
40
to freely seek a government of their own choosing!"
On September 11, 1950 Truman made the decision to
extend military operations beyond the thirty-eighth parallel.
Truman, on that day, approved a Joint Chiefs' directive
which authorized General MacArthur,
... to conduct the necessary military operations 
either to force the North Koreans behind the 38th 
parallel or to' destroy their forces. If there wa’a 
no indication of a threat of entry of Soviet or 
Chinese Communist elements in force, the National 
Security Council recommended that General MacArthur 
was to extend his operations north of the parallel 
and to make plans for the occupation of North Korea. 
However, no ground operations were to take place 
north of the 38th parallel in the event of Soviet 
or Chinese Communist entry. 50
Later in September another directive was transmitted to 
MacArthur which authorized him to conduct military operations 
north of the thirty-eighth parallel. This directive contain­
ed specific restrictions to be observed in carrying out this 
operation. As in the first directive, MacArthur was author­
ized to cross the parallel only if at the time there was no 
indication that the Soviets or Chinese Communists intended
49
Tang fsoui* ££• > P- 570-71.
50Truman, Memoirs Vol. II., op. cit., p. 359.
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to counter such, operations.MacArthur was further instructed,
... that under no circumstances were any of his forces 
to cross the Manchurian or U.S.S.R. borders of Korea, 
and, as a matter of policy, no non-Korean ground 
forces were to be used in the provinces bordering on 
the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian 
border. Similarly, support of his operations north 
or south of the 38th parallel by air or naval action 
against Manchuria or the U.S.S.R. territory was 
specifically ruled out. 51
The General Assembly adopted a resolution on October
7, 1950, (despite doubts expressed by some Asian and Arab
nations, especially India), which in effect "placed the
seal of the United Nations' Approval on the Unified Command's
proposal to complete the destruction of the North Korean
52armed forces and pacification of North Korea." While the 
General Assembly'*s authorization was of substantial value, 
in that it justified the American position, the real deci­
sion had already been made in Washington. MacArthur had 
sent the first South Korean troops across the parallel on 
October 1, six days before the U.N. resolution.
The United States decision to meet the North Korean 
aggression really meant that the area of "containment" had 
been expanded to include the Par East. Yet, although the 
area of containment was expanded, Europe maintained its 
primacy in American policy planning. While the military 
conflict centered in the Korean peninsula, the United States, 
nonetheless increased its military commitments to Western
51Ibid., p. 360.
52Goodrich, ojo. cit. , pp. 133-134.
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Europe during the war. This action was in keeping with 
the American belief, that Europe, not Korea, was the 
ultimate target of the Communist "conquest." Many of the 
decisions of the Truman Administration concerning Korea 
in fact were based on what they believed was necessary in 
the maintenance of Western European security. For Truman 
and his advisers the Korean crisis paralleled the Greek 
crisis in 1947, in that it constituted a challenge of 
wills between East and West.
The influence of the theory of containment was even 
evident in the United States' military conduct of the Korean 
War. America's original objective in Korea was to achieve 
the re-establishment of the border dividing the two Koreas, 
prior to the outbreak of the conflict. At the same time 
the United States wished to prevent the conflict from escal­
ating into a possible atomic confrontation between the two 
superpowers. In order to prevent this possibility the con­
cept of limited war was introduced in Korea. General Ridge­
way in his book’The Korean War describes the concept of 
limited war:
A limited war is not merely a small war that has not 
grown to full size. It is a war which the objectives 
are specifically limited in light of our national 
interest and our current capabilities. 54
55^Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy And The 
Korean War, op. cit., p. 33-
54Ridgeway, ojo. cit. , p.. 245.
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The traditional concept of war was inadequate in Korea
because it was open-ended - "it had no clearly delineated
geographical, political and military goals beyond 
55'victory'". In that sense it is a war "that may escalate
itself indefinitely, as wars will, with one success re-
56quiring another to insure the first." That is exactly 
what the world wished, to avoid in Korea.
Even after the United States expanded its objective 
in Korea, the concept of limited war was maintained, des­
pite the violent objection of General MacArthur. However, 
the Truman Administration, their allies and even the Soviet 
Union apparently realized that to pursue the traditional 
concept of war in the atomic age might prove to be suicidal. 
Otherwise, the Korean War may have meant "the turning back
of civilization by several thousand years, with no one left
57capable of signaling the victory."
When the Truman Administration decided it would 
attempt to unify Korea, the policy of containment was temp­
orarily abandoned. Containment, in essence, was a policy to 
maintain the "status quo"; the unification of Korea, on the 
other hand, meant a change in the ante bellum Korean
55Ibid., p. 245- 
56Ibid., p. 245. 
57Ibid., p. 245.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
51
58situation. The concept of containment had originally 
been adopted by the Truman Administration because it was 
their belief that the policy would stem Soviet expansion 
and at the same time prevent the outbreak of another World 
War. The Administration's decision of September, 1950, 
therefore, must have been based on their belief that Korea 
offered the United States an opportunity not only to stem 
Communist expansion but in fact to "roll back" the line of 
Soviet control, without the risk of global confrontation. 
Such an opportunity had not existed in Europe.
The decision to extend military operations into the 
North proved to be a disastrous one for the United Nations— ■ 
but especially for the United States and the people of 
Korea. As a result of this action, the Chinese Communist 
intervened in the war, and the Korean War became intensified 
and drawn out as the threat of global war was renewed.
The United States decision to attempt to unify Korea 
by means of a military victory and the U.N. approval of this 
objective had been based on the assumption that neither the 
Soviet Union nor Communist China would intervene in the war 
in an attempt to prevent the achievement of that goal. And 
yet, Peking, since the latter part .of August had voiced its 
increasing concern over the developments in Korea, and their 
relationship to China's own security. On September 30, the
58It may be argued that the division of Korea was 
not officially recognized, nonetheless, the division did 
exist.
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day before the ROK forces under^the United Nations Command
first crossed the thirty-eighth parallel, Communist China's
Premier Chou En-lai publically declared:
The Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate 
foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate 
seeing their neighbors being savage.ly invaded.
Whoever attempts to exclude nearly ;’500 million 
people from the United Nations and "whoever ignore 
and violate the interest of this one-fourth of 
mankind and fancy vainly to solve arbitrarily 
any Par Eastern problem directly concerned with 
China, will certainly break their skulls. 59
After the first ROK units "crossed the thirty-eighth parallel,
and MacArthur broadcast his ultimatum, ordering Pyongyang
to surrender," Chau En-lai informed the Indian Ambassador
in Peking, that should U.S. ground troops invade North
60Korea, China would enter the war. The Indian Ambassador
promptly informed American sources of the warning. Similar
information was also given to the United States from other
sources and American intelligence reported a heavy build-up
of Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria. The threat of
Chinese intervention was nevertheless minimized by American
leaders, who believed that Chou En-lai's threats "were a
bald attempt to blackmail the United Nations by threats of
61intervention in Korea." The United Nations at the time 
was deliberating over a resolution that would recommend
59Tang Tso.u, ojo. cit. , pp. 572-573. Goodrich, op. 
cit., p. 139.
^Whiting, ojo. cit., p. 108.
61Truman, oj d. cit. , p. 362.
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"that all appropriate steps he taken to insure stability
throughout all of Korea."
While Washington for the most part minimized the
Chinese Communist threats, -it did take a precautionary
measure and sent MacArthur a directive, authorizing him
to engage Peking forces in Korea, only as long as in his
judgement, such action offered a reasonable chance of 
6 2success. While the Truman Administration was again re­
emphasizing their desire to limit the Korean conflict, they 
left the ultimate decisions concerning military operation 
up to MacArthur to interpret. On October 7, the first 
American ground forces crossed the thirty-eighth parallel,
and within a week of that event the first Chinese Communist
63troops crossed the falu River.
The entrance of Communist China into the Korean War, 
drastically changed the entire complexion of the war. 
Militarily, by late 1950, the Communist had once again re­
gained the advantage. The United Ration forces at that time 
were forced back behind the thirty-eighth parallel and there 
was some speculation that they might be forced to retreat 
from the entire Korean peninsula.
The Communist military success presented the Truman 
Administration with a grave decision. It had to decide 
whether or not the war was to be extended to China. General
62Whiting, ojo. cit. , p. 111.
65Ibid., pp. 114-115.
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MacArthur insisted, after the Communist Offensive in Novem­
ber, that such a course was imperative if his forces were 
to he victorious. While the Administration desired a 
military victory, they were aware of the political consider­
ations that had to he taken into account, before a decision 
on whether or not to carry the war to China could be met. 
Political considerations were of paramount importance in 
Korea because the military operations were being conducted 
under the flag of the United Nations. Almost every U.N. 
member had expressed their opinion at various times, that 
they were opposed to any enlargement of the war.
Then Secretary of Defense Marshall in discussing 
the diplomatic aspects of the situation in Korea had stated 
that it was his opinion,
... (that) it (was) essential for the United States 
to go along with the United Nations approach to the 
Korean question, even if going along with the United
Nations meant some difficult problems .........  it
(was) essential for (the U.S.) to keep a unanimity 
of approach in the U.N. 64
Marshall further stated that the three American Service
Secretaries agreed that it was most important that the United
States not become involved "either individually or with the
6 5United Nations in a general war with China."
At the same decision-making meeting at which Marshall 
spoke, Secretary of State Acheson also expressed his opposition
^Truman, ojd. cit. , p. 586.
65Ibid., p. 386.
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to any extension of the war. A^cheson explained his position
from the standpoint of America's overall foreign policy:
We had hanked our foreign policy on the idea of 
keeping Russia contained, and we had succeeded 
in repulsing her attempts to break out. If we 
allowed the Russians now to trap us inside their 
perimeter, however, we would run the risk of 
being sucked into a buttomless piti There would 
be no end, and it would bleed us dfy. 66
A-cheson, therefore, was also opposed to a war with China,
because he believed it would hinder rather than assist the
main U.S. objective, the containment of Soviet expansion.
With President Truman, his advisers, except of
course General MacArthur, and U.K. members all in agreement,
the decision was made not to extend the war to China. Prom
this point on the'United States' avowed objective of uniting
Korea through a military victory is played down and replaced
by expressed desires to end hostilities. The re-establishment
of the status quo ante bellum seems to become once again
the main objective to be achieved by the United Rations and
the Truman Administration in the Korean conflict. Leland M.
Goodrich states in his book Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in
the United Rations, that during the period, December 1950
and early January 1951, when U.R. military operations in
Korea were at low tide, that,
There was a reluctant willingness, (on the part of 
the U.S.) as evidenced by the acceptance of the
66Ibid., p. 388.
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"Five Principles" ... to maintain the "coalition" 
intact, to agree to discuss certain political issues 
raised by the Chinese Communists in return for a 
cease-fire agreement which would provide for the 
withdrawal of North Korean and Chinese Communist 
forces back of the 38th parallel. Thus it can be 
said that during this period of uncertainty and 
adversity, the restoration of peace was accepted 
as an objective which to some extent took prece­
dence over the resolve to deny to the aggressor any 
possible fruits of aggression. 68
While the Truman Administration was adamant in its 
decision not to enlarge the conflict, General MacArthur 
was just as adamant in his belief that the war had to be 
carried to China. This sharp difference of opinion 
between the President and the General, caused U.K. members 
many anxious moments.
MacArthur not only disagreed with President Truman's 
policy of limitation, he openly ridiculed it. In a final 
attempt to force Truman to change his policy, MacArthur 
appealed directly to the U.S. Congress and the American 
people. MacArthur's actions and statements instilled doubt 
and fear in some U.N. members. They began to doubt Truman's 
authority in the making of policy decisions, fearing he 
might be a mere figure-head and that the real decisions were 
made by some military complex. If this were the case, as
r  t-j
The Five Principles were a group of five proposals 
established by the General Assembly in the U.N. in an effo.rl; 
to find an acceptable negotiating position for both the 
United States and the Peoples' Republic of China. Communist 
China rejected them as an acceptable solution. The "Five 
Principles" are listed in Goodrich, ojo. cit., pp. 160-161.
66Ibid., p. 180.
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allies of the United States they feared that they might he 
drawn into a major war without previous consultation or 
choice. The Truman-MacArthur rift, therefore, often hindered 
U.S. - U.N. cooperation.
By March, 1951, the tide of the military battle in
*7
5
Korea shifted in favor of the U.K. forces. President Truman
decided that because of the more favorable military situation,
the time was ripe to begin a new approach to a negotiated
cease-fire. Truman in his Memoirs recalls his reasoning
behind his decision.
... since we had been able to inflict heavy casualties 
on the Chinese and were pushing them bach to and beyond 
the 38th parallel, it would be in their interest (the 
Communists) as much as ours to halt the fighting. 69
On March 24, the day Truman was to release a statement declar­
ing the United States desire for a cessation of hostilities, 
MacArthur issued a statement "that was entirely at cross­
purpose" with the statement Truman intended but never did 
release that day.7^ America's allies, who had known of 
Truman's intentions, became confused by MacArthur's statement
and immediately rushed inquiries to Washington to learn if
71there had been a sudden shift in the President's policy. 
President Truman became increasingly disturbed with MacArthur, 
who continued to misrepresent "official" American policy.
69. Truman, ojo. cit., p. 438.
7?Ibid., p. 440.
71Ibid., p. 442.
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It had come to the point where the General was not only
i
openly expressing his opposition to the President's 
policy hut he was also confusing American allies and foes 
alike*and therefore hindering American peace efforts in 
Korea. A few weeks later, General MacArthur wrote a
J
letter to House Minority leader, Joseph Martin, which
caused Truman to relieve MacArthur of his command. The
letter, read by Mr. Martin in the House of Representatives,
72
belittled President Truman's diplomatic efforts in Korea-.
In belittling the President's policy, MacArthur condemned
the concept of limited war and the policy of containment.
Truman felt he had no choice but to relieve MacArthur of
his duties as Commander of the U.N. forces because of this
open insubordination to his Commander-in-Chief, especially
since such actions were forestalling a possible settlement 
73in Korea.
General MacArthur's return to the United States 
set off a public protest against Truman's Korean policy. 
Americans who had grown disenchanted with the various 
aspects of Truman Administration's policies rallied together 
in support of the great General. The supporters of the 
General varied from those who were then opposed to the
72Ibid., p. 446.
75Ibid., p. 447.
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7 4Korean War, to those who rejected the concept of limited■*»«
war, the containment policy and the leadership of President
Truman. Many Americans dismayed by the American retreat
since the November Communist Offensive felt that MacArthur
had become a scapegoat for Truman's blunders. They did
s
not understand that MacArthur's open opposition to Truman's 
policy had greatly hindered the American war effort and 
caused a serious rift in ally cooperation. Por most, 
MacArthur remained the World War II hero who was being dis­
missed because he insisted on a military victory - the 
traditional American objective in war. To condemn a great 
man because of this was too much for many Americans to bear. 
They felt they could no longer remain silent as American 
failures mounted.
Americans of many political persuasions had become 
confused and contradictory in their wants. Por example, those 
who criticized the concept of "limited war" were pleased that 
the Korean War was waged below the level of a general war, yet 
at the same time they despised it because "it whittled down
^iQien the United States entered the Korean War, 
a Gallup Poll released showed that 81$ of the people polled 
were for the war and only 13$ opposed. In another release 
shortly after MacArthur's forced retreat by the Chinese,
66$ of the people polled favored pulling out and 25$ were 
opposed. Cited in Thomas A. Bailey", A Diplomatic History 
of the American People (New York, 1964), p. 821, p. 823.
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75the real superiority of the United States." Other 
Americans had come to "believe that Truman's policy of con­
tainment was nothing more than a policy of appeasement,
7603? a policy of fear. The rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine
had so overcome the American people, that they could not
tolerate a policy of "appeasement" or a policy that "brooked
compromises with the all-evil Communists. This attitude
was influencial in the following Administration's decision
77to adopt a stronger "anti-Mao and pro-Chiang policy," 
which would come to jeopardize America's entire Asian policy.
On July 10, while public criticism continued to rage 
in the United States, delegations representing "both sides in 
the Korean conflict began to meet at Kaesong, near the 
thirty-eighth parallel, for discussions "concerning the 
cessation of military activities and the establishment of
no
peace." These meetings continued with no substantial 
results until finally an impasse was reached. Despite the 
impasse, however, negotiations continued to take place off 
and on until 1953. During this period the fighting dragged 
on.
75Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Daugherty, "The 
lessons of Korea: War and The Power of Man" in Korea And 
The Theory of Limited War, op. cit., p. 82.
^Truman, ojo. cit., p. 4-57•
77Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World 
War II, op. cit., p. 98.
^^Truman, ojo. cit. , p. 459-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The American people displayed their dissatisfaction
■**«
with the Korean War in 1952, and elected a Republican
President, Dwight David Eisenhower. The Republicans had
based their presidential campaign on Eisenhower's pledge
to the American people to end the Korean War if elected.?1
President Eisenhower, however,*>upon assuming office, 
found, as had his Democratic predecessor, that the Communist 
were reluctant to conclude the war. The Eisenhower Adminis­
tration, finally frustrated by the lack of progress achieved 
at the negotiation table and irritated by the sporadic
Chinese Communist Offensives, .threatened the use of atomic
79weaponry if a truce was not soon arranged. Whether it was
the threat of an 'atomic attack, as Dulles and Eisenhower 
RObelieved, or whether it was the uncertainty that came over 
the Chinese- and North Korean leaders because of a change in 
Soviet leadership in 1953, or most likely a combination of 
the two, nonetheless negotiations did take.on a different 
nature with the Communists becoming more moderate in their 
demands. In late June 1953 an agreement was reached and a 
truce signed at Panmunjom at July 27, 1953, ending all 
military activity in Korea.
The armistice was almost disrupted by Syngman Rhee, 
the leader of the South Korean Republic who insisted that 
the conflict could not be settled as long as Korea remained
79Por more detail see Rees, ojo. cit. , pp. 417-420. 
80Ibid., pp. 418, 420.
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divided, and thus refused to comply with any armistice
based on such a division. Ehee's threats to resume the
conflict on his own, caused the United States and the
United Nations some anxious moments. American desires to
end the confrontation forced it to "buy-off" Ehee. In
return for Bhee's cooperation in complying with the truce,
the United States pledged itself "to train and equip a
South Korean army of twenty divisions, to extend some one
billion dollars in economic aid, and to conclude a mutual
security pact to protect South Korea against future
81Communist aggression." The mutual security pact with 
the South Korean Government was ratified by the U.S. Senate 
in January, 1954.
The armistice agreement of July 27, 1953 ended the 
military conflict in Korea, but the political settlement 
of the Korean question was left to be resolved at a later 
diplomatic conference.
The Korean War had a profound effect on the world 
leaders. Heads of Government faced the reality of a global 
power struggle between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, as well as a revival of Chinese power. Many came to 
realize that in lieu of these world realities they must 
re-evaluate their foreign policies. The possibility of an 
atomic war and consequently the possible annihilation of 
world became very real. If they were to insure their very
81Davids, ojo. cit. , p. 457.
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survival they realized they had to make every effort to 
prevent a future Korea, for there was no guarantee that 
the next time the two superpowers met, the conflict would 
be a limited one.
American leadership, during the Korean War, had
built up very little credit for itself either in Europe
82or Asia. Initially most U.K. members were pleased and 
impressed by the prompt American initiative in meeting the 
Korean crisis, in defense of the principle of collective 
security established in the United Nations. Yet, as the 
war continued, many of the members, especially the Arab 
and Asian members, became disillusioned by American 
motives and objectives. More and more it became apparent 
that American interests were taking precedent over United 
Nations interest, when the two may have conflicted. Neutrals 
and alliance partners of the United States discovered that 
there were disadvantages of following American decisions.
As for example, they found themselves in a war against 
Communist China, even though it was not in their interest, 
and they had expressed their desire to avoid it.
Unquestionably, the quick response by the United 
States to the North Korean aggression - thereby exhibiting 
its determination to face up to the Soviet challenge, was 
instrumental in preserving the then newly organized Atlantic
82Cottrell and Daugherty, ojo. cit. , p. 91, Richard 
Stebbins, The United States In World Affairs 1934, (New 
York, 1956TJ p* 8.
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Alliance. In fact during this^jperiod, the United States
increased its military assistance to the NATO allies,
and with the American leading the way the military strength
of the alliance was greatly strengthened. Yet, while
American allies were impressed with American efforts in
}
Europe, these governments were not ple'ased with all of 
American’s Asian policy. Some felt that the United States, 
by forestalling the "natural” integration of Eormosa with 
the Chinese mainland and by the use of its powerful 
influence to keep Red China out of the United Nations, was, 
in part responsible for the continued state of tension in 
the Ear East.8^
American 'prestige had declined especially in Asia 
by the end of the Korean War. Some Asians interpreted 
American efforts to unify Korea by means of a military 
victory, an act of white "imperialism", which caused the 
devastation of the Korean peninsula. The increased American 
involvement in Indochina on the French colonist side, rein­
forced these thoughts. In noting the U.S. involvement in 
Korea, Taiwan and Indochina, other Asians feared that the 
United States had embarked upon a program in which small 
Asian territories were to be used as pawns in America's 
gigantic power contest with the Soviet Union.
On the other hand, the prestige of the Communist . 
nations, the Soviet Union and Red China, was on the upswing
85Ibid., p. 91.
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in Asia at the end of the Korean War. Many Asians, desiring 
a quick end to the Korean conflict, were impressed with the 
various Soviet efforts to conclude a truce in Korea. These 
efforts overshadowed the fact that the conflict was started 
by a government whose troops were armed with Soviet weapons. 
Peking's ability to fight the most powerful Western nation 
to a stalemate commanded the respect of all Asian nations.
The United States emerged from its three year 
struggle in Korea as a scared nation. "Where it had once
felt itself as one of an alliance," after Korea, "it felt
84 85alone." As a nation it was "hurt and humorless."
Despite the fact that it had achieved its original objec­
tive in Korea, having been denied a clear victory, America 
lost much of its self-assurance. The moral defeat incurred 
by the Communists in Korea, increased America's determina­
tion to stand up to the Communists to a point where it 
was to evolve into an obsession.
American leaders then viewed China as the most 
powerful ally of the Soviet Communist empire. Communism, 
therefore, came to be viewed as a monolithic threat with 
Peking being an enemy in Asia of the same type as was the 
Soviet Union in Europe. This perception manifested itself
84Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff, The New Politics, 
(New York, 1962), p. 33.
85Ibid., p. 33-
Donelan, 0£. cit., p. 173.
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in the U.S.. post-Korean War policy.. Secretary of State 
Dulles ■was to bring into operation in Asia the full appara­
tus of European-style containment — "the. iron-clad military 
resistance on the free world's borders with Red China, the 
butteressing of Red China's neighbors with economic and
military assistance, .the building of perimeter alliances
ft 7
and the rejection of diplomacy."
The military aspect of the containment policy, which 
had begun with lATO, was reinforced during and after the 
Korean War. Collective defense alliances became the key­
stone of American foreign policy in Asia. During the Korean 
War defense pacts were signed with the Philippines, Japan, 
Australia and New Zealand, and another was concluded with 
South Korea at the end of the war.. The war in Korea taught 
the United States that "there must be no further power
vacuums into which the forces of Communist aggression could
88move with impunity." Even before the Korean War had ended, 
American policy-makers, were attempting to apply this lesson 
to Indochina..
871 b i d p. 173:..
88Thomas Mahoney "Lessons Prom Korea," The Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
July, 1951, Vol. 276, pp. 43-47.
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. CHAPTER III
CONTAINMENT IN ASIA
1954-1963 7
«
Up until the outbreak of the Korean War, as pre­
viously noted, the policy of containment as an operative 
policy pertained to Western Europe. While Korea marked 
the beginning of the United States' active pursuance of 
the containment policy in Asia, it was in the post-Korean 
period that the policy became clearly identifiable in its 
Asian context. Because containment has been and is the 
fundamental theme of American foreign policy in Asia, every 
Asian event dealing with either domestic affairs or exter­
nal affairs, during the 1954-1963 period examined here, had 
some affect on American policy. The type of affect varied 
of course with Washington's perception of the event's 
importance with regard to American policy. Therefore, a 
precise study of the Asian version of the containment policy 
would, in effect, involve a day-to-day account of all events 
during this period, which had in any way, shape or form 
some relation to it. Such a task is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. Rather, it will be the purpose of this 
chapter to identify and examine the main elements or instru-
67
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merits of the containment policy as they pertained to Asia.'*' 
during the ten year period 1954-1963 and to further attempt 
an evaluation regarding the appropriateness or inappropriate­
ness of such a policy in Asia. Insofar as there are various 
elements or instruments of the containment policy, the 
discussion of containment in this chapter will accordingly 
he divided into several subsections, each of which will 
deal with a specific aspect of the policy.
The Legacy of the Korean War
"The Korean War left its mark not only on American
attitudes and policies toward China but also on United
States security strategy throughout all of Asia and the 
2Pacific." Communist China's entry into the Korean War 
greatly affected American perceptions of the Peking regime. 
Prior to Red China's participation in Korea many American 
officials had viewed it as merely an unfriendly nation, but 
after Peking actively allied itself with North Korea, the 
United States tended to view Peking as a violently hostile
3
and aggressive ally of the Soviet Union. This American
^The discussion of containment in Asia in this 
dissertation does not include the area of the Middle East. 
American policy-makers have treated the Middle East as a 
distinct area rather than as part of their Asian policy.
2Blum, ojo. cit. , p. 158.
3
Ibid., p. 158. While this view is not clearly 
identifiable through the promouncements of the Truman 
Administration, it is quite evident under the Eisenhower 
Administration, led by Secretary of State John Poster Dulles.
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perception of a monolithic Communist threat gave impetus 
to a series of security arrangements between the United 
States and countries in the Pacific. In the latter half 
of 1951 American security treaties were signed with the 
Philippines, with Australia and hew Zealand (ANZUS) and 
with Japan. While Australia and New Zealand had desired 
a defense treaty with the United States because they wanted 
American reassurance against a resurgent Japan, Washington 
considered the treaty's chief value a defense against 
Communism.^
Growing Involvement In Indochina
Immediately after the outbreak of the Korean War, 
the United States accelerated its military assistance to 
the French in Indochina. Prior to that time overt American 
support of the French in Indochina, appeared to be tempered 
by a reluctance to be associated with what had been consider­
ed a colonial war. However, with the Worth Korean aggression, 
the United States' view of the war in Indochina shifted to 
become one of a definite struggle between Communism and the 
"free w o r l d . A m e r i c a ' s  interest and involvement in the
^Fred Greene, U.S. Policy .And The Security of Asia, 
(Hew York, 1968), p. 21.
5See Chapter 2, pp. 11-12. Truman, Memoirs, 
op. cit., p. 339.
^Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall eds., The 
Vietnam Reader, (New York, 1967), p. 54.
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Ind.och.ina war increased during.,the period of its involve­
ment in Korea, and was to continue after the Korean 
7
armistice. In fact, Indochina had become of such great con­
cern to American leaders that President Eisenhower stated, 
prior to the Korean armistice, that not only was peace in 
Korea necessary but "no less importantly, an end to the 
direct and indirect attacks upon the security of Indochina....
For any armistice in Korea that merely released aggressive
8armies to attack elsewhere would be fraud."
In July 1953, when the Korean Armistice was finally 
concluded, Indochina became the focal point of American 
interest in Asia. Eisenhower, himself, in the now famous 
"domino theory," expressed the rationale for U.S. involve­
ment in Indochina. He stated that the "loss of all Vietnam 
would have a disastrous material and psychological effect
on the security of nearby states, which might then topple
9
like a row of dominoes." The Korean Armistice, therefore, 
did not remove the conflict between the United States and 
the Communist world in Asia; rather it "only shifted the
■ , — — — — — I I M  .■ — — —  —  I , I — —  I ■! . 1  I. | 1^ ^ —  II
7The United States military assistance to the French 
in Indochina increased from $119 million in 1951 to $815 
million in 1954. In addition the Associated States of Indo­
china received approximately $25 million in economic aid. 
Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, Volume II
Vietnam at War, (New York, 1967),p. 808.
8Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 28,
April 27, 1953, p. 601.
Q
Greene, op. cit., p. 60.
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center of conflict from the napth to the south.”'*'0
By April 1954, the French military position in 
Indochina had deteriorated to the point where defeat was 
imminent, if it did not receive outside assistance.
Secretary of State John Foster Dullest aware of the French 
plight in Indochina, wished to ash the"* Congress for a 
joint resolution to permit the use of American air and 
naval power in support of the French in Indochina. Mr. 
Dulles' desires, however, did not correspond with the 
Congressional mood at the time, nor did it enjoy the 
complete approval of President Eisenhower. Both the Presi­
dent and the majority of U.S. Congressmen,with the trauma 
of Korea still lingering,felt that the United States should 
not Become directly involved in another Asianwar. This 
Belief was reinforced By the fact that such unilateral Ameri­
can action offered no guarantee of success But did carry the 
risk of involving American ground forces at a latter date. 
Dulles was instructed By President Eisenhower to consult 
with American allies and find out which allies might assist 
the United States if and when it decided to directly inter­
vene in the Indochina War.'*'"*" In diplomatic discussions,
■^Amry VandenBosch and Richard Butwell, The Changing 
Face of Southeast Asia, (Lexington, 1966), p. 174.
o
"^Chalmers M. Roberts, "The Day We Didn't Go To War',' 
in Marvin E. Gettleman, ed., Vietnam History, Documents and 
Opinions On A Major World Crisis, [Great Britain, 1966), 
pp. 104-105.
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Dulles was unable to convince J;he chief American ally,
Great Britain, to assist the United States in such an
intervention. The British Government made it perfectly
clear that it would not he a party to any such action,
because it felt that such action would seriously impede
12negotiations at the impending Geneva Conference.
Britain’s refusal to support American action coupled with 
his personal doubts concerning the success of such an 
intervention, apparently determined Eisenhower's decision 
not to involve the United States directly in the war in 
Indochina. President Eisenhower in explaining his decision 
stated:
If the United’ States sent its flag and its own 
military establishment - land, sea or air into 
the Indochina War, then the prestige of the U.S. 
would be engaged. ... We could not afford thus 
to engage the prestige of the United States and 
suffer a defeat which would have world-wide 
repercussions. 13
The French without the additional military assistance
were unable to hold their position in Indochina. ' In addition
to the steadily deteriorating military position, there was
mounting pressure on the French Government from its people
to end the war. The French populace had grown weary of the
war after eight years of fighting with no prospect of
success. The heavy strain that the mounting cost of the
war placed on the French economy was a further incentive to
12Ibid., p. 109.
1^
Victor Bator, Vietnam A Diplomatic Traged.y,
(Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1965), p. 220.
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the French government to seek an armistice. While the 
French wished to conclude an armistice, Secretary of State 
Dulles encouraged the French to continue their battle 
against the Communists. Yet Dulles could not change the 
French position, without a U.S. commitment to intervene 
on France's behalf, which Eisenhower refused to make.
At the Geneva Conference, which had originally 
been scheduled to deal with the Korean and Indochina ques­
tions, the proceedings focused on achieving an armistice 
in Indochina.
A settlement was finally reached which brought 
about a cessation of hostilities. Vietnam was divided 
along the seventeenth parallel, with the Communist forces 
of Ho Chi Minh controlling the Worth and the French con­
trolling the South. On either side of this line of demar­
cation there was to be a buffer zone. The division was to 
be only a temporary situation, and two years after the
Geneva Conference general elections were to take place to
15determine what government would govern a united Vietnam.
In addition, the nations of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos
were forbidden to participate in military alliances or to
14Source for Geneva Settlement taken from The 
United States In Vietnam, by George McTurnan Kahin and 
John W. Lewes, Appendix 2, pp. 348-376, (U.S.A., 1967)
15Chapter 4 deals with what did take place in 
Vietnam after the Geneva Settlement of 1954.
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allow foreign powers to establish military bases on their
territory. An International Control Commission"*"^ was
established to see that the provisions of the Settlement
were carried out.
The United States was not pleased with the final
settlement and expressed its displeasure by refusing to
sign the final declaration. In fact, when it became clear
that "the solution that was being arrived at in Geneva
would not accord with the American concept of an acceptable
settlement," Secretary Dulles left the conference, before
the final draft of the Settlement had been concluded, and
turned over representation of the United States to Walter 
17.Bedell Smith. Dulles stated that his absence was his 
way of "disassociating the United States from the agree­
ments because 'American public opinion would never tolerate
the guaranteeing of the subjection of millions of Vietnam-
18ese to the Communist rule.'" Although the United States 
refused to confirm the settlement in the end, its represen­
tative did state that the United States "would refrain from
"^Members of the I.C.C. were Canada, India and
Poland.
17Kahin and Lewis, ojo. cit. , p. 60.
18Ibid., p. 60. Mr. Dulles' statement was mere 
rhetoric for the United States continued to be represented 
at the Conference. What in fact Mr. Dulles did do was to 
disassociate himself personally from the Settlement and 
not the United States. later, in 1955 and 1956 Dulles was 
to rely heavily on his contention that the United States 
"disassociated" itself from the Settlement.
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1 9the threat or use of force to disturb the agreements."'
Furthermore, in a warning addressed to the Communists,
Smith added that his government "would view any renewal
of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid Agreements
with grave concern and as seriously threatening inter-
20national peace and security."
As soon as the Settlement produced in Geneva,
confirming the stalemate situation in Vietnam, became an
accomplished fact, American policy in Asia "turned into
21a clear cut containment posture."
The Republican Version of Containment
The Republicans' professed foreign policy was one
of liberation, one described by the London Economist as a
policy which "means either the risk of war or it means 
22nothing." Eisenhower, in deciding not to intervene in 
the Indochina War with American military forces had dis­
played his administration's desire to shy away from war,
19Buttringer, ojo. cit. , p. 840. While the United 
States was to refrain from the use of force, it nonetheless 
actively pursued policies which if they were not against 
the letter of the settlement, ran counter to the spirit 
of the settlement. See Chapter 4.
2QIbid., p. 840.
21Bator, ojo. cit., p. 224.
o
22Cited in Hans J. Morgenthau, "John Foster Dulles" 
in Norman A. Graeliner ed., An Underlain Tradition - 
.American Secretaries of State In The Twentieth Century,
(New York, 1961), p. 293-
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at least as much, as the previous administration had.
Consequently, the policy of liberation was indistinguishable
25from the policy of containment in operation. Thus,
Secretary Dulles was to spend much of his tenure in office
(1952-1958) "trying to transfer the concept of containment,
which he had so vigorously denounced in Europe - but which
had been effective there - to Asia, where its deficiencies
24became steadily more apparent."
Secretary Dulles' version of containment in Asia
25stressed the military aspects of the policy. Under his
guidance anti-communism became a blinding dogma, that was
reflected in the rigidity of his containment policy. The
policy became devoid of flexibility even when wisdom 
2 6demanded it.
The Eisenhower Administration attempted to implement 
a policy of containment in Asia, particularly in Southeast 
Asia, although they were almost totally unprepared to tackle 
such a task. In contrast to their knowledge of Europe, its 
people, condition and needs, prior to American involvement 
there, American policy-makers committed the United States 
in Asia, "knowing little about its people and their hopes,
25rbid, p. 293.
24.Coral Bell, ojd. cit., p. 135-
25Bator, op. cit., p. 227.
26Ibid., p. 228.
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27their weaknesses and their strengths." As a result of
American policy-makers lack of knowledge concerning Asia,
they tended to visualize problems in Asia on the basis of
analogies with the area they were better schooled in -
Europe. However, "in the absence of firm ties and mutual
interests of the kind that had bound the United States and
Western Europe," containment in Asia did not rest on a
28stable foundation. While, both the United States and.
the nations of Western Europe visualized a common external
threat to Western European security, a key factor in
cementing their bonds of cooperation, in Asia there was no
agreement between the majority of Asia leaders and the
29United States on what constituted the common threat.
"Eor most of the Asians the enemy was not Soviet military
might or ... the rising power of Communist China," as the
United States contended, "so much as the past colonial or
30semicolonial domination of the West." American policy­
makers failed to realize that agreement on a common external 
threat is an "indispensable condition for the success of
27Edwin 0. Reischauer, Beyond Vietnam: The United 
States And Asia, (New York, 1967), pT 57.
28David Mozingo, "Containment In Asia Reconsidered," 
World Politics Vol. xix, No. 5, April, 1967, p. 362.
29Notable exceptions were Nationalist China, South 
Korea, Thailand and the Philippines.
30• Reischauer, ojd. cit. , p. 79
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3 1policies, modelled on European-type containment." In
fact, some Asians felt that U.S. policy was too closely
aligned with former colonial policies and therefore con-
32sidered it a threat to Asian freedom and progress.
By 1954-, America's policy of containment had
clearly Become a policy predominantly military in nature.
Beginning in 1949, with the collective defense alliance
in Europe (NATO), followed "by the Pacific alliances in 
331951, and the alliance with South Korea in early 1954,
containment, as it evolved, had Become almost synonomous
with collective defense alliances. After the United
States' jolting diplomatic defeat in Indochina in 1954, '
34 'Secretary Dulles renewed earlier efforts to secure a 
security plan for Southeast Asia to prevent any further 
Communist expansion in that area. In a press statement 
on July 23, 1954, Mr. Dulles stated there were two lessons 
which the free nations should learn from the Indochina 
experience, namely: "that resistance to Communism needs
popular support, and this in turn means that the people
31Monzingo, ojd. cit. , p. 365.
32Stebbins, ojo. cit. , p. 6.
33Referring to the alliances with Japan, 1951, the 
Philippines 1951, and Australia and New Zealand (AUZUS), 
1951.
34Prior to the Geneva Settlement 1954 Dulles had 
discussed with American allies the necessity of a security 
alliance for Southeast Asia. At that time, however, Britain 
refused, fearing that such an alliance might disrupt the 
impending Geneva Conference.
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should feel that they are defending their own national
institutions (and) that arrangements for collective defense
need to he made in advance of aggression, not after it is 
35under way." The Republicans in formulating an Asian 
policy were to concentrate their efforts 'on the second 
lesson learned in Indochina at the expense of the first.
They failed to realize that any collective defense arrange­
ment needs the popular support of the nations of the area 
to be successful. This failure is evident in the negotia­
tions that preceded the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization.
Asian Attitudes Towards U.S. Policy 
The United States proposal, after the Geneva Settle­
ment, for a collective defense alliance in Southeast Asia 
did not meet with much enthusiastic support in Asia. As 
already noted, many Asian leaders did not agree with the 
United States' perception that Communism was the primary 
threat to the independence of the Asian nations. Therefore, 
many Asian leaders did not believe that a military alliance 
designed to protect Asian nations from Communism would be 
of any substantial value in insuring the defense of their 
own national institutions. On the .contrary, it appeared 
that some Asian leaders felt that a formal alliance with 
a superpower (the United States) would be a greater danger 
to their nations' independence than the nebulous threat of
35Yandenbasch and Butwell, op. cit., pp. 371-372.
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"Because America was an atomic superpower whether
it denied it or not, Asians looked for ulterior motives and
36devious intent Behind each American move? The increased
activity of the United States in Asian; affairs after World
$
War II, in China, Japan, Korea and also its support of 
the French in Indochina, did nothing to alleviate such 
suspicions and in fact they Became intensified. While the 
United States explained its involvement in Asia on humani­
tarian grounds that it was attempting to protect the 
independence of Asian nations, some Asians interpreted
American action as that of a powerful outside force inter-
37fering in their problems. The disparity Between the 
region-wide preoccupation of the United States and the domes­
tic or national preoccupation of Asian nationalist leaders, 
particularly in South and Southeast Asia, often made "mutual
7Q
trust difficult to establish and maintain."
Another reason why many Asian nations preferred not 
to align themselves formally with the United States was that
•z g
Wayne Ayres Wilcox, Asia and United States Policy, 
(Englewood Cliffs, 1967), p. 10.
37large segments of the elites in India, Indochina 
and Burma. K. P. Karunakaian, India In World Affairs 1950- 
1953, (London, 1958), pp. 251-252.
7Q
Roger M. Smith with assistance of Lionel Landy, 
"Some Southeast Asian Views of American Foreign Policy," in 
William Henderson ed., Southeast Asia: Problems Of United 
States Policy, (Cambridge, Massachusetts^ 1963), p. 112.
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many of them felt "that involvement in the cold war would
divert their attention and energy from the internal develop-
39 ■ment of their countries." Prince Sikanouk of Cambodia 
declared:
Por our part we believe we have the right, consider­
ing the vital problems which beset us, to stay away 
from the bloss and so-called "defensive" military 
organizations which in practice often show themselves 
to be of a nature which tends to draw peoples into 
adventures which do not concern them, and where 
they stand to gain little. 40
While Prince Sikanouk's statement concerned Cambodian 
feelings, it is a fair description of the feelings of.many 
other Asian leaders.
Several Asian nations, because of the aforementioned 
reasons, and because of the fear of some Asian leaders that 
a thoroughgoing Western or Communist alliance would encounter 
opposition from important and vocal segments of their popula­
tions, chose a policy of non-alignment. However, during the 
Eisenhower Administration Secretary of State John Poster 
Dulles seemed to reflect the belief that non-alignment was 
i m m o r a l . P r o m  an American point of view at that time,
non-alignment "was against the best interest of the free 
42world," because the U.S. regarded neutral countries as
^ Ibid. , p. 124.
40Ibid., p. 125.
41This American attitude seemed to change by late 
1957. Beginning in 1958 American policy seemed to show a 
greater toleration of non-alignment.
4^William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan and Constance 
G. Coblenz, United States Poreign Policy 1945-1955, 
(Washington, D.C., 1966), p. 453.
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constituting a dangerous power vacuum susceptible to 
43communism. The non-aligned nations of Asia resented
Dulles' condemnation of their foreign policy position.
Prime Minister U Uu of Burma, in June 1955, declared that
The implication (of American policy) seems to be 
that a nation which does not choose sides and 
join irrevocably with one or the other camps 
in the armed truce that exists in the world 
today lacks courage and conviction. And very 
often the inference which seems to be drawn is 
'if you are not with us, then you are against 
us.' And if you are not with us, you must be 
either openly or secretly in tow with communism. 44
American policy-makers' condemnation of non-alignment 
stemmed from the fact that they did not understand that 
many Asian leaders, particularly in Southeast Asia, were 
concerned with the conflict "between nationalism and imper­
ialism and not (that) between Communism and freedom.
Although in reality both the Asians and the United States 
sought a similar objective - the maintenance of Asian 
national independence - because they differed concerning the 
major, immediate source of the threat, they very often 
differed on the type of policy to pursue in attaining their 
objective. Therefore, while the United States wanted the 
Asian nations to join with itself and other Western allies 
in a military alliance for the area, many Asian leaders
43Roger Smith, ojo. cit., p. 117.
o
^ U  Uu, An Asian Speaks, (Washington, 1955) 
quoted by Roger.Smith, ibid., p. 118.
^Lennox A. Mills, Southeast Asia, (Minneapolis, 
1964), p. 169.
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resisted such efforts contending that "the developments 
of major power groupings" would give rise to tensions, 
which would impede Asian efforts in the pursuit of parti­
cular ohjectives.^  Due to the differing views between 
the United States and many Asian leaders, it is not sur­
prising that the latter rejected alignment with the United 
States and individually sought to curtail American presence 
and keep the cold-war struggle from the area.
Pre-SEATO Negotiations 
In the preliminary negotiations leading up to the 
Manila Treaty (SEATO), many differing views, concerning the 
desirability of a collective defense alliance in Southeast
Asia, were expressed by the participants. During the nego-
' f 1,1' '  - 4 7
tiations seven nations, that were asked by the United
States to participate in the alliance, and had agreed to do
so, displayed such varying interests, that the final alliance
arrangement was to be greatly hindered as an operative force.
In fact, of the eight participating nations only the
United States, Thailand and the Philippines v/ere primarily
concerned with the Communist threat, which for the most part
had by now come to mean in practical terms the threat of
46Reitzel, Kaplan, Coblenz, ojo. cit. , p. 453.
47Great Britain, Prance, Australia, New Zealand, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan.
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/ Q
Communist China. Yet, even among these three nations the 
perception of the nature of the threat differed somewhat. 
Thailand’s neighbor, Red China, had emerged from the Korean 
War as a formidable power and the Thais, feared they might 
become "swallowed up" by this growing giant. The Philippines, 
because it had experienced Communist subversion, was there­
fore very interested in curtailing future Chinese-sponsored 
Communist activity. However, the Philippines was already 
an alliance partner of the United States and seemed to be 
interested in the proposed new alliance more from the point 
of view of a guarantee and reinforcement of the previous 
U.S. commitment. The United States, on the other hand, was 
interested in furthering its containment policy by strangth- 
ening the regimes along the periphery of Mainland China.
The remaining five nations expressed interest in the 
proposed alliance more from the point of individual interest 
than a collective interest. Pakistan envisioned the arrange­
ment as being an instrument which would strengthen itself 
militarily against its enemy, India. Prance seemed interested 
primarily because it desired to retain some influence in 
Asia, if only in a limited capacity. Great Britain still 
had interests in Asia, especially in Malaya, and therefore 
felt it should belong to any alliance which might affect
/ Q
Communist China's activities were perceived to con­
stitute the greatest immediate threat to Asia and world peace, 
whereas the U.S.S.R., after Stalin's death was exploiting 
with some success the theme of relaxation of tension and 
peaceful coexistence. Sabbins, The United States In World 
Affairs 1954, op. cit., p. 28.
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these interests. Australia's and New Zealand's interests 
could probably be attributed primarily to those countries 
increasing dependence on American defense commitments. 
Neither country wished to jeopardize their relationship 
with the United States and thus were willing to agree 
with American desires. Also, like the Philippines,
Australia and New Zealand viewed the proposed alliance as 
a guarantee and reinforcement of the United States' exist­
ing commitment to them established in ANZUS.
While during the preliminary negotiations various 
reasons for the desirability of an alliance had been ex­
pressed by the participating nations, many Asian leaders 
expressed adamant opposition to the proposal. What was 
of particular significance was that jthe strongest opposi­
tion came from the larger and more influential nations 
in Asia - India and Indonesia. Peking naturally, also 
objected vigorously, but that was to be expected, since 
the main objective of the alliance as far as the United 
States was concerned, was the creation of an instrument 
which would contain mainland China.
India's severe criticism of the proposed alliance 
irritated Dulles. He was fully aware that India's refusal 
to join the alliance would greatly weaken the "grand design" 
against Communism, he had envisioned. India, in condemning 
the plan so vociferously, was influential in discouraging 
other Asian states from participating in the alliance.
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Indian Prime Minister Nehru stated that "the peace of 
Asia should he maintained by Asians" and the proposed 
American alliance would in no way help peacemaking in the 
area but rather hinder peace.^ Indonesia expressed 
similar criticism. The United States, however, was deter­
mined to secure a collective defense alliance in the area 
and therefore continued to press its proposal, despite the 
fact that Asian opposition would hinder the effectiveness 
of the alliance.
Ultimately, in September, 1954, a conference was 
held in Manila to draw up a collective defense alliance for 
Southeast Asia. Among the participants were only three 
Asian nations, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines. The 
results of the recent war in Indochina had been a major 
influence on the decision by American policy-makers to con­
clude a collective defense alliance in Southeast Asia and 
yet Laos, South Vietnam and Cambodia were prohibited from 
directly participating in the alliance. According to the 
provisions of the Geneva Settlement (1954), these nations 
could not join military alliances. Pormosa had not been 
invited to participate, because the. British and Pakistanis 
already recognized the Peking regime. Japan, likewise, 
had not been asked to participate due to the feeling of 
mistrust that existed among many Asians toward Japan. While
49Amry Vandenbasch and Richard Butwell, Southeast 
Asia Among The World Powers, (Lexington, 1958), pp. 298-299.
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many Asian leaders had voiced opposition to the very con­
cept of the alliance, it was feared Japanese membership in 
the alliance would reinforce their opposition. In any 
event Japan probably would not have accepted an invitation 
to participate because Japanese public opinion would have 
been against it. India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia 
refused to be members, preferring to maintain their non-
aligned positions "in the conflict that centered between
50the United States and mainland China."
SEATO
The final product of the Manila Conference was the
collective defense alliance known as the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization. The alliance was extremely vague in
its overall presentation. The varying interests expressed
by the members during the preliminary negotiations were
evident in the alliance's lack of "definiteness, cohesive-
51ness and organization." The heart of SEATO, signed on 
September 8, 1954, is found in Article IY, paragraph 1.
It states:
Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of 
armed attack in the treaty area against any of 
the Parties or against any State or territory which 
the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter 
designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, 
and agrees that it will in that event act to meet
50Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, 1945-1960, 
op. cit., p. 95•
51Bator, ojd. cit. , p. 166.
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the common danger in accordance with its con­
stitutional processes. 52
The United States qualified its interpretation of 
Article IV, by asserting that its obligations applied only 
in the event of Communist aggression. Secretary of State 
Dulles had originally intended that this position would 
be specifically stated in the text of the agreement, but 
he was opposed by some of the other member nations expec- 
ially G-reat Britain and Pakistan. Dulles was in no posi­
tion to push his demands for the inclusion of the anti­
communist clause.
In addition to Article IV, paragraph 1, which 
states the main purpose of the Manila Treaty, there are 
three other provisions which are of significant importance. 
These three provisions concern, the problem of subversion, 
the description of the treaty area, and a proclamation of 
general principles.
The problem of subversion directed from outside and
indirect aggression are dealt with in Article IV, paragraph
2. This provision calls for
... immediate consultation on the steps for common 
defense if a party believed the political independence 
or territorial integrity of any member in the treaty 
area or designated state or territory was threatened 
by other than armed attack or for any fact or situation 
that might menace the peace of the area. 53
52Treaties And Other International Act Series 3170,
p * 3 • (- -z
Russell H. Pifield, Southeast Asia in United States 
Policy, (New York, 1963), pp. 114-115.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
89
Action, however, could only be initiated at the invitation
or approval of the government concerned.
One of the basic problems or weaknesses of SEATO
is that the treaty's emphasis is placed on meeting overt
aggression rather than the threat of subversion. It is
ironical that as the provisions were being formulated, the
Communist shifted their strategy and began concentrating
on subversive activity rather than overt aggression such
as they employed in Korea. The SEATO Association is
legally restricted to consultation in combating subversion
and thus is not able to meet effectively what most observers,
including now American officials, consider to be the main
55obstacle to peace in the area.
What has become, a most important provision of the
Manila Treaty, expecially as far as the United States has
been concerned, is the description of the treaty area.
The area is defined as:
... the general area of Southeast Asia, including
also the entire territories of the Asian parties, 
(Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines), and the 
general area of the South-West Pacific, not includ­
ing the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes 
(21°30') north latitude. 56
54
American analysis of Communist activity and intent 
was not aware of this at that time.
^9A SEATO report for 1962-63 stated that subversion, 
infiltration and local wars remained the principal tools of 
the Communist in the treaty area. D.E. Kennedy, The Security
of Southeast Asia, (London, 1965), p. 161.
5 6Cited in A Report by a Chatham House Study Group, 
"Collective Defense In South East Asia," (Hew York, 1958), 
p. 9. Parenthesis added.
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The treaty territory as defined excludes Hong Kong and 
Formosa hut does include the protocol states of Laos,
South Vietnam and Cambodia. The only changes that have 
occurred concerning the treaty area, have been the removal 
of the Federation of Malaya, through its decision not to 
join SEATO after achieving its independence in August, 1957, 
and the dropping of the protocol States of Laos and Cambodia. 
Laos was excluded as a result of the Geneva Settlement of 
1962, and Cambodia was excluded because of its expressed 
desires not to be covered by the alliance.
A proclamation of general principals called the
Pacific Charter was included in the text of the treaty, at
the request of the Philippines. The Filipinos, sensitive
to the criticism of some Asian leaders that SEATO encouraged
colonialism, felt that the treaty should make it clear that
participating nations in no way supported colonialism. The
Pacific Charter in effect states that members "were seeking
the welfare of the Asian peoples and were not supporting 
57colonialism." While the proclamation was an attempt to 
squelch the critical Asian attitude toward SEATO, it also 
left the door open to a possible future extension of the 
Asian membership. As an effort to stem Asian criticism, 
the Pacific Charter failed. The Asian opposition and 
criticism that followed the signing of the agreement inten­
sified. U.K. Krishna Minon, Indian delegate to the United
57Fifield, ojo. cit. , p. 115.
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Nations, denounced SEATO as "an incipient and embryonic
58infringement on our peace area approach." Indian Prime 
Minister Nehru described the alliance as "diplomacy by 
threats and an unwarranted intrusion into Asian affairs.
Nehru was especially embittered not so much by the fact 
that the West discussed Asian problems of peace and security, 
as that it had taken upon itself, without significant Asian 
participation and despite Asian protest, the right to imple­
ment what it perceived to be the proper solution. The 
Indian Prime Minister seriously believed that the alliance 
would have the effect of halting "the process of calming 
down" that had begun at the time of the Indochina Settlement
(1954) and that the alliance would in fact 'increase the ten-
60sion and unrest in the world. Despite the Pacific Charter, 
as far as Nehru was concerned^ SEATO "stunk of colonialism".
Some observers have argued that SEATO was to some degree res­
ponsible for Nehru's efforts to establish a closer relation­
ship with Communist China at that time.^ However, since the 
Panch Shila agreement between India and Red China preceded 
the Manila Treaty it would appear that SEATO at most reinforced
58Vandenbasch and Butwell, Southeast Asia Among The 
World Powers, op. cit., p. 502.
59Mills, ojo. cit., p. 166.
60 °Vandenbasch and Butwell, Southeast Asia Among The
World Powers, ojo. cit. , p. 302.
^Brian Crozier, South-East Asia In Turmoil,
(Middlesex, 1968), p. 103.
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an already amiable relationship that was encouraged by the 
U.S.-Pakistan military aid agreement of February, 1954-•
India was not alone in its dislike of SEATO. The 
Indonesian Prime Minister was so strongly opposed to the 
Manila Treaty, that he immediately "suggested an- all-
Asian alternative to SEATO's commitments to ensure peace
6 2in the area." His immediate proposal was a mutual non­
aggression treaty with Communist China. Fortunately .for 
the United States the proposal did not receive sufficient 
support from the other Asian nations.
SEATO's military capabilities to effectively meet 
an act of overt Communist aggression are questionable. The 
consensus appears to be that the alliance could not ade­
quately do so, without expanding the incident into a nuclear 
holocaust. However, a detailed discussion of SEATO1s military 
structure and capabilities are not germane to this discussion^ 
What is relative here is that the correlation between the 
distribution of power and responsibility, is close among 
SEATO members, (both being centered in the United States).
The military backbone of SEATO ultimately rests on American 
nuclear weapons and thus is not properly equipped to meet 
the challenge of guerrilla warfare.'
62Vandenbasch and Butwell, Southeast Asia Among The 
World Powers, ojo. cit. , p. 302.
^See Fifield, ojd. cit. , pp. 113-157*
64Ibid., p. 121.
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The then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
believed that SEATO would be a vital instrument in halting 
the spread of international communism in Asia. Yet, "what­
ever compatibility of interest that flowed from the American 
desire for allies, and the Asian desire for American aid,
it did not cover the specific and crucial question of the
65future of China." The United States in return for the 
inconsequential military support it received from Asian 
members in SEATO, was to pay a high political price. For 
example, the United States in increasing the amount of 
military assistance to Pakistan through SEATO, placed an 
enormous military and financial burden on India, a nation 
which, because of its greater size and strategic geographic 
location, was of even greater concern to the United States^ 
While this is but one example, it is typical of the inherent 
contradictions between America's Asian policy and the object­
ives it sought to achieve.
Instruments of the Containment Policy 
In December, 1954, the United States signed a defense 
pact with Nationalist China. This completed the American 
alliance system in Asia, the revised Japanese-American secur-
t
ity pace of I960 being the only alteration. Under the pro­
visions of the U.S.-Nationalist China defense alliance, "the
65Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy .1945-1960, op. cit. ,
p. 96. 
. ^ Ibid. , p. 96.
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United States assumed the standard obligation to meet the 
common danger of an armed attack in accordance with its
r-7
constitutional processes." This agreement additionally
"provided for mutual help in resisting Communist subsersive
activities directed from without against either signatory's
68territorial or political stability."
American alliance-building efforts in Asia, during
the 1951-1954 period, seemed to be based on the premise
that pressures from Peking and Moscow were and would be in
the near future the "primary and at times the only causes of
69Asian instability." One would further conclude that Ameri­
can policy-makers at that time believed the thrust of such 
outside pressures would be in the form of aggression rather 
than subversive activities. The fact that military alliances 
comprised the largest share of American efforts to counter 
Sino-Soviet pressures and the fact that the provisions of the 
alliances emphasized the responsibilities of the members in 
the case of "armed attack'^ while in dealing with the problem 
of subversion members' responsibilities are stated in such 
broad and vague terms as "consultation" and "mutual help", 
lends credence to such a deduction.
Although military alliances were the primary instru-
67
Greene, ojd. cit. , p. 80.
68Ibid., p. 80.
^Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy .1945-1960, op. cit.,
P- 95.
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ments of the United States' containment policy in Asia 
during the 1954-1963 period, other instruments, especially 
the diplomatic and external aid instruments, played their 
part in the implementation of that policy, as the follow­
ing two sections will show. Dulles believed that the 
cement for effecting cohesion (anti-Communism and pro-United
States) was "a shared ideology and economic and military
70interdependence."
U.S. China Policy 
The policy of containment in Asia, during this 
period, became intertwined with and at times seemingly sub­
ordinated to the United States' policy toward Communist 
China.
The United States "recognition and support of the
government of the Republic of China on Taiwan, renewed and
reinforced as a result of the Korean War," became the major
element of its China policy during the 1950's and continues
71to exist today.
Prior to the outbreak of the Korean War and for a 
short time thereafter, John Poster Dulles advocated the
/ ft
admipission of Red China into the United Nations. In the
' i
book War or Peace written by Dulles, he stated that the 
organization (U.N.) "will best serve the cause of peace
70■Brown, ojo. cit. , p. 76.
71. Blum, ojo. cit. , p. 145.
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if its Assembly is representative of what the world actually
!
is, and not merely representative of the parts we like.”
Continuing, Dulles stated that if a government did establish
control, it "should be represented in any organization that
purports to mirror world reality,” therefore if the Peking
regime exhibited its control of mainland China, "then it ...
72should be admitted to the United Nations." Yet, Dulles, 
while serving in the State Department during the Truman 
Administration, was hesitant about the United States 
immediately recognizing the Communist regime in China. In 
explaining his seemingly contradictory position, Dulles 
declared "that every government should be tested over a
73period of time in order to establish the fact of control."
After assuming the office of Secretary of State in the 
Eisenhower Administration Dulles' position regarding Peking's 
membership in the United Nations shifted. While he contin­
ued to maintain that "the U.N. should be constructed on a 
universal base," Dulles qualified this position by stating
that "universality should not turn the United Nations into
74an impotent organization." Some political writers and 
72 John Poster Pulles, War Or Peace (London, 1950), 
pp. 190-191.
^Michael S. Guhin, "The United States And The 
Chinese People's Republic: The Non-Recognition Policy Review­
ed," International Affairs, Yol. 45, No. 1, January, 1969,p« 54.
74Ibid., p. 56. Mr. Dulles obviously was referring 
to the fear that the Peking regime would use its veto power, 
which it would receive as a member of the Security Council, 
to prevent the U.N. from performing any type of pertinent
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analysts claim that Dulles, as Secretary of State, adopted a ridgid
position against recognition of Peking and its membership of the U.N.
because that was the overwhelming opinion of Congressional members
75and their constituents. However, while there is no doubt that
*
Secretary Dulles necessarily took Congressional and public opinion
76into consideration in formulating America’s China policy, it is 
important to note that Dulles personal beliefs coincided with public 
opinion at the time. It would seem to be a distortion of the facts, 
therefore, to insinuate that Dulles'China Policy was due to the 
pressures of public opinion. Instead it would be more accurate to 
say that the China policy was a reflection of Dulles’ convictions and 
were supported by congressional and public opinion.
Early in 1954, the United States' policy toward Communist 
China was officially described as "a middle one, calculated tolimit 
the capacity of the enemy for further aggression and to build up 
the strength of our friends11 - a policy of "pressure and diplomatic 
isolation" that would
function in maintaining world peace. Yet, considering the fact 
that the Soviet Union already possessed such power, the addition 
of a Chinese veto at that time would prove to be no greater hinderance 
to the U.N. Today, when a Sino-Soviet split is evident and U.S.- 
Soviet cooperation has steadily increased, the fear of a Chinese 
veto in the Security Council is understandable.
75Robert P. Newman, Recognition of Communist China?, (New York, 
1961), pp. 1-15. Also see Guhin, op. cit., pp. 44-63.
76Dulles was always conscious of Congressional opinion.
During his tenure as Secretary of State he strove to please the 
Congress, always remaining aware of the fate suffered by his prede­
cessor, Dean Acheson, at the hand of the Congress. Hans J. Morgenthaw, 
"John Foster Dulles," Norman R. Graebner ed., An Uncertain Tradition 
- American Secretaries of State In The Twentieth Century, op. cit., 
p . 292. !
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"at least slow the growth of the war-making potential of
Communist China and retard the consolidation of its diplo-
77matic position." Therefore, by 1954,- the American policy 
of not recognizing, the Peking regime and American efforts 
to block Communist China from attaining U.N. membership, 
were additional instruments being used to contain Communist 
China. Just as the military alliances were an effort to 
contain Peking's territorial expansion, the former instru­
ments were an attempt to contain Peking's expanding influ- 
7ft
ence. It would be much more reasonable to presume, there­
fore, that Dulles pursued a policy of non-recognition of 
Peking a,nd worked to prevent Peking from attaining U.N. 
membership by design, rather than as a result of the pres­
sure of th^ domestic public opinion.
Pollowing Dulles' retirement in 1958, his successor 
Christian Herter maintained the same policy. In 1961, there 
seemed to be a shift in attitude on the part of President 
Kennedy toward the possible admission of Peking into the
77Statement made by Walter P. McConaughy, then 
director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of 
State Bulletin, Vol. 30, January 11, 1954, pp. 40, 42 cited 
in Blum, ojo. cit. , pp. 119-120.
7ft
Michael Edwards states that the American belief 
that non-recognition is an effective instrument in blocking 
Peking's attempt to extend Communist rule in Asia is a 
myth. It is similar to saying fire can be prevented from 
spreading by denying that it is fire. Michael Edwards,
Asia In The Balance, (Baltimore, 1962), p. 183.
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Uax-ted. Nations.. Yet,, before this: apparent change in attitude was able 
1Ui» mainfest. itself in II. S.. policy,, Peking, .in: 1962, became involved 
in ax harder: conflict with India.. Peking' s militancy removed all hope of 
the Ulnited States adopting a: more realistic-policy. The Kennedy Am- 
nrinistratinn knew that: the: American people would be in no mod at that 
time to, accept a changer, in. America'S China policy, especially one that 
would have appeared to be favorable to Peking by the American people. 
Having already, received; heavy criticism from the Congress and the American 
public for the Bay ofPigsr fiasco,. the Kennedy Administraton did not feel 
it could then pursue a policy which.would draw heavy critcism and op­
position by Congress and the American people;
It is quite'apparent; however:^ 5 President Kennedy did not use the 
policy at non-recognition and a policy of:blocking Peking admission to 
the HT..FT.. as instruments: tor contain. .China as Mr. Dulles had. But in so 
far as the policy did: not, changey. the rhetoric of containment was often 
used as; a rationale..
Siho-Ameriiran; relations- fbcused durihg the 1950's and continue 
to fauces today/ an: the- island of 'Taiwan. . InrPeking's view "Taiwan is 
Chinese territory and the: 'liberation*’of.Taiwan and the defeat of the
79national i st regime arec required too complete the unification of China."
As previously stated,, the United:States recognizes and supports the 
nationalist Government on;Taiwan"asstheclbgal government of China. Yet, 
the United. States maiirteairs:- thatt theclegallstatus of Taiwan remains unset­
tled*
The Japanese Ffeace: Treaty effective :April 28, 1952, stripped Japan 
of "all right,, title: and.claimssto Formosa and the Pescadores." It 
did not,, however,, establish, present. or future legal rights in connection
79A. Doak Barnett, "The United States and Communist China" in 
Willard L.. Thorp e d . , The: United States:And The Far East, 2 ed., 
((Englewood. Cliffs,. 1962) ,, p. . 14-3, .
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ftowith these islands.
While both Mao Tse-Tung and Chiang Kai-shek are well aware of 
the American position both point back to the Cairo Conference of 19^3 > 
where the U.S. agreed that the islands should be returned to China.
O  “ i
Therefore both insist that the area is indisputably a part of China, 
and are determined that China should be united. . The United States 
since the beginnning of the Korean War has stationed its Seventh 
Fleet in the Taiwan Straits to avoid open confrontation between 
Peking and the Nationalist regime, which might set off general war 
in Asia.
On September 3, 195*+5 Communist artillery began a heavy shelling 
of the off-shore island, Quemoy. The Nationalists retaliated with 
attacks on the mainland "but discontinued them about a month later, 
evidently at American r e q u e s t . a result of the Communist 
attacks and probably as part of an agreement with the Nationalists 
to stop their attacks on the mainland, The United States signed a 
defense alliance with the Nationalist regime.
In the three years following 195*+? Communist China’s attempts 
to bring about the "liberation" of Taiwan were
'^Allen S. Whiting and Robert A. Scdlapino, "The United States 
and Taiwan," in Thorp ed. Ibid.. p. 161.
8lIbid.. p. 161.
Q p
°^Harold C. Hinton, Communist China In World Politics. (Boston,
1966), p. 261.
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carried out for the most part through diplomatic means.
The Nationalist regime during this period built up its 
military forces on the off-shore islands. Chiang Kai-shek' 
was skeptical of American intentions, because the United 
States was carrying on ambassadorial discussions with 
Peking in Warsaw. The Nationalist leader feared that the 
-discussions might lead to a "two China" arrangement, a 
situation which he considered out of the question despite 
the fact that such a de facto situation existed. Continual 
American statements emphasizing the fact that the U.S. was 
arming the Nationalist Government only as a defensive mea­
sure and thus by implication not as a supporting gesture of 
Chiang1s desire to regain control of the mainland, intensi­
fied Chiang^ suspicion of the United States. Chiang Kai- 
shek^ fear that American policy-makers did not support 
his personal ambition of regaining control of the mainland 
were entirely justified. While the United States could not 
officially advocate a "two China" policy because of domestic 
pressures against such arrangement, it is clear that American 
policy Was based on this strategy. The United States, al­
though it wished to eliminate the Communist control of the 
mainland, was not prepared to risk an Asian war to achieve 
this desire. At the same time the United States had become 
steadfast in maintaining Taiwan as part of the "free world."
^Communist China shelled the off-shore islands 
briefly in 1956. •
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Taiwan had become strategically important to the American 
defenses in Asia.
In 1955, President Eisenhower in a letter to
Winston Churchill concerning the Taiwan crisis, wrote:
We believe that if international Communism should 
penetrate the island barrier in the Western Pacific 
and thus be in a position to threaten the Philippines 
and Indonesia immediately and directly, all of us, 
including the free countries of Europe, would soon-- 
be in far worse trouble than we are now. Certainly 
the whole region would soon go. 84
America's support of the Nationalist regime thus was based 
on Taiwan's strategic importance as a link in the United 
States' island chain defenses and Taiwan's symbolic impor­
tance in displaying to the "free world" America's determina­
tion to halt Communist advances, rather than on the belief
that the Nationalist G-overnment was the legal and rightful
85
government of China. U.S. efforts to prevent the Nation­
alist Government from attacking mainland China seems to be 
further evidence.
That the United States Taiwan policy has incurred 
the wrath of the Peking regime is understandable. Through 
unilateral action the United States has prevented the Com­
munist regime not only fron consolidating Taiwan, at one
oa
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate Por Change: The 
White House Years 1955-1956, (New York, T9F3, pp. 470-471.
O C
"President Kennedy especially alarmed Nationalist 
Leaders by repeatedly referring to the 'defense of Taiwan' 
and our commitments to 'the government and people of Taiwan.' 
The term 'Republic of China' was Confined in usage mainly 
to official documents and communiques." Allen S. Whiting 
and Robert A. Scalopino, ojd. cit. , p. 161.
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time part of China, under its control, but has actively 
supported an alternative to the Peking regime. Prom 
Peking's point of view the survival of the Nationalist 
Government is a threat to its own position.
The United States in its determination to contain 
Communist expansion in Asia has complicated the settlement 
of the Taiwan issue by placing it in the realm of the cold 
war struggle. Yet the United States seemingly has pushed 
aside the feelings of the Taiwanese people in the formula­
tion of their policy. The native-born inhabitants consti­
tute the vast majority of the population of Taiwan. Despite 
the fact that "mainlander refugees" and native-born Taiwanese
are both of the Chinese race, substantial cultural differ-
86ences exist between the two groups. "These cultural dif­
ferences, reinforced by occupational and political dispar­
ities, have presented a problem on Taiwan, albeit one not
07
openly discussed." While the indigenous Taiwanese popu­
lace has displayed signs of unrest, as long as economic 
conditions remain reasonably good and some social mobility 
is possible, mass revolt seems unlikely. However, if the 
United States officially pushes for a two China policy, 
there is the possibility that "such a policy will exacerbate
political tensions within Taiwan, and may risk an upheaval
61 88 that could only be of advantage to the Communist." At
86Ibid., p. 162.
87Ibid., p. 162.
88Ibid., p. 179.
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present there does not appear to he any solution to the 
Taiwan question which would he satisfactory to parties 
concerned, hut the United States must become more aware 
of the Taiwanese position, if the question is ever to be 
resolved.
The U.S. China Policy, a central element in its 
overall containment policy in Asia, is rejected by most 
Asians. Despite the fact that many Asian nations acknow­
ledged a growing fear of Communist China during the 1954- 
1963 period, especially the latter part, most of these 
countries maintained that the United States must face world 
reality, and its China policy does not. Some of the main 
Asian complaints concerning the U.S. China Policy is that 
it is too negative, and defensive, not to mention unrealis­
tic. For these reasons Asian nations refuse to support it. 
And yet, the success of the containment policy is dependent 
upon the cooperation and collective action of Asian nations. 
Because non-Communist states in Asia favored a more flexible 
realistic American policy toward China, a successful imple­
mentation of containment was thus hindered. In perpetuating 
its myth-based China policy, the United States isolates
Taiwan from the mainstream of thought and action in non-
89Communist Asia, and fosters a situation of continual 
potential crisis.
89Chester Bowles, The 'China Problem; Reconsidered", 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 38 April, I960, p. 477.
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Foreign Aid In Asia
When the containment policy first became operative
in Western Europe, U.S. economic assistance, in the form
90of the Marshall Plan, was the primary instrument. In 
Asia, American economic assistance has been, for the most 
part, a secondary instrument in achieving containment 
objectives.
During the Eisenhower Administration, U.S. foreign 
aid to the countries of Asia was restricted. While Presi­
dent Eisenhower personally desired to cut down on the amount 
of American foreign aid, he found it difficult to do. He
came to realize that foreign aid was necessary "to support
/ ,
Secretary of State John Poster Dulles' polico-strategic
drive to complete a ring of strong points around the
91Communist bloc." But, Secretary of State Dulles' preoccu­
pation with the military aspect of containment and his per-
92sonal prejudice against non-alignment greatly influenced 
the allocation of American assistance to Asian countries
90This was to change, beginning in 1950 when NATO 
became the prime instrument of containment in Europe.
91Charles J.V. Murphy, "Foreign Aid: Billions in 
Search of a Good Reason" reprinted in Harry Howe Ranson, 
ed. An American Foreign Policy Reader, (New York, 1965), 
p. 372.
92By 1958 Dulles' position on non-alignment shows 
signs of toleration.
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while he was in office. It was Dulles' opinion that
... economic aid to nations not militarily allied 
with the United States was an extravagance (the U.S.) 
could not afford; that such nations were essentially 
hostile to (the U.S.) purpose anyway, seeking to 
embarrass (it) and to play off East against West 
for their own material gain; that many of these 
new nationalistic regimes were more interested 
in following "socialistic" models of development, 
and thus had ideological leanings toward the "other
Wet United States G-overnment 
Foreign Assistance
(In U.S. $ millions)
1955A) 1959 1963Country
Ceylon (1) 19 4
India 118 320 736
Wepal 2 3 14
*Pakistan 67 142 378
Burma (1) 14 10
Cambodia 28 21 20
*Taiwan 109 86 74
Indonesia, 9 17 77
*Japan 65 48 33
*Republic of Korea 279 232 231
**Lao s,v' 37 35 31
Malaipia (1) (1) 5
*Philippines 21 24 8
*Thailand 16 48 29
*Vietnam 203 177 210
*U.S. allies
** Laos neutralized 1962.
(1) less than $500,000
Source: A) Statistical Abstract of the United States 1952,
(Washington, 1963), pp• 8^5-867.
B) Ibid., 1963, pp. 860-861
U.S. Foreign Assistance 
Commitments Under Economic and Military 
Assistance Programs 
(In U.S. $ millions)
Year Economic Military
1955 1,821 2,396
1959 1,916 2,110
1963 2,296 1,810
Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States 1964,
(Washington, 1964), p. 859.
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side" in the Cold War despite their pretentions 
of non-alignment; and finally if (the U.S.) 
discounted these ideological incompatibilities 
and extended aid, most of the would-be bene­
ficiaries lacked the administrative and tech­
nical talent, economic structure, and will to 
make significant gains with the additional 
capital. 94
It is often difficult to clearly distinguish between
military assistance and economic assistance in the American
foreign aid program. A division, therefore, into the two
categories of military assistance and economic assistance
is not particularly enlightening and more often than not,
confusing. It is important, however, to distinguish
between what Arnold Wolfers refers to as "short-run aid,
military or economic, both being in the field of defense
broadly conceived, and economic development aid that will
95bear material fruit at best after two or three decades." 
During the Republican Administration not only was the largest 
part of U.S. assistance to Asia sent "to increase defense 
capabilities in countries on the southern and eastern borders 
of the Soviet Union and Communist China," but the amount of 
"military assistance and that part of economic aid, which 
finances defense support or other security objectives, were
94Walter W. Rostow, The United States in the World 
Arena, (hew York, I960), pp. 364-65. Also see Brown, 
op. cit., pp. 100-101.
95Arnold Wolfers, "Questions of Priority in Mutual 
Security Allocation," in Ransom op. cit., p. 419.
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roughly double the level of developmental aid."^ Yet, 
while the major portion of American assistance to Asian 
nations was designated to build military defenses against 
Communism, the major problem faced by most Asian leaders 
was that of economic development. The Indonesian Ambassa­
dor to the United States, Murkarto Natowijdo, in 1954, 
discussing Asian problems stated:
The significance of the danger is inherent in 
the failure of economic developments ... to keep 
pace with those in other parts of the world is 
not fully appreciated by the West. The emphasis 
of the Western Powers has been on achieving a 
military balance of power. 97
Most Asian leaders, even some of those allied to the United
98States, agreed with Natowigdo's assessment. American aid
programs, because they were not directed toward what most
Asians agreed was the major problem of the area, disappointed
many Asian leaders, alienated others and produced some
99results no one wanted.
The United States in viewing Communism as not only
96Joan M. Nelson, Aid, Influence and Poreign Policy, 
(New York, 1968), pp. 20, 4.
97Vandenbasch and Butwell, Southeast Asia Among The 
World Powers, op. cit. , p. 313-
98In 1956 the Thai press strongly criticized the 
predominately military emphasis of U.S. aid programs. Thailand 
was at the time and continues to be today one of America's 
staunchest supporters in Asia. Stebbins, The United States 
In World Affairs 1956, op. cit., p. 131.
99Henry J. Reuss, "The U.S. Poreign Aid Program: An 
Appraisal," The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, July, 1961, Vol. 33^ pp. 23-29,- pp.24-25.
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the primary but virtually the absolute enemy in Asia, gave 
its assistance to any government, even a reactionary one, 
when it was or appeared to be the only alternative to 
power in the hands of men orientated toward Communism.
Asian leaders desiring American assistance ironically dis­
covered that a noisy Communist minority "was an absolutely 
invaluable natural resource."'^'*' Indeed, Chester Bowles 
has stated that "the unearthing of a local Communist under­
ground might be expected .. to produce more American dollars
102than the discovery of oil or uranium." As a consequence ,
a government in powei; as a means of obtaining aid,would fre­
quently exaggerate the danger of communism within its border.
In making a declaration of anti-Communism a major 
criterion for the granting of assistance, the United States 
found itself at times supporting a despot or a military 
oligarchy, W'hile at times "a despot or military oligarchy 
was the only possible alternative for the exercise of 
power, excluding Communist or radical reformers," American
policy-makers restricted their own choices by "equating
103radical reformers with Communists." American support for
■^^Raymond Aron, "Reflections on American Diplomacy,"
Daedalus, Journal of American Academy of Arts and Sciences,
Vol. 91, Rail, 1962, pp. 715-32, p. 724.
■^■^Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 48, June 17,
1963, No. 1251, p. 940.
102u Ibid., p. 940.
103Aron, ojd. cit., p. 724.
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autocrats,.. because; they declared themselves to be anti- 
OkrnTmi-ntBt:,. often meant,in .reality, that the United States 
was- supporting a irresponsible and corrupt regime that had 
littLe support, from., its. people,. as in. .the case of Syngman 
Ehee in. Korea,. General Khourni. Nasavan in Laos and Ngo Dinh 
Uiem in. SBanth: Vietnam.. When indigenous forces rose up to 
oppose these type governmentsAmerican "support of these 
gpTOmments. became a powerful- issue.around which to organize 
GEppusitibn.1^ 0^  The- United States, .thus, found itself, at 
times;,,, being considered: by - some. nationalist groups, the 
aliTy of reaction, and: the. enemyt of progress. Because some 
Asian. nationalists viewed, theeUnited.States as an impos­
ing farce perpetuating an unsatisfactar3r status quo, they
often allied themselves. with.theCommunists in an effort to
105sweep) aw^r hath, thee United:;Statessand:the unhappy past.
TThe United: States,, confusing, all.'.discontent and disorder 
with. onfstideE aggression-. orr polit i callsubvers ion, aided - effort s 
to suppress: these, nationalist.group at■times and,- therefore, 
was responsible:- in: part: fbrr increasing,the Communist appeal 
in that area.. In: T93W,. eighttUVSS .Senators in a letter to 
the Eresideni expressed theirrfearrthat American military 
assistance to: Asia. was: inc re as ing ^ rathe r than decreasing 
the problems, in. that, are an. Iitwasstheir opinion that the
■^^Sfenator: Edward ML...Kennedy., .Decision Bor A Decade, 
((Garden City.-,. 1968).,. p... 152..
105South Vietnam is an excellent example.
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United States,by contributing to the maintenance in power
"of regimes which have lacked broad support within their
countries," by creating "a militaristic image of the United
States," and by "perpetuating military hierarchies" in Asia,
the United States has at times endangered "the very value
of individual freedom which (it) seeks to safeguard.
American defense assistance was intended to promote
stability and security in Asia. In this sense it can be
107said to have defeated its own ends." Not only was such
assistance manipulated by some regimes, to secure their 
own power at the expense of people, but excessive militar­
ization placed a great burden on the economics of these 
weak nations, in need of economic development. Still an­
other adverse affect of American stress on military assis­
tance was that it aroused fears in neighboring non-Communist
neighbors, excerbating relations between neighbors by alter-
108ing the local balance of power. At the same time,
relations between some of these non-Communist nations and 
the United States were strained, thus, promoting relations 
between these nations and China, because it was an alterna­
tive .
"^^Wolfers, "Questions of Priority in Mutual 
Security Allocation," oj d. cit. , p. 418.
107D. E. Kennedy, ojd. cit. , p. 250.
108Bium5 cit., p. 174. Arnold Wolfers, "Ques­
tions of Priority in Mutual Security Allocation," ojd. cit., 
p. 424. D.E. Kennedy, ojd. cit. , p. 250.
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President Kennedy, noting the importance of econ­
omic development in these underdeveloped nations, pursued 
aid programs in most Asian countries which emphasized 
developmental aid rather than military aid. Yet, his 
Administration could not, through aid programs, remedy the 
deficiencies caused by some recipient nations' own unsound 
fiscal or economic policies. On the other hand, the United 
States continued to run the serious risk of being viewed
as an imperialist nation, whenever it took any initiative
109in sponsoring internal changes in Asian lands.'
Contradictions in the Asian Containment Policy, 1954 - 1963
Walter Lippman, in an article in the hew York HeraJLd
Tribune, described the American position in Asia in 1961
in this manner:
The revolutions in South Korea and Iran, following 
the disorders in Laos and South Vietnam are a 
warning that in Asia the policy of containment by 
American satellite states is breaking down. In 
all four of these countries the governments have 
been (U.S.) clients, indeed they have been (U.S.) 
creations. All of them are crumbling for the 
same reason. In relation to the popular feeling 
of independence and the rising popular expecta­
tion of material welfare, these American client 
states are not only corrupt but they are intoler­
ably reactionary. The fact that they are also 
under the protection of a foreign and non-Asian 
power is an additional liability. 110.
109Testimony of Edwin Reischauer, Hearings Before The 
Committee on Foreign Relations Januahy 31, United States 
Senate, Ninetieth Congress, First Session, "Asia, The Pacific 
and the United States) (Washington"^ 1967), p. 8.
^Walter Lippmann, New York Herald Tribune, May 18, 
1961 reprinted in Chang Hsin-hai, America and China: A New 
Approach to Asia, (New York, 1965), p. 257.
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Mr. lippman perhaps exaggerated the situation, but he did 
amply point out some of the adverse effects America's Asian 
policy had wrought, as well as some possible explanations 
for their occurrence. The main thrust of Mr. lippmann's 
criticism was directed at what was the main handicap of 
America's Asian policy - it often went against the grain 
of Asia's most potent force, nationalism. In so doing a 
successful containment policy not only became impossible, 
but opposition to the United States often became the 
logical consequence.
In pursuing the policy of containment in Asia, the 
United States, a superpower, was pursuing its global interest. 
Secretary of State John Poster Dulles and his successors 
followed a policy of military containment in China because 
they believed it was in the interest of the free world. Por 
most Asian nations, however, their prime concern was with 
local objectives, and they, therefore, "formulated policies 
of purely national character, often designed to improve 
their internal conditions and create modern social struc­
tures."'^ "*' Because U.S. interests and Asian interests at 
times were perceived to be different by the respective 
parties and because the individual .interests among Asian 
nations also at times differed and were sometimes opposing, 
any attempt to unite these divergent attitudes and interest 
into an anti-Communist coalition was almost an impossible
111Reitzel, Kaplan, Coblenz, ojd. cit., p. 455*
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feat. The United States failed to unite the majority of 
Asian nations in an anti-Communist coalition, and its 
policies served the Communist purpose. SEATO, America's 
China Policy and its Poreign Aid Programs had divisive 
effects. Asian nations who allied themselves with the 
United States tended to become isolated from the rest of 
Asia while various non-aligned countries were pushed toward
the Communist bloc as the only alternative to American .
112dominance. Even after the Communist Chinese adopted a
more militant Asian policy, which aroused fears in all 
the Asian nations, most Asian nations still were unwilling 
to ally themselves with the United States, because its 
policy of military containment had already displayed so 
many shortcomings that it offered no reasonable alternative.
While American policy-makers generally did not
understand why Asian leaders refused to adhere to the
American policy, Soviet Premier Khrushchev in a speech in
1955, expressed the reasons quite accurately. He stated
that the United States was attempting
... to push ... (the peoples of Asia) off the path 
of peaceful development and on the path of militari­
zation and preparations for new war. It is this 
purpose, incidentally that lies behind all kinds 
of military pasts and blocs knocked together in 
South-East Asia and the Hear East and in other 
areas of the world. They arouse the justified 
suspicion of the peoples of Asia, because sponsor­
ing them are the forces which at one time 
implanted and defended the colonial order. 113.
112D. E. Kennedy, ojd. cit. , p. 235.
113Reitzel, Kaplan, Coblenz, ojd. cit. , p. 415.
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While Khrushchev's statement naturally distorted American
intentions, it does describe the impression many Asian
leaders held about American policy.
Defenders of the United States containment policy
in Asia, constantly point out the fact that Communist China
did not expand territorially, with the exception of Tibet.
However, they fail to mention the fact that during the
same period, 1954-1963, Chinese influence in North Korea,
North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Nepal, Burma and Pakistan 
114increased. They also fail to mention that a policy
directed against Red China is not effective in prohibiting 
adventures by second or third level powers seeking to alter 
existing situations and it is equally ineffective in pro­
hibiting internal conflicts. In fact, the United States 
because of its many commitments continually faces the 
prospect of being drawn into local or internal conflicts, 
which many feel is the case today in Vietnam.
The United States, for all its intensive involvement 
in Asia during the 1954-1963 period, was not able to insure 
Asian stability. Its policy which was intended to maintain 
an international status quo, evolved into a policy that 
often protected an unsatisfactory internal status quo, while 
Asian nationalism demanded a new and acceptable order.
o
114Vidya Prakash Dutt, China And The World: An 
Analysis of Communist China' s Poreign Policy, (.New York,
1966), p. 36.
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Containment, therefore, did not alleviate Asian problems and 
may have compounded them, and yet, Asian progress and 
stability is a prerequisite for any policy which attempts 
to prevent the expansion of Communism in that area.
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CHAPTER IV 
VIETNAM
Hans J. Morgntb.au has stated that the United States 
is "militarily engaged in Vietnam by virtue of the basic 
principle of its foreign policy that was implicit in the 
Truman Doctrine of 1947" and followed by each successive 
administration.1 This basic principle is the containment 
of communism. Eormer President Johnson confirmed this 
fact in a major policy speech on Vietnam in 1965.^ Amer­
ica's present tragic involvement in Vietnam is thus a 
consequence of its containment policy in Asia. It is 
due to this fact that the present war in Vietnam has stirred 
many leading men, both in government and in academic circles, 
to question not only the Americanization of the Vietnam War 
but also almost all aspects of America's containment policy 
in Asia. It, therefore, seems most appropriate to devote 
the last chapter of this thesis to a case study of American
■*"Hans J. Morgenthau, "We Are Deluding Ourselves in 
Viet-Nam," New York Times Magazine, April 18, 1965 reprinted 
in the Viet-Nam Reader, op. cit. , p.' 37.
2
See Lyndon B. John, "Speech §,t John Hopkins Univer­
sity," Department of State Bulletin LVI, April 26, 1965,
pp. 606-610.
117
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involvement in Vietnam.
Vietnam was temporarily divided into two zones, at 
the conclusion of the Erench-Indochina War in 1954. This 
division, according to the settlement reached at the Geneva 
Conference (1954), was to he resolved by the Vietnamese 
people in general elections to be held in 'July, 1956. 
luring this two year interim, however, the United States 
went about creating an independent anti-communist state 
in the southern half of Vietnam. The United States design­
ed a two-pronged plan to achieve this situation. One prong 
consisted of the Manila Treaty (SEATO), initiated by the 
United States following the Geneva Agreements that granted, 
in effect, "protection in advance to the southern regroup­
ing area against any attack by indigenous forces based in 
the other half of the same country."4 The other prong was 
the United States' efforts to build a political entity in 
South Vietnam. To further its objectives the United States 
launched a massive program of economic assistance to South 
Vietnam and "started to retrain and reorganize the South 
Vietnamese army," under the leadership of its "hand-picked"
5
candidate, Ego Dinh Diem.
3George McTurnam Kahin and John W. lewis, ojo. cit. ,
p. 68.
4Ibid., p. 63.
5
Edwin 0. Reischauer, ojo. cit. , p. 25-
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American policy-makers apparently were determined 
to prohibit the Communist-from gaining control of all of 
'Vietnam, for despite the Agreements decided upon at the 
Geneva Conference, the United States, through unilateral 
action, went about making the seventeenth parallel a 
permanent division. The reunification elections were not 
held in 1956. Diem, with full American support, refused 
to allow South Vietnam to participate in such elections, 
stating both that his government had not signed the Geneva 
agreements and that the absence of all liberty in North 
Vietnam made the question of electoral and pre-election
g
campaigns practically unattainable for the moment. In 
fact, however, the main reason Diem and the United States 
did not want the elections to take place was simply that 
Ho Chi Minh would have easily won the election and therefore 
his regime would have become the ruling government of all 
Vietnam. (The Communist belief that reunification elections
^U.S. Senator Ernest Gruening and Herbert Wilton 
Beaser, Vietnam Eolly, (Washington, D.C., 1968), p. 165. 
Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson defending 
Diem's failure to agree to hold reunification elections told 
a group of Americans that such elections should not occur 
because of "crimes against suffering humanity committed by 
the Worth Vietnamese.' He went on to charge the Northern 
regime of having "sold their country to Peking." Marvin E. 
Gettleman ed. , History, Documents, and Opinions on a Ma,jor 
World Crisis, (England,1965), p . 170.
7
David Schoenbrun, Vietnam How We Got In, How To 
Get Out, (New York, 1968), p"! 4^7 See also Reischauer, 
op. cit. , p. 25. Gettleman, ojd. cit., p. 171.
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would be held in Vietnam, and that Ho Chi Minh would emerge 
victorious, seems to have been a major factor in their 
agreeing to the armistice in 1954). When it became apparent 
that Diem would not abide by the Geneva Settlement, refusing 
to hold reunification elections, the North protested the 
violation to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, but 
found little satisfaction. The Co-Chairmen seemed to be of 
the opinion that as long as no hostilities had taken place, 
it would be unwise to press the issue. Ho Chi Minh, then 
appealed to Communist China, but like Britain and the Soviet 
Union, the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, Peking in­
dicated that "they were more interested in the maintenance
1 8of peace than in reunification elections in Vietnam. With­
out the backing of the two leading Communist nations, North 
Vietnam could do little; it was in no position to take on
what in effect was the United States and its vast power 
q
alone.
The Eisenhower Administration's decision in 1954 to 
create a separate independent state in South Vietnam, des­
pite the fact that such action was contrary to the spirit 
of the Geneva Agreement, was due in part to domestic pres­
sures. The United States at that time was still gravely 
concerned and disillusioned by Senator McCarthy's charges 
of a "global communist conspiracy." £dd to that some
8Gruening and Beaser, ojd. cit. , p. 167.
9Ibid., p. 167.
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dissatisfaction with, the stalemated conclusion of the Korean 
War and it becomes apparent that "it would have been politi­
cal suicide for Eisenhower to appear to be appeasing the 
Communists," in Indochina. Eisenhower-and Dulles were 
fully aware of some of their Republican cohorts charges 
against the previous Democrat Administration for "losing 
China," and did not want to risk a similar fate, accusing 
their Administration of "giving Indochina to the Reds."'*'"*' 
Dulles, because of his personal convictions and the atti­
tude of the Congress, left the Geneva Conference early in 
the proceedings, in an effort to disassociate himself and 
the Eisenhower Administration from "negotiations which were
likely to result in an armistice involving concessions to
12Asian Communists." Furthermore, the Administration re­
fused to give even its oral assent to the final declaration 
of the conference. Despite the Administration’s efforts to 
disassociate itself from the Geneva Settlement, it did not 
escape unscathed. Some Congressional disapproval of what 
they considered an unfavorable settlement, was heard none­
theless. Senator Jenner appraised what had occurred in 
Geneva thusly:
■*"^Schoenbrum, ojd. cit. , p. 43.
U Ibid., p. 43-
12Donald lacater "Power Politics At The Geneva 
Conference -1954". The selection is from The Emancipation 
of French Indochina, (hew York, 1961), pp. 313-26, 332-37 
in Gettleman ojd. cit. , p. 129. However, Walter Bedell- 
Smith, the Under Secretary of State, was left behind to 
lead the United States delegation.
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The United States has been out-thought, out-traded, 
and out-generaled. ...
It does no good to say we did not physically sign 
the Geneva agreements. That is an old excuse of 
Pontius Pilate, who washed his hands to keep his 
conscience clear. 13
Senator Jenner, if he had criticized Secretary Dulles'
personal behavior and lack of diplomacy at the conference,
would have been justified. But it is very doubtful whether
the United States would have been able to achieve a more
satisfactory settlement in Geneva. ^  On the other hand,
because the Geneva agreements were not to the Eisenhower
Administration's liking, the Eisenhower-Dulles team went
about altering the settlement.
After the deadline for reunification elections had
passed without either ballot or undue incident, American
15policy in Vietnam up until 1961 was one of continuous
13Bernard B. Balls, The Two Viet-Nams, second revised 
ed., (New York, 1967), p. 253.
■^Bedell Smith, upon his return to Washington stated: 
"I am ... convinced that the results are the best that we 
could possibly have obtained in the circumstances. ... 
diplomacy has rarely been able to gain at the conference 
table what cannot be gained or held on the battlefield." 
Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs 1954, op. cit. 
p. 255.
"^Bernard K. Gordon chooses the year 1962 as the one 
in which Vietnam became of paramount importance. He goes on 
to state that up until that time "the United States had not 
yet made any suggestion that its role in Asian security was 
inextricably linked with its ability specifically to prevent 
South Vietnam from being absorbed by the Hanoi Government." 
Whatever U.S. commitment to South Vietnam that did exist up 
until that time was an incremental combination of specific 
commitments. Bernard K. Gorden, Toward Disengagement In Asia, 
A Strategy for American Eoreign Policy, (Englewood Cliffs,
1969), pT 24.
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aid: ±331 support off the. anti-Communist ruler, Diem. During 
this: period American policy-makers apparently did not see 
the.- ne.e.d to reexamine their policy, despite growing evi­
dence of Diem' 's.. tyrannical rule and the. growing numbers 
among; the, Sbuth.Vietnamese population opposed to his 
regime..
By: X9.6X,when President Kennedy took office, the 
condition of the. Diem .regime had seriously deteriorated and 
waa getting worse.. Relations, between the Diem Government 
and. the1 United States had become:strained during the pre­
vious: year;. The. American. Ambassador to South Vietnam had 
carried so many, messages., of. disapproval from the United 
States,, that: Diem no: lbnggrrwelcorned h i m . F o l l o w i n g  an 
attempts d coup d 'eiat.in.Novemberj .1960, "things had gotten 
even.: worse,, ,P' Pi 'em, believing that:the American Ambassador
had. previous: knowledge: of .the attempt and did not warn the 
X77regime.. President: Kennedy,, .uponi.assuming office, appointed
a  new Atoba^adhr-to: StethhVietnamiwith the hopes "of restor­
ing goad relations: with::Diem" nand :at the same time "attempt­
ing to: influences him:, toward: concessions that would bring his 
regime wider’ support: fro nr: within ..Vietnam and make it politi­
cally easier for the-United States to give him aid he 
THErequested.."'
^Hoger Hilsmar,. To Move A Nation, (Garden City, 
mSlO)„ pp.. 4X9,-420..
I7Ibid., p. 420.
* ^Tifciid..,, pr.. 420..
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During the first year of the Kennedy Administration, 
while the President gave the impression that he believed 
much of the opposition the Diem regime faced was due to 
Diem's own mistakes, the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, was 
speaking of "the determined and ruthless campaign of propa­
ganda, infiltration and subversion by the Communist regime
19in North Viet-Nam to destroy the Republic of Vietnam."
It is particularly interesting in this connection to note 
that Rusk had been Assistant Secretary of State for Par 
Eastern Affairs during 1950-1952, under the Truman Adminis­
tration. It was at this time that the United States began 
to view the Viet Minh resistance to the Prench "as part of
the international aggressive Communist movement of conquest,"
20rather than primarily a colonial war. It is curious that 
even as early as 1950 Mr. Rusk failed to take into account 
"the strong nationalistic motivations of the Vietnamese 
people," in assessing the Vietnam situation. During the 
Pirst Indochina War and later as Secretary of State, Dean 
Rusk continually seemed to have formed his opinions on Viet­
nam on the basis that Ho Chi Minh was a Communist and therefore
21was "being told what to do by Peking and Moscow."
■^Secretary Rusk's New Conference of November 17,
1961. Reported in U.S. Senate Committee on Poreign Relations, 
Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, 
2nd rev. ed., 89th Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 87.
20 •Gruening and Beaser, ojd. cit., p. 201.
21Ibid., p. 201.
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Bhring 1.961 President Kennedy, moved cautiously in
developing his Vietnam policy,, "appreciating the internal
aspects of the conflict,."" and. becoming increasingly fearful
that the- United States "might be following the same dis-
22astrous path" the. Prench.had previously taken. In 
(October 1961,. the President: sent: Maxwell Taylor and Walt 
Rostow: to Vietnam to find out "Whether Vietnamese national­
ism hah turned i'rre.v.o cably against (the United States)" or
■whether it might: still "herve as. a. has is for the fight
23against ■Communism.."' Kennedy,. ih.aftempting to evaluate 
the true state ccf affairs: in: Vietnam.:, was constantly remind­
ed of his awn fact-finding mission. to Vietnam as a Senator 
in 1.951- At that. time. Kennedy had concluded that the Prench 
■were net being; successful, because- they had been unable to 
gain the- support of. the Vietnamese: people.
Fcrticeably- missing: from the:Taylor-Rostow mission 
was any ranking; member' oil thee States Department. Roger 
Bill smar „ who. ini the latterr-parte off thee Kennedy Administra­
tion became Assistant Secretary■offState.for Par Eastern 
Affairs,, stated: the: reason. was. that; .
 he ((Rusk:)) did note want: thee State : Department to
piE^y a prominent rolee in: thee upcoming decisions
Mchmaa: Kb he n: and f Jo hr. ,W. lewis, op. cit., 
m>- 1^ 7/’—I2&-.
■'Arthur- M.. Sehlessiiige r;. A-1. Thou sand Days: John P.
Kennedy in the: White- House.,. (Boston^. 1965)~, p. 545. Maxwell 
Taylor at the time was a general: in. the U.S. Army and Walt 
Rostow a White House aid.
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on Vietnam. For he regarded Vietnam as essentially 
a military problem even though a number of his 
colleagues in the State Department disagreed. 24
Considering Secretary of State Rusk's views on 
Vietnam and the lack of proper State Department represen­
tation on the Taylor-Rostow fact-finding mission, it is 
not surprising that the major theme of the missions 
report to the President was military. The report suggested 
that"the problem was primarily a military one, which could
be solved by a larger commitment of American power includ-
25ing, if necessary, American fighting men." The recommen­
dation to use American combat forces, although qualified in 
the Taylor-Rostow report, was similar to an earlier rec- 
commendation proposed by the Chiefs of Staff in April of 
1961.
24Hilsman, ojo. cit. , p. 421. Arthur Schlessinger 
concurs with Hilsman. He states: "It expressed a conscious
decision by the Secretary of State to turn the Vietnam 
problem over to the Secretary of Defense. Rusk doubtless 
decided to do this because the military aspects seemed to 
him the most urgent ... ." Schlessinger goes on to say that 
"Kennedy doubtless acquiesced because he had more confidence 
in McNamara and Taylor than in the State Department." 
Schlessinger, ojo. cit. , p. 545.
Averell Harriman, who was about to take over as 
Assistant Secretary for the Par East at the time disagreed 
with Rusk. Harriman was sure that the crisis in Vietnam 
"was political in its origins and had resulted from Diem's 
repressive and reactionary policies in face of a Communist- 
managed peasant insurrection." "The trouble with the State 
Department," Harriman said, "is that it always underestimates 
the dynamics of revolution." Ibid., p. 547.
25George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, djo. cit.,
p. 128.
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Theodore C. Sorensen states, in his biography of 
Kennedy, that the President did not approve of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff recommendation concerning combat troops.^
The same was apparently true of the Taylor-Rostow recom­
mendation, for he again refused to send American combat 
forces to Vietnam, while accepting the majority of the 
other recommendations in the report. President Kennedy, 
however, in response to the various reports recommending 
the use of American combat forces in Vietnam,
... tripled the number of advisers to be sent to 
Vietnam, "with officers assigned at the batallion 
level as well as to regiments, to advise in combat 
as well as training, and to aid in unconventional 
as well as conventional warfare. United States 
logistical support was increased (helicopters) to 
fly South Vietnamese soldiers from place to place 
and ultimately as it turned out, into battle).
In addition, more money and more instructors were 
made available to the South Vietnamese Civil Guard 
and Self-Defense Forces. 27
Kennedy's actions, despite his own apparent misgivings, 
conformed to Secretary of State Rusk's credo that the 
problem in Vietnam was primarily a military one. His dec­
ision to increase military aid to Vietnam followed the 
pattern of American foreign policy decisions in Asia since 
the outbreak of the Korean War, which emphasized meeting 
■the Communist threat by means of military force.
s>
It is curious that while Kennedy accepted a neutral­
ist government in Laos, he never serious contemplated a
26Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, (New York, 1965)
p. 652.
27Gruening and Beaser, ojd. cit. , pp. 205-206.
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similar settlement in Vietnam. Schlessinger, then a Special
Consultant to the President, argues that such a policy would
not have worked in Vietnam. He claims that,
... the collapse of the Dulles policy in Laos had 
created the possibility of a neutralist solution 
there; but the survival of that policy in South 
Vietnam, where the government was stronger and 
the army more willing to fight, left us in 1961 
no alternative but to continue the effort of 
1954. 28
However, while Schlessinger may be correct in saying that 
the South Vietnamese Government was stronger than the U,S. 
supported Laotian Government, it is also true the Diem 
Government was not a strong one at that time. The growing 
unrest in Vietnam which had reached serious proportions 
by 1961 and the attempted coup d'elat in late I960 seem to 
be evidence of this fact. Schlessinger's contention regard­
ing the willingness of the Vietnamese army to fight is 
either wishful thinking or a distortion of the facts. Prime 
Minister Nguyen Cao Ky in February, 1966 described the 
army's attitude toward Diem thusly: "We were dying for a
cause, but we saw little evidence that the cause was worth
29laying down our lives for." Therefore, it is more reason­
able to assume that the South Vietnamese Army did not possess 
the "willingness to fight" which further enhanced Diem's 
opponents' chances of success.
The Kennedy Administration in their remaining years
28Schlessinger, ojo. cit. , p. 538.
29Buttinger, ojo. cit. , p. 985*
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in office concentrated on projecting their contention to
the people of the United States and the- world that Communism
was the enemy in South Vietnam, and the insurrection there
was directed from the North. In 1961 the State Department
issued a "White Paper" entitled "A Threat to Peace: North
Vietnam's Effort to Conquer South Vietnam." This document
"sought at every turn to give the impression that hut for
Ho Chi Minh and his cohorts in the North there would he
nothing hut peace and prosperity in South Vietnam."^
Secretary of State Rusk and Under Secretary of State George
Ball attempted to reinforce this impression in all their
Vietnam policy speeches. As an example, in a major address
before the Economic Club of Detroit in 1962, Ball stated:
The struggle in South Vietnam today is not a local 
civil war. It is a carefully planned and motivated 
campaign of subversion and insurgency - equipped 
and directed from Hanoi. 31
And yet later in the same speech the Under Secretary did
admit that,
Strong ties must he developed between local communi­
ties and the Central Government. The village people 
must he helped to acquire a sense of identity with 
the National State. 32
30Gruening and Beaser, ojo. cit. , p. 21.1.
31 ^George W. Ball, "Vietnam: Pree-World Challenge
in Southeast Asia," from an address to the Economic Club 
of Detroit, April 30, 1962, reprinted in Arthur C. Turner : 
and Leonard Ereedman, ed., Tensions in World Affairs,
(Belmont, California, 1964-), p. 297*
52Ibid., p. 300.
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Prom Mr. Ball’s latter statement one would conclude that 
the people in many areas of South Vietnam neither supported 
nor identified themselves with the Government at that time.
It would, therefore, seem reasonable to assume that much of 
the South Vietnamese population were either opposed to the 
Dien government or were indifferent, not caring what side 
won the war, as long as there was some hope that living con­
ditions would improve. In the latter case the people were 
quite vulnerable to Communist propaganda promises; in the 
former case, if these people were the ones responsible for 
attempting to dispose the government, it was civil war.
In either case the major problem in South Vietnam was 
internal. The State Department, however, refused to accept 
that fact.
The State Department, if they had t.o focus on
the theme of aggression, would have done themselves a favor
as well as perhaps sparing thousands of American boys and
millions of Vietnamese people the brutalities brought about
by the escalation of the War. While there is little doubt
that the Communists were involved in the insurrection, they-
found ready allies in the Vietnamese nationalists. While
in reality there was some aggression from the North, there
was also civil war. While some of the revolutionaries were
33Communist, some were nationalists. But perhaps because
^Richard N. Goodwin, Triumph or Tragedy, Reflec­
tions on Vietnam, (New York, 1966), p.~?5• Also see 
Buttinger, ojd. cit. , pp. 981-992.
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the situation in South Vietnam was so complex and therefore 
had no easy or single solution, the United States Government 
deluded itself into believing that Hanoi-controlled aggres­
sion was the major if not the sole problem, in which case 
the solution became simple - additional military commitment.
During 1962 and 1963 the situation in Vietnam stead- 
34ily deteriorated. The United States during that time
increased the amount of aid and the number of its advisers
to the Diem regime, despite the growing rift inside the■
Kennedy Administration over its Vietnam policy. Arthur
Schlessinger, Jr., a Consultant to the President at that
time, writes that the group of dissenters to the Vietnam
policy, was led by Averell Harriman, then Assistant Secretary
of State for Par Eastern Affairs, who insisted the United
35States was on the wrong course in South Vietnam. However, 
the Rusk-McNamara coalition remained content with the 
military predominance of the United States' Vietnam policy, 
and their views were to win out at that time.
^‘Htfhile from hindsight there is no doubt that this 
was the case, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense 
McNamara, and General Harkins, head of the American advisers 
in Vietnam at that time, all claimed the opposite was true.
In the spring of 1963 Secretary McNamara authorized the 
Defense Department to announce "we have turned the corner 
in Vietnam" and General Harkins predicted that the war would 
be won "within the year." Schlessinger, 0£. cit., p. 982.
35^uRoger Hilsman, then head of the State Department 
Office of Intelligence and Research, and Michael Porrestal, 
a White House Aid, were others to share Harriman's views.
Ibid., p. 984.
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Up until August, 1963 American leaders had put 
little pressure on the Saigon regime to initiate reforms 
in South Vietnam, even though numerous reports had noted 
the necessity of such reforms. The Kennedy Administration 
had consistently requested Diem to adopt various reform 
measures with each additional outlay of assistance. Diem 
neglected the requests.
Early in May, 1963 open conflict between the Diem 
regime and the Buddhist organizations erupted. The Buddhist 
crisis began on May 8, 1963, when the Buddhists of Hue 
protested a Diem order forbidding them to display their 
religious flags. Troops were ordered to disburse the pro­
testers which resulted in open confrontation between the 
Government Eorces and the Buddhist in which nine persons 
were killed. The nine deaths added to the Buddhist's 
furor and as a result the number of demonstrations increased, 
including human sacrifices, protesting against the Diem 
regime. Buddhist .leaders demanded that Diem punish those 
responsible for the murders on May 8 and compensate the 
families of the victims, but he refused to meet these demands.
Washington became deeply concerned about the Buddhist 
crisis in South Vietnam. The Kennedy Administration not 
only felt guilty in supporting a regime that seemed to prac­
tice religious persecutions, but there was also grave con­
cern that the growing public resistance to Diem would hinder
36Buttinger, ojo. cit., p. 993.
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3 7the war effort against the "communists." The latter fear
is guite understandable considering that probably about
70 per cent of the Vietnamese people considered themselves 
■58
Buddhist. President Kennedy, disgruntled by Diem's, 
unwillingness to reconcile the Buddhists, instructed the 
American Ambassador in Vietnam to warn Diem that if he 
failed to compose the Buddhist struggle, the United States 
might publically disavow his Buddhist policy. In a tele­
vision interview on September 2, 1963, the President told, 
an American public,which had become enraged by what they 
considered a religious persecution,
The repressions against the Buddhist ... were very 
unwise ... all we could do is make it clear that 
we don't think this is the way to win. 39
During the same interview discussing the general situation
of the war effort, Kennedy said:
I don't think that unless a greater effort is made 
by the government to win popular support that the 
war can be won there. In the final analysis, it 
is their war. They are the ones who have to win 
it or lose it. We can help them, we can give 
them equipment, we can send our men out there as 
advisers, but they have to win it - the people 
of Vietnam - against the Communists. ... In 
the last two months the Government (Saigon) has 
gotten out of touch with the people. 40
One week later in another national broadcast Presi­
dent Kennedy reiterated that the United States was using
37Ibid., p. 995. Schlessinger, op. cit., p. 987.
58Ibid., p. 993.
39Gruening and Beaser, ojd. cit. , pp. 226-227.
40Ibid., p. 226.
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its influence on the Saigon regime to take steps to "win
hack the support of the people." Particularly interesting
was Kennedy's mention that he feared Vietnam might become
a situation similar to the one the United States faced in
the Chinese civil war after World War II. He stated:
Strongly in our mind is what happened in the case 
of China at the end of World War II, where China 
was lost, a weak government became increasingly 
unable to control events. We don't want that. 41
In effect, Kennedy was admitting, contrary to official 
State Department releases, that not all the opposition to 
Diem stemmed from Hanoi's aggression. At the same time, 
however, it is apparent that he did not believe the situa­
tion in Vietnam had deteriorated to the point where a policy 
of containment had no chance of success, as 'Truman had 
believed was the case in China. Kennedy, although never 
seriously contemplating American disengagement in Vietnam, 
at that time, made it clearly known that while he intended 
to continue the American commitment, he was not in total 
agreement with Saigon's policies and would be forced to 
cut-back American assistance to Vietnam, if that government
continued to pursue policies which alienated the Vietnamese 
42populace. Above all he believed that the United States 
must restrain itself from taking over control of the war 
effort. For in doing so the United States would convert
o
41Hilsman, ojd. cit. , p. 505.
42Schlessinger, ojd. cit. , p. 547.
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the Vietnam struggle into a white man's war, in which case 
the United States would lose as the French had lost a 
decade earlier. President Kennedy's fearful prophecy 
became reality during the Johnson Administration.
On September 12, 1963 the President stated the
objectives of his Administration's Vietnam policy:
... we have a very simple policy in that area 
(Vietnam) ... we want the war to be won, the 
Communists to be contained, and the Americans 
to go home. 43
At•,that time he again referred to his growing
disenchantment with Diem's policies, stating:
What helps to win the war, we support; what 
interferes with the war effort, we oppose. 44
The Kennedy Administration was planning to place 
heavy pressures on Diem forcing him to alter his aggres­
sive policies, but before they were applied Diem was 
assasinated (November 1, 1963). A military junta led by 
General Duong Van Minh took control of the Saigon Govern­
ment. The New York Times summed up the Kennedy Administra­
tion's attitude toward the coupd'etat thusly:
The Administration welcomes the coup d'etat in 
South Vietnam, assumes that its policies helped 
to bring it about and is confident of greater 
progress now in the war against the Communist 
guerillas. 45
43Hilsman, ojo. cit. , p. 506.
^ Ibid. , p. 506.
45 ’Max Prankel, New York Times, November 2, 1963 
in Kahin and Lewis, ojo. cit., p. 145.
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The Times description obviously did not correspond to the 
Government's official statement, but it did describe fairly 
accurately the actual attitude of the men in the Kennedy 
Administration.
However, before President Kennedy had time to eval­
uate the new regime in Saigon, and perhaps alter his Vietnam 
policy because of the leadership change, he, too, was struck 
down by an assassin.
By the end of the Kennedy Presidency the war in . 
Vietnam had become a major problem for American foreign policy­
makers. During those years the Communist had steadily in­
creased their strength. The National Liberation Pront, the 
political organization of the Viet-Cong, which had emerged 
in 19604  ^and had received open verbal support from Hanoi, 
was well established at the time of Kennedy's death. In 
many parts of rural Vietnam it had established an alterna­
tive de facto government, "the degree of its administrative
47authority varying from province to province." Much of the 
Vietnamese populace had become alienated from the Saigon 
Government because of Diem's oppressive policies. As the 
situation in South Vietnam deteriorated, the Kennedy policy
46
There are some indications of the prior establish­
ment of the Liberation Pront. Yale anthropologist Gerald 
Hickey wrote in J1958 that in a South Vietnamese village he 
studied, had "for the first time experienced the activities 
of a relatively new political movement - the Mai Tran Dan 
Tac Gioi Phong Mien Nam Viet Nam (National Pront for the 
Liberation of Vietnam)" Gerald Hickey, Village in Vietnam 
in K a h m  and Lewis, ojo. cit. , p. 110-111 ff.
47Ibid., p. 145.
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became one of increased American support and aid, both
military and economic, to the Saigon regime. President
Kennedy/"personally seemed to have believed the problem
in Vietnam was more than just a military one,;requiring a
dRmilitary commitment. However, Kennedy did little more 
than recommend that the Saigon Government initiate a pro­
gram for land reforms; for the most part such recommenda­
tions went unheeded in Saigon. The number of American 
advisers in Vietnam, increased from approximately 750 in .
1961 to about 17,000 by the end of 1963.^ The United 
States, during the Kennedy Administration, became more 
directly involved in the Vietnam war, yet it had been able 
to retain a position where the military struggle in Vietnam 
remained essentially Vietnamese. While Kennedy's policy 
enlarged the American commitment in Vietnam, thus reducing 
to some degree the following Administration's choice in its 
Vietnam policy, "he did succeed in keeping both the 'militar­
ization' and the 'Americanization' of the struggle in Viet-
50nam within tolerable limits."
A Q
Schlessinger states that "Kennedy, beset by the 
missile crisis, Congressional elections, Skybolt, deGaulle, 
Latin America, the test ban negotiations and the civil rights 
fight, had little time to focus on Southeast Asia. " Instead, 
his confidence in McNamara, led the President to go along 
with the Secretary of Defense's policy. Schlesinger, op.cit.,
p. 982.
49Senator Vance Harke, The American Crisis In 
Vietnam, (New York, 1968), p. 3£7
50Hilsman, ojo. cit. , p. 579. Also see Harke, 
op. cit., p. 37•
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President Johnson inherited the problems of Ameri­
ca!' ss Vietnam: policy at ar_time* . as stated above, when the 
attaj^gie: was: stilli essentially; between the Vietnamese. 
While thee American-involvement :ih_Vietnam had increased,
asc to which.direction the. Vietnam policy would take.
Shortly after Lyndon Johnson assumed the Presidency, 
the Secretary General of the;United Nations, U Thant, is • 
reported to have met-with him and conveyed a message from
ILtfc is: bedieved. that, at that time Ho Chi Minh’s recommenda-
tians consisted of. a coalition government for South Vietnam
and' the neutralization of South Vietnam. ~ President Johnson
dfficb not; immediately"react":to:the-message of U Thant but his
Hew; Year-*i messages to: South. Vietnam's leader, General. Duong
VSar. Minh',, cieariy: s±ated:.his^refusal to accept any settlement
tihufc ihcdhdsd: thee neutralization: o>f: South Vietnam. \ In the
rrreeeage: PTesi dert" Johnson stated : :
Hfeuttcaiihatibn'.off Shut if: Vietnam .would only be 
another, name. for. a Communist take over. ... The 
Unitad States, will continue to furnish you and 
yonzr people with:the-., fullest .measure of support 
im this- bitter.-fighte .... .We shall maintain in 
Vietnam: American personnel and materials needed 
ttoo assist: you.: in:achieving victory. 52
Thu neutralization:offSSuih:Vietnam: at that time would have
DiikuCy; Xedd to: aaChmmundst^eontroiled Government. General
thu Johnson: Administration was: still "afforded some options
Hu Chi Minh:proposing^ discussions on a possible settlement
"nuhih: and - Lewis 5 . op: . cit r r p. 145.
52Hew York Times, January 1 and 2, 1964.
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Duong Van Minh had been in control of the South Vietnam
Government less than two months and there was no evidence
that he had been able to consolidate firm control in that
short period. The questionable stability of the new Saigon
government and the strength of the Communists, in a neutralized
Vietnam, would have likely resulted in a situation similar
to Laos, where the Communists had increased their area of
control after the nation was neutralized in 1962. President
Johnson's position on the possible neutralization of Vietnam
was the same as that of his predecessor, President Kennedy,
whose policies he had pledged to continue. However, unlike
the Kennedy Administration's rationale for believing neutral-
53ization unacceptable. President Johnson's reasons seem 
much more realistic. At the same time, Johnson's unwilling­
ness to accept neutralization as a basis for a settlement 
and his promise to continue American assistance to Saigon 
to achieve "victory", made a settlement at that time 
impossible from Hanoi's viewpoint.
The year 1964 witnessed a growing discontent with 
American involvement in the Vietnam War among U.S. Congress­
men and the American press. Some Congressmen were calling 
for a reevaluation of the entire United States containment 
policy in Asia, as had similarly been done during the Korean 
War. Senator Mike Mansfield, a leading member of the 
Senate's Poreign Relations Committee stated that the time
~^Vide Supra, pp. 15-16.
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had come for the United States to "face up to the realities
54of today, and not depend on the wishes of yesterday."
The problem, however, among Congressional critics and 
between Congressional critics and the Administration was 
that there was little agreement on what those realities 
were.
President Johnson proceded very cautiously with his 
Vietnam policy in 1964 because it was an election year. The
..’■ v A - W o  vy A-'vor
American people were aligning Afchemselves--4nte^ two main cate­
gories: the "hawks", those advocating the escalation of the
war, and the "doves", those advocating the United States to
withdraw troops from Vietnam. President Johnson, not wishing 
to alienate any sector of the electorate chose a middle of 
the road stand on Vietnam.
While Vietnam evolved into a campaign issue in the 
United States, the situation in Vietnam continued to deter­
iorate, and the failures of American policy became more 
apparent. By the end of July, 1964,
Prance was calling for the neutrality of Indochina. 
Cambodia had begun to accept Russian military aid.
Civil strife had broken out in Laos over which the 
United States had begun reconnaissance flights
and had lost two planes early in June, 1964. 55
On August 2nd and 4th the now much questioned Gulf
of Tonkin incidents occurred. According to the Secretary of
Defense, on these dates, three North Vietnamese PT boats
54Gruening and Beaser, 0£. cit., p. 230.
55Ibid., p. 235.
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attacked an American destroyer. These attacks, according 
to Secretary McNamara, were unprovoked and occured in 
International waters. President Johnson, on August 4 in 
a nationwide broadcast, told the American people of these 
hostile acts committed by the North Vietnamese. The Ameri­
can people were told that aggression "by terror against 
the peaceful villagers of South Vietnam" had been joined".
"by open aggression on the high seas against the United
56States." The United States would respond to the belli­
gerent acts in a "limited and fitting" manner. Johnson's 
"limited and fitting" response turned out to be retaliatory 
bombing raids on Vietnamese PT boats and petroleum dumps.
While the Congress at that time did not criticize the 
President's actions, in retrospect the bombing raids do
seem to have gone beyond the scope of a "limited and fitting" 
57response. The President in justifying the need to retal­
iate and in determining the form the retaliation should take, 
pushed aside the fact that the American destroyer was not 
damaged in the alleged attack and that two Vietnamese PT 
boats were sunk. In so far as the U.S. Navy had already
56rbid., p. 236.
57In April, 1964 "Ambassador Adlai Stevenson told 
the Security Council the United States had 'repeatedly1 
expressed its emphatic disapproval of 'retaliatory raids, 
whenever they occur and by whomever they are committed.'"
The United .States then voted for the resolution which 
condemned "reprisals as incompatible with the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations." On November 25, 1966, 
the United States voted to censure Isreal for her reprisal 
raid on Samu, Jordan. Harke, ojo. cit., p. 50.
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punished the aggressor, the addition of the bombing raids 
seemed to be out of proportion to the actual "crime" commit­
ted. However, today it is quite apparent that the Johnson 
Administration used the Gulf of Tonkin incident as an 
excuse to escalate the war, a policy that some members of 
the Administration had been advising for some time.
In addition the President went to the Congress and 
asked them for a resolution "affirming the national deter­
mination that all such attacks will be met, and that the.
United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting
58the free nations of the area defend their freedom." The
vast majority of Congressmen enraged by the "alleged" attack
on the American vessel willingly and hurriedly consented
to Johnson's petition. The final resolution stated,
That the Congress approves and supports the deter­
mination of the President, as Commander in Chief, 
to take all necessary measures to repel an armed 
attack against the forces of the United States and 
to prevent further aggression. 59
The resolution because of the ambigious meaning of the phrase
"and to prevent further aggression," came back and haunted
many Congressmen. Because the resolution did not qualify
what was meant by further aggression or against whom the
aggression had to be directed, the President in 1965 used
58President's Message to Congress, August 5, 1964. 
Department of State Bulletin, August 24, 1964, pp. 261-263.
59Southeast Asia Resolution, Background Information 
Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, op. cit., p. 128.
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the resolution as a justification for increased American 
involvement and escalation of the war in Vietnam, against
the protest of some Congressmen, men who voted for the
/ \
resolution-, not realizing the possible repercussions of
their action.
Although the United States unilaterally responded
to the Gulf of Tonkin incident, it did also protest the
North Vietnamese attacks in the Security Council of the
United Nations. However, the protest consisted merely of
verbal denunciation of the attacks, and at no time did the
United States ask the Council to assume jurisdiction of
the Vietnam conflict.
The retaliatory bombing raids had set the stage
for American escalation of the Vietnam war; yet President
Johnson on the "campaign trail" during the months of
September and October gave no indication that the United
States intended to do so. On the contrary, he constantly
criticized his Republican opponent, Barry Goldwater, for
even suggesting that the U.S. bomb North Vietnam and use
nuclear, weapons if necessary to win the war. Johnson said:
I want to be very cautious and careful and use it 
only as a last resort, when I start dropping bombs 
around that are likely to involve American boys in 
a war in Asia with 700,000,000 Chinese. So just 
for the moment I have not thought that we were 
ready for American boys to do the fighting for 
Asian boys.... 60
e
Nearing the end of the 1964 presidential campaign, Lyndon
6Q
Brown, ojd. cit. , p. 327.
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Johnson reiterated unequivocably "We are not going to send 
American hoys nine or ten thousand miles away to do what 
Asian hoys ought to he doing for themselves. President 
Johnson’s statements throughout the campaign gave no indica­
tion that he would escalate the American involvement in 
Vietnam, as his "war monger" opponent had suggested the 
United States should do. The homhing raids on North Viet­
nam were presented as "just retaliation" and not as it 
turned out, the initial step in a pattern of escalation. 
Johnson's promise to keep American hoys out of comhat in 
Vietnam, turned out to he nothing hut campaign oratory,as 
the American people found out within the year.
During the presidential campaign, President De 
Gaulle of Prance and Secretary-General U Thant appealed to 
President Johnson to hegin negotiations for a Vietnam 
settlement, hy calling for a reconvening of the Geneva Con­
ference. Johnson, on the advice of his political advisers 
neglected the appeals, stating that such a consideration 
should he postponed until after the Presidential elections. 
Yet, after the election had come and gone and President 
Johnson had heen elected in one of the greatest landslides 
ever recorded in a Presidential election, he again rejected 
U Thant’s proposal. Eric Sevareid in an article in look 
magazine, November 30, 1965 states:
6lIhid., p. 327.
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In the early autumn of 1964 ... U Thant ... pri­
vately obtained agreement from authorities in 
North Vietnam that they would send an emissary to 
talk with an American emissary in Rengoon, Burma. 
Someone in Washington insisted that this attempt 
be postponed until after the Presidential elec­
tion. When the election was over, U Thant again 
pursued the matter. Hanoi was still willing to 
send its man. But Defense Secretary McNamara 
... opposed the attempt. He said the South 
Vietnamese Government would have to be informed 
and it would have a demoralizing effect on them; 
that government was shaky enough, as it was ... .
U Thant was furious over this failure of his 
patient efforts. 62
Secretary McNamara's statement that Saigon "govern­
ment was shaky," was an understatement. At the end of 
October 1964 a civilian government was installed in Saigon, 
the fourth government since Diem in 1963. The civilian
government, however, did not find favor among the Buddhists
63who soon organized demonstrations against it. Premier 
Huong's civilian government lasted until January 27, 1965 
when the military leaders led by General Khanh staged a 
successful coup. While American officials became increas­
ingly concerned about General Khanh's growing opposition 
to "the U.S. political presence in Saigon," and anti-Ameri­
can feelings grew in South Vietnam,^^the Viet Cong were 
able to increase their already strong position. Some men 
in the Johnson Administration believed South Vietnam had
62Eric Severeid, Look, November 30, 1965 in 
Gruening and Beaser, ojo. cit. , pp. 256-257.
Kahin and lewis, ojd. cit. , p. 164.
64Ibid., pp. 164-168.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 4 6
reached the point where it could not he "saved" without 
a heavy U.S. commitment, that included combat forces 
if need be.
On February 7, 1965 the Vietcong attacked a United 
States military compound at Pleiku. Seven Americans were 
killed and 109 were wounded as a result. The United States 
"enraged" by the terrorists action again bombed the North 
as a "retaliatory" measure. However, some evidence has 
since come to light, that the bombings were planned pre­
vious to the Pleiku attack, and were therefore not merely
65retaliatory actions. Pleiku was a convenient opportunity 
that the Johnson Administration was able to use as justifi­
cation for action they had every intention of taking in any 
event. The United States had already decided to bomb the 
North in an effort to reduce the infiltration of forces 
from there,that the American leaders claimed was responsible 
for the deterioriating situation in the South.^ Further­
more, it is "coincidental" and "convenient" that in February 
1965, the United States State Department came out with a 
"White Paper" on Vietnam entitled, ""Aggression From The 
North: The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign to Conquer
65Charles Roberts, a White House reporter for 11 
years, has said that Johnson told him in May, 1965 that 
he, Johnson, had made the decision to bomb four months 
before Pleiku, in October,^1964 at the height of the 
Presidential Campaign. HarTce, ojo. cit., p. 51.
^Brown, ojd. cit. , pp. 353-336. Also see Gruening 
and Beaser, ojo. cit. , pp. 265-284.
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South Vietnam."
Upon reading the State Department's "White Paper" 
one would find that it is nothing more than a justification 
for American escalation. The "facts" presented in the docu­
ment do give reasonable evidence that some aggression from 
the North existed. However, at the same t'ime the evidence 
is not so concrete as to disprove that the cause of the 
war in Vietnam was essentially the South Vietnamese people's - 
dissatisfaction with the Saigon Government. Yet, even in 
"proving" that there was aggression from the North, the 
State Department found it necessary to distort some of the 
facts. Por. instance the "White Paper" refers to the Inter­
national Control Commission's reports that stated "there 
was 'sufficient evidence to show beyond a reasonable doubt' 
that North Vietnam had sent arms and men into South Vietnam 
to carry out subversion with the aim of overthrowing the 
legal Government t h e r e . W h a t  the document does not 
state, however, is that the same Commission's report also 
found the governments of South Vietnam and the United States 
in violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954- In examining 
the figures cited in the "White Paper" concerning the number 
of Communist weapons captured and the number of "infiltrees" 
from the North it is difficult for many to come to the same 
conclusion as the State Department - if the "other side"
C . **7
"Aggression Prom the North, The Record of North 
Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet-Nam" Department 
of State Publication 7839, (Washington, D.C., 1965).
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would halt its aggression everything would he all right 
in South Vietnam. The "White Paper" does nothing more 
than give some "evidence" that North Vietnam supports 
the guerrillas in South Vietnam, hut that is no more a 
secret than that the United States supports the South 
Vietnamese government against them.^®
The American "retaliatory" homhing raids following 
the Communist attack at Pleiku in February, 1965, were 
continued during the following month. However, the homh­
ing soon proved ineffective. The insurgency and terror
in South Vietnam and the number of men infiltrating from
69the North increased, rather than diminished. As the 
"Americanization" of the war became more apparent, with no 
solution in sight and as the number of casualties increas­
ed, especially the number of civilian casualties, people 
from all parts of the world and from all walks of life began 
to heavily criticize the United States Vietnam policy. In 
March, 1965 seventeen non-aligned nations issued a statement 
expressing their concern about the "aggravation of the 
situation in Vietnam" and stated that it was their belief 
that foreign military intervention was responsible for the 
situation. The group of nations called for negotiations, 
without any preconditions "so that a political solution
C . o
See I. P. Stone, "A Reply to the White Paper," 
G-ettleman, 0£. cit. , pp. 535-341.
69Brown, ojo. cit♦ , p. 334.
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to the problem of Vietnam may be found in accordance with
70the legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people."
The United States reply to the non-aligned nations' request 
was made on April 8. Its content was a reiteration of the 
American position - negotiations were possible the moment 
the aggression from North Vietnam ceased.
President Johnson, on the previous day, had deliv­
ered his celebrated speech on Vietnam at John Hopkins.
This address is very important because it is the most thor­
ough statement of the Johnson's Administration's Vietnam 
policy. In the first part of the speech President Johnson 
states the reason why the United States is involved in 
Vietnam.
... we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every 
American President has offered support to the 
people of South Vietnam. ... we made a pledge to 
help South Vietnam defend its independence. 71
This reason, while heavily used by defenders of President 
Johnson's policy, is too shallow a reason to justify the 
heavy commitment of the United States to Vietnam. More­
over, in reviewing his predecessors' correspondence with 
the South Vietnamese government, the "pledge" President 
Johnson spoke of is in reality an interpretation on his 
part, rather than an actual fact. President Eisenhower 
and Kennedy both offered assistance to Saigon, but with
____________________________________________ o_________________________
70G-ruening and Beaser, ojo. cit♦ , p. 279.
^ Department of State Bulletin LVI, April 26, 1965,
pp. 606-610.
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the understanding that certain conditions be met. In so
far as Saigon more often than not neglected to initiate
many of the reforms suggested by the American Presidents,
it would seem that the United States technically could
rescind its offer. President Johnson, himself, must have
had some doubts concerning the nature of America's
"pledge" for he felt it necessary to give further reasons
for his Administration's policy.
We are there to strengthen world order. Around 
the globe, from Berlin to Thailand, are people 
whose well-being rests in part on the belief 
they can count on us if they are attacked. To 
leave Viet-Uam to its fate would shake the 
confidence of all these peoples......  72
We are also there because there are great stakes 
in the balance . . . .
We have (responsibility) there for the same 
reason we have a responsibility for the defense 
of Europe. World War II was fought in both 
Europe and Asia, and when it ended we found 
ourselves with continued responsibility for the 
defense of freedom. 73
The latter two reasons offered by Lyndon Johnson were the 
core reasons for the United States' involvement in Vietnam. 
The Johnson Administration perceived a Communist victory 
in Vietnam as a threat to its post-war policy of contain­
ment. What President Johnson was unable to realize or 
acknowledge was that American policy and perceptions, 
especially his Administrations', had elevated the predom­
inately civil war in South Vietnam to the plateau of a
75Ibid.
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Cold War struggle.
In defining the real enemy in Vietnam Johnson said
The confused nature of this conflict cannot mask 
the fact that it is the new fact of an old enemy.
Oyer this war - and all Asia - is ... the deepening 
shadow of Communist China. ... It is a nation 
which is helping the forces of violence in almost 
-every continent. The contest in Viet-Nam is part 
of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes. 74
According to President Johnson therefore, Communist China
75was the stage manager of the insurgency in Vietnam.
Despite the fact that no Chinese soldiers had taken part 
in the struggle in South Vietnam, the United States pre­
sumably was defending Saigon from Chinese domination.
What is especially curious is that the same China was un­
willing to give more than verbal support to Hanoi back in 
1955-56, when Hanoi desperately needed assistance if its 
demand that the elections subscribed to in the Geneva 
Accords was to be realized.
President Johnson in stating his reasons why the 
United States was in Vietnam and in defining Communist 
China as the ultimate enemy there had implicitly placed 
Vietnam in the wider framework of America's containment 
policy in Asia. In stating his response to the Communist 
challenge in Vietnam it becomes explicit.
... we must say in Southeast Asia as we did in 
Wueope, in the words of the Bible: 'Hitherto
shalt thou come, but no further.' 76
74Ibid.
75Broun, ojo. cit. , p. 535.
7^Department of State Bulletin, April, 26, 1955.
op. cit.
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The President made perfectly clear his Administration’s
determination to win the war in Vietnam.
We will not he defeated. We will not grow tired.
We will not withdraw; either openly or under the 
cloak of a meaningless agreement. 77
At the same time, the President went on to speak of his
willingness to explore the possibilities of an early
peaceful settlement to the war:
We will never be second in the search for a 
peaceful settlement in Vietnam.
We have stated this position over and over 
again fifty times and more, to friend and 
foe alike. We remain ready, with this 
purpose, for unconditional discussions. 78
Yet, the phrase "unconditional discussions" must denote
a different meaning to President Johnson than it does to
other men; for on the very next day, as has already been
noted, Johnson's reply to a similar request by a group of
non-aligned nations, demanded a pre-condition.
In the latter part of this address Johnson spoke of
the need to improve the "life of man in that conflict-torn
79.corner of our world." He divulged his plans for a 
billion-dollar American investment on a Mekong River pro­
ject, which potentially could provide food, water and 
power to dwarf America's own TVA. While the project itself 
was a constructive ideal, practically it could only bring
77Ibid.
78Ipid. •
79Ibid.
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about its intended objectives if there was peace. General 
Maxwell Taylor once used a revealing phrase which appro­
priately describes the necessity of peace first - it is 
"difficult to plant corn outside the stockade when the 
Indians are still around."®^1
Despite President Johnson's expressed readiness 
for a peace settlement in Vietnam, the mighty arms which 
he claimed were "symbols of human failures" were soon 
increased. The number of. bombing raids were increased 
and more American boys were sent to Vietnam. There was, 
therefore, a credibility gap between the President's verbal 
desires to find a peaceful settlement and his decision to 
further escalate the war. It is difficult to understand 
how or why the Administration concluded that Hanoi would 
be willing to talk peace while under heavy bombardment.
Even if the bombing seriously crippled Hanoi's war efforts, 
which later evidence indicated it did not, for Hanoi to go 
to the peace table under such conditions, would have, in 
effect, been an act of surrender.
When the increased bombing raids produced no visible 
productive results, world and domestic pressures were ex­
erted on Johnson to halt them. Under these conditions 
Johnson decided to suspend the bombing to give Hanoi a
80 * 'Stanley Hoffmann in a letter published by the
Hew York Times May 1, 1966 reprinted in Stanley Hoffmann,
Gulliver's Troubles, Or The Setting of American Poreign
Policy, (Hew York, 19*58), p. 384.
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chance to honorably seek negotiations. The homhing was 
halted from May 12 to May 18, 1965. At the end of the 
six days the United States claimed Hanoi had made no 
response; it therefore not only continued the bombing but 
increased again the number of bombing raids and the number 
of American forces in Vietnam. Also in May, 1965, Presi­
dent Johnson went to the Congress and received additional 
appropriations to carry out the United States' war effort 
in Vietnam. In July, 1965 the number of American troops, 
in Vietnam was increased by 75 per cent. The American 
escalation continued until late 1965, but there was no 
sign of the struggle ending. On the contrary, since the 
Johnson Administration had embarked on its program of esca­
lation, the potentially explosive nature of the Vietnam war 
had increased. It became noticeably evident that both the 
Soviet Union and Communist China had increased their 
assistance to Hanoi.
In 1965 as large-scale American combat troops were
introduced into South Vietnam a war alarm occurred in the
81major cities throughout southern and coastal China.
"Pitched to the slogan of preparing for war 'sooner rather 
than later, nuclear as well as conventional,' a Chinese 
civil defense campaign built up, complete with air-raid 
drills, pamphlets and films on protection against atomic
^Aliens S. Whiting, "How We Almost Went To War 
With China," look, April 29, 1969, p. 77.
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fallout."82 In early May, 1965 the Chinese Chief of Staff 
Lo Jui-Ching claimed, "We will go on supporting and aiding 
the Vietnamese people, whether or not U.S. imperialism
85bomhs our country and whether or not it enlarges the war." 
Johnson's policy of escalation threatened to touch off a 
major war with China, hut was ineffective in bringing about 
a swift end to the Vietnamese war.
The year 1965 was a time of low morale in South 
Vietnam for another Saigon government had fallen. American 
casualties were rapidly rising as were American critics of 
the Johnson Vietnam policy. As the United States took 
over the major combat functions in Vietnam, President
Johnson explained, "We did not choose to be the guardians
84 ,
at the gate, but there is no one else." Yet, in reality
nothing could be farther from the truth. Since 1954,
immediately following the Geneva Conference, the United States
had followed a policy of self-appointed guardians of Saigon
regimes. Granted, the previous Administrations may not have
laid the basis of a sound Vietnam policy, but no one had
forced the Johnson Administration to escalate the war; it
was their decision and their mistake.
At the end of 1965 and during the first month of
82Ibid., p. 77.
85Ibid., p. 77.
8^Broun, ojo. cit. , p. 341.
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1966, President Johnson again suspended the bombing. The 
bombing operations had proved to be a dismal failure in 
bringing Hanoi to its knees, while the threat of a wider 
war with Communist China intensified in late 1965. In the 
early fall of 1965 Mao had sent regular forces of the 
Chinese People's Liberation Army to North' Vietnam. While 
these forces were primarily engaged in railroad, road and 
bridge construction, there existed the possibility of
85Chinese troops joining Hanoi in the case of a U.S. invasion. 
Purthermore, Chinese anti-aircraft units moved in to protect 
vital targets in North Vietnam, and to shield Chinese engin­
eering and construction personnel.8^
On January 7, 1966, during the 37-day bombing halt 
Secretary of State Rusk issued his Pourteen Points for 
negotiations in response to Hanoi's Pour Points, issued in
on
April, 1965. At that time Rusk said "the two positions
were really not far apart" and "certainly, there was reason
88for negotiations on the basis of both positions." How­
ever, Secretary Rusk's optimism was based on the American 
condition that Hanoi was willing to back down on their
85Whiting, ojd. cit. , p. 77.
86Ibid., p. 77.
87
Hanoi issued its Pour Points as a basis for 
negotiations less than one week after President Johnson's 
speech at John Hopkins University, where he stated the 
U.S. was always ready for "unconditional discussions."
88Broun, oj d. cit. , p. 341.
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position that any negotiations include the National Libera­
tion Front. Hanoi- could not accept Rusk's condition; to 
do so -would have been an admission of guilt by Hanoi, that 
they were aggressors. Not only that, but Hanoi realisti­
cally knew that any settlement without the NLF, would not 
be lasting. Mr. Rusk made it clear that until Hanoi was 
willing to agree to this condition, there existed no basis 
for negotiations as far as the Johnson Administration was 
concerned. In explaining the Administration's position, 
the Secretary said:
If the Vietcong come to the conference table 
as full partners, they will ... in a sense 
have been victorious in the very aims that 
South Vietnam and the United States are 
pledged to prevent. 89
The question arises,what aims are the governments of Saigon 
and the United States pledged to prevent? By examining the 
policy statements of the United States and Saigon one must 
conclude that both governments are attempting to prevent 
the forceful conquest of South Vietnam by the Communists, 
or in more positive terms to secure the right of self-deter­
mination for the Vietnamese people. To admit the Vietcong 
to the conference table, does not necessarily abandon these 
goals. What it does,is admit the fact that the Vietcong 
are a southern grouping and that the war in Vietnam is 
essentially a civil war. While the United States consis­
tently claimed the Vietcong was merely a "southern arm" of
^New York Times, January 29, 1966.
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Hanoi, it must "be remembered Hanoi Has also consistently
claimed that the Saigon regime is nothing more than a
puppet of the United States. Therefore, Hanoi, while
repeatedly denying recognition of the Saigon regime as
the legitimate government of South Vietnam, was willing
to concede to their presence at the conference table„ If
the United States seriously desired negotiations, and one
accepts compromise as an essential part of negotiation,
then Hanoi's insistence on HUE1 representation was not
unreasonable. The request was unreasonable as far as the
Johnson Administration was concerned because it did not
desire compromise, but all-out victory. Their refusal to
grant the N1D representation was "intrinsically bound to
the theory that (the United States is) resisting a war of
90aggression and the opening blow for world conquest."
While American soldiers continued to die at the hands of 
the Vietcong, the Johnson Administration found it impossible 
to recognize its political arm, the HLF, and begin meaning­
ful negotiations.
On January 31, 1966 the Administration resumed its 
.aerial attacks with "even greater punch." Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk explained that the bombing was resumed 
because "the response has been negative, harsh, unyield­
ing ... . "91
a
■^Harke, ojo. cit., p. 63*
91Ibid., p. 58.
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Meanwhile, the Johnson policy of escalation was 
receiving increasing criticism in the United States. The 
.Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January, 1966 began 
hearings on Vietnam. During the hearings the Senate 
Committee heard the testimony of many distinguished Ameri­
cans who were opposed to the Administration's policy. The 
reasons for their opposition were varied. For example 
General Gavin testified that he feared the American esca­
lation would begin to hurt the United States' world 
strategic position. He went on to say "When (the United 
States) begins to turn (its) back on what (it) is doing 
in world affairs ... to support a tactical confrontation
that appears to be escalating at the will Of an enemy (it)
92is in a very dangerous position." On the other hand the 
former diplomat, George Kennan, who first introduced the 
concept of containment, questioned American military inter 
vention in the first place. Furthermore, Kennan concluded 
that the prestige of the United States was being damaged 
abroad because of its excessive involvement in Vietnam, 
particularly in Japan. General Gavin, a year later, 
agreed with Kennan on this latter point, when he again 
appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee. It is 
especially interesting that these two distinguished men 
opposed Johnson's policy on grounds similar to those used 
by the President to defend the policy. Obviously a
92Broun, ojo. cit. , p. 342.
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credibility gap existed.
President Johnson, while the Senate Hearings were 
in process, conveniently found that the time was right to 
meet personally with the leaders of the Saigon Government.
In Honolulu, the two Governments in a public declaration 
proclaimed their common objectives and efforts to maintain 
an independent South Vietnam. During the conference the 
leaders discussed joint military operations, but the main 
news to emerge from the meeting dealt with new programs 
for the socioeconomic benefit of the Vietnamese people.
Yet, while the Vietnamese people's need of such programs 
were unquestionable, peace was their foremost need, and a 
pre-condition if the programs were to be successful. But 
the Honolulu conference ended without peace in sight.
Throughout 1966 and 1967 the war continued and the 
number of bombing raids and American combat troops increas­
ed, until the number of American boys fighting the war 
that should be fought by Asians, reached approximately 
540,000. During this period the Administration often spoke 
of how the United States was winning the war. Each act of 
escalation was explained as a necessary act to bring the 
war to an end. While the Administration just as often 
spOke of their willingness to negotiate, it was quite clear 
that they were banking on a military victory.
The Communist Tet offensive in February, 1968 crush­
ed the Johnson Administration's illusions of a military 
 ^ victory. Henry Kissinger points out that from a strictly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 6 1
military point of view, the Tet offensive was an American 
93victory. However, he also points out that more import­
antly it was a political defeat in the countryside for 
Saigon and the United States.^ "The Vietcong had made 
a point whose importance far transcends military consider-
95ations: there are no secure areas for Vietnamese civilians." 
Washington faced the sad realization that from hoth a 
military and political point of view, its policy was a 
failure. Militarily, the American and South Vietnamese 
forces were not defeated, hut they had not made any signi­
ficant progress in bringing the war to an end, and the Tet 
offensive had vividly showed that it was unlikely that they 
could in the near future. This realization caused President 
Johnson, for the first time to put a limit on the number 
of American troops for Vietnam. He refused General West­
moreland's request for an additional two hundred thousand
American troops, to secure a "major improvement" in the
96military situation in South Vietnam. President Johnson, 
finally faced the reality, that the American military mach­
ine after almost four years had been unable to improve
93^Henry A. Kessinger, American Poreign Policy,
Three Essays, (Hew York, 1969)1 p^  106.
•^Ibid. , p. 106.
95Ibid., p. 107.
• 96Coral Bell, "Security in Asia: Reapparisals after 
Vietnam," International Journal, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, Winter 
1968-69, p. 3.
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appreciably the military and political situation of the
97Government of South Vietnam. In facing these facts,
President Johnson found that an eventual commitment to a
political solution was inevitable and began the quest for
98a negotiated settlement.
On March 31, 1968 President Johnson before a nation­
wide television audience announced a partial halt in the 
bombing of North Vietnam. In November of the same year the 
Administration announced that peace negotiations would take 
place in Paris, with the United States, Saigon, Hanoi and 
the NLP represented. After almost three years of continuous 
battle, and countless deaths, the United States no longer 
maintained that NLP representation at the peace table meant 
in a sense victory for the ’’other side." Yet, because the 
United States "yielded" in 1968, after three years of 
insisting it could not allow NLP representation at the peace 
conference, the "other side" had indeed gained a victory in 
a sense. The NLP presence brought out the weaknesses and 
failures of the United States' past policy and the internal 
contradictions within it.
The peace negotiations in Paris begun under the 
Johnson Administration and continued by the succeeding 
Nixon Administration have yet, at the time of this writing, 
to bear any fruit. So today the war in Vietnam continues
^Ibid. , p . 4 •
98Kissinger, ojo. cit. , p. 108.
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and the "blood of American boys and innocent South Viet­
namese civilians redden the soil of that country, demon­
strating the failures of American leaders and the inade-
99(luaey of their Asian foreign policy.
In examining the United States' Vietnam policy 
since 1954, one might conclude that the U:S. commitment 
there has actually been an American commitment to itself - 
to contain Communism. This writer concurs with this con.- . 
elusion for two reasons. First, during the 1954-1956 
period the United States deliberately went about under­
mining the Geneva Accords of 1954; Accords perceived to be
clearly unsatisfactory to American interests. Secondly, 
during the 1960's American statesmen have seemingly:'been 
unable to define who is to be contained in Vietnam. The
"White Papers" of 1961 and 1965 state that the enemy is
Hanoi and therefore it is Hanoi that must be contained. 
President Johnson, however, especially in his John Hopkins 
Address in 1965, strongly suggested that China was the real 
enemy in the Vietnam war and therefore it was China that 
must be contained. On the other hand, Dean Rusk, Secretary 
of State in both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 
when asked in an interview for MacCleans in February, 1968, 
if he regarded China as the real enemy in Vietnam, replied
99• The Hixon Administration have displayed favorable 
signs of earnestly attempting to end the war. However, at 
the time of this writing, it is not possible to evaluate 
its policy, or foresee any immediate end to the war.
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"No. The aggressor nominates himself by his own action.
Yet in continuing Secretary Rusk said:
But in simple terms we believe and have believed 
throughout my term in office and before, that 
if Hanoi were to take over South Vietnam by 
force, the effect would be to stimulate the 
expansionist ambitions of China and greatly 
weaken the will and capacity of independent 
nations of South East Asia to resist.
Thus Vietnam has a direct bearing on freedom 
throughout South East Asia and particularly 
freedom of the area from Chinese pressure 
and subversion. 101
Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs,
William P. Bundy in Eebruary of 1968, gave yet another
slightly different assessment of the enemy in Vietnam.
He stated:
the nations of Southeast Asia are individually 
threatened by the parallel and mutually rein­
forcing ambitions of North Viet-Nam and 
Communist China. 102
While the debate between American statesmen over
who is the enemy in Vietnam and therefore who is to be
contained has concentrated on Peking and Hanoi, American
refusal to accept the National Liberation Front as a
party to peace negotiations up until March of 1968, and
U.S. refusal until recently to consider a coalition
government as a basis for a settlement, indicates that
^ ^ State Department Bulletin, Vol. 58 No. 1493 
February 5, 1968, p. 208.
101Ibid., p. 208-209.
102
Ibid., p. 177.
100
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the Nil* was then to he the enemy to contain. Thus, while 
American statesmen have had difficulty agreeing on the 
face of the enemy, they have agreed on its name - Communism, 
that evil which threatens world peace and the American 
way of life.
Vietnam is a key element in the United States'
Asian containment policy. The bankruptcy of the Vietnam 
policy is due to a considerable degree, to the failures 
in the entire Asian containment policy, in which context 
it was formulated.
Asian containment, as constructed during the Dulles
era, is based on the image of a monolithic threat. Yet,
currently it is quite apparent that there is disunity and
diversity in "international" communism. This fact, almost
by itself, makes a general policy of containment irrele- 
105vant.' In any event, the original notion of containment 
became vulgarized in Asia, "so that while acquiescing in 
Soviet power in Europe, the United States, without counting 
costs and feasibility has set itself against parochial 
Asian Communism of minor s c a l e . V i e t n a m  is the classic 
example. Indeed, American goals in Asia sometimes seemed
105Herman Kahn, "On Establishing A Context for 
Debate," in Erank E. Armbruster, Raymond D. Gastil, Herman 
Kahn, William Pfaff, Edmund Stillman, Can We Win In Vietnam?, 
(New York, 1968), p. 45.
■^^Edmund Stillman, "Containment Has Won, But ... " 
The New York Times Magazine, May 28, 1967, p. 76.
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even more generalized - the containment of disorder, be
105it national or social discord, because the United 
States has allowed itself to perceive all discontent as 
Communist inspired. The United States, because of this 
mistaken perception, has found itself supporting regimes 
whose oppressive policies have caused much of their 
population to become discontented. American policy 
because it has become identified with the status quo, 
which at times may be regarded as less than satisfactory 
to the Asian peoples concerned, has at times alienated 
and seldom cultivated the important Asian nationalist 
forces. When alienated, these nationalist forces some­
times become associated with and later, as in Vietnam,
106"largely subordinated to the Communist movement." The
United States, therefore, must learn from its Vietnam 
experience that it is not enough to support the governments 
in Asia who proclaim to be anti-Communist, but that the 
support of the Asian peoples themselves is needed, if it 
is to successfully achieve its desired objectives in Asia. 
Vietnam has proved beyond a doubt that while the United 
States may be able to advise and assist Asian peoples, it 
cannot force them to fight Communism, especially where 
Communism is allowed to appear as the better alternative.
105Ibid., p. 76.
" "^^^Senator J. W. Pulbright, "On the Arrogance of 
Power" in The Viet-Nam Reader, op. cit., p. 209-
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In Vietnam, as in most of the developing countries in Asia, 
American policy-makers must come to realize that the "over­
whelming problem is not to buttress but to develop a
107political framework." The United States policy of 
containment in Asia, with its dominant stress on military 
Blight, cannot meet this demand. At the same time this is 
not meant to suggest that the entire military aspect of 
the policy must be or should be eliminated; it is merely 
to suggest that a greater emphasis must be placed on 
political aspects, for the basic problems facing the Asian 
nations are political.
Furthermore, "while the United States has committed
itself to the containment of Communism everywhere in the
world," American policy-makers must come to realize that
"this commitment must obviously be subject to qualifica- 
108tions." As stated in a Report to the U.S. Senate
C-OBimittee on Foreign Relations:
It does not follow, however, that it is in the 
interest of the United States or that it 
enhances (its) national security to respond 
to (Communist) pressures in all circumstances 
and in every specific situation in Southeast 
Asia. Nor does it automatically follow that 
that an ever-deepening total involvement of 
the United States on the Southeast Asian 
mainland is the only way or, in all circum­
stances, the best way to deal with the 
implications of the Chinese hostility. 109
107Kessinger, 0£. cit., p. 1G6.
108Hans J. Morgenthau, "Vietnam-Another Korea?" in 
Tension Areas in World Affairs, op. cit., p. 303.
109„The Vietnam Conflict: The Substance And the 
Shadow," Report to Committee on Foreign Relations, United 
States Senate, (Washington, D.C., 1966).
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American policy-makers, obviously, have not realized the 
necessity to qualify this commitment. If they had,the 
United States would not have found itself involved in a 
land war in Asia, which threatened to bring on a major 
confrontation with C h i n a , a  situation contrary to the 
United States' national interest.
110Vide Supra, pp. 1511-152.
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CONCLUSION
For almost twenty years the policy of containment 
has been the foundation of America's Asian policy. Yet 
today leading Americans are still asking, what is America's 
Asian policy? and what are its objectives? A study of the 
containment policy in Asia brings out the reason why such 
inquiries are still made. Containment as an operative 
policy in Asia has become so distorted that the fundamental 
concept, so successful in Europe, has become obscured.
In its original European environment, containment 
reflected a cold assessment of American national interest. 
Despite the Administrative rhetoric that was used in intro­
ducing containment at the time of the'Truman Doctrine, 
stripped bare, the policy was as Coral Bell has stated, a 
traditional balance of power strategy.^ In an effort to 
maintain a European balance of power, which was perceived
p
to be endangered by the threat of Soviet expansion,
^Vide Supra, Chapter 1, fn. 33.
2
It has been a matter of debate, especially in the 
1 9 6 0 ' s whether or not the Soviet Union in the immediate 
post-war period did in fact have any design to control 
Western Europe and world domination. However, the statement 
here, represents what all evidence indicates was the Ameri­
can and Western Europe perception of Soviet intent at that 
t ime.
169
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programs within the economic, military and political 
spheres were initiated with the object of building "situa­
tions of strength" in Western Europe as a counterweight 
to the Soviet controlled Eastern Europe.
The initial success of the policy in Europe can 
be attributed to three main factors; (1) it was a policy 
whose objectives were vital to U.S. interest; (2) the 
objectives were within American means to achieve and; (5) 
the policy had the support of those the United States was 
trying to protect. Western European support for the policy, 
the indispensable factor in the policy's success stemmed 
from the area's agreement with the United States on the 
serious nature of the threat to their security and the 
common identification of the Soviet Union as the source 
of the threat.
The weight American policy-makers gave to factors 
1 and 2 as a necessary prerequisite to attempting contain­
ment is evidenced by the American refusal to apply the 
policy to the Chinese Civil War, where American interests 
were not clear, and the desired objective seemed unattain­
able .
Containment was first actively applied in Asia at 
the outset of the Korean War. At that time there was still 
no indication that the policy was to be the basis for theo
United States Asian policy as a whole, for in extending the
•z
Ronald Steel, Pax Americana, (New York, 1967) p. 11.
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European limits of the policy President Truman let it he 
known that it was to be a "symbol" of American determination 
to live up to its commitments to the lands along the Soviet- 
controlled periphery.^- Originally, therefore, containment 
was applied to Asia because it was believed to be an 
integral element in the maintenance of European balance.
With the entrance of Communist China into the Korean
War, American leaders seemed to think of containment as a
specifically Asian policy. The Communist alliance in Korea
was looked upon as a monolithic threat in Asia similar to
the Soviet threat in Europe. Because the struggle in Asia
was viewed as being the same as it was in Europe, the United
5
States attempted to apply the same remedy.
The successful defense of South Korea without perci- 
pating World War III, reinforcing containment's success in 
Europe, led American leaders to implement the policy on a 
wider scale in Asia - despite the fact that the general 
Asian situation differed from the particular situation in 
Korea just as it differed from the situation in Europe.
John Poster Dulles, the chief architect of the Asian 
containment policy, immediately found Asian opposition to 
his policy. Many of the Asian nations seemed to be oblivious 
to the monolithic threat of Communism that Dulles claimed 
threatened their security.. Actually Asian leaders were well
^See Chapter 2, p. ^9.
5
Steel, ojo. cit., p. 31*
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aware of the possible threat a resurgent China posed but 
made a distinction between Communism as a social doctrine 
and Communism as a form of Chinese and Soviet imperialism - 
the United States did not. In any event', Asian leaders 
were-primarily concerned with maintaining their newly 
won independence and believed the tight alliance bonds 
favored by the United States to be oppressive limitations 
on their freedom, rather than the source of protection 
Americans claimed it to be.
Despite the rejection by many Asian leaders of 
his proposed policy, Dulles tenaciously went about imple­
menting it, seeking the cooperation of those Asian leaders 
willing to join the United States in its "crusade" against 
Communism.
The main instrument of Dulles' version of contain­
ment was the military alliance. The United States, using the 
aggression in Korea as an example of potential future Com­
munist activity in Asia, entered into alliances in Asia de­
signed to combat overt aggression. In its search for 
military allies in Asia, the promise of American economic 
assistance was waved as an incentive. As a result, the 
United States found itself allied with some nations which 
offered little or no hope of ever becoming military bul-
o
warks against Communism and "which had special uses of 
their own for military aid it furnished. This aid in turn
^Ibid., p. 31.
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was used by despotic rulers to secure their personal 
power position. When national sentiments turned upon 
the ruler, the United States, because of its association 
with the regime, often became the target of Asian anti­
colonialist sentiments. Events in Vietnam and Laos 
provide good examples of this type of situation.
Because of the nature of its alliance system in 
Asia the United States has also found itself caught in the 
middle of regional confrontations. Eor example, in South 
Asia the U.S. was placed in a situation where an allied 
power, Pakistan, was hostile to a non-allied power, India, 
in whose security the U.S. has a major stake. Under these 
conditions the United States has found relations with both 
nations complicated, often resulting in one or both nations 
reacting against U.S. policy.
In both instances the alliance system has had a 
divisive effect hardly conducive to the successful imple­
mentation of the containment policy.
Even the military strategy of the alliance system 
has proved inadequate. As previously stated, it is based 
on an assumed need to combat a Communist frontal attack 
similar to the one used in Korea. The Communist, however, 
have adopted a new tactic that is commonly referred to as 
"wars of liberation," the type presently employed in Viet­
nam. This type of Communist approach is based on guerilla 
warfare. There had been a fundamental shift in American 
military strategy to meet this type of challenge, but the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 7 4
impiemerttatijon-of; it;has;been..difficult and has not met
wiLth: much- success..
Ah; ocbseesibn..wi thi Communism has led the United
Statese: into: thee trap., ofIindiscriminately condemning it
as; the. enemy all. orer Asia. . This has complicated America's
A^ siar; poimey ,. for; it; has:perpetuated the myth of a cohesive
Gbmmunisi conspiracy.. Today,.however, the United States
no longer faces, a..monolithic Communist bloc controlled
and used, f or- the. furtherance - of.its own interests by the
Soviet: Union,, or.-even an .Asian conspiracy directed by
Bedcing,. as;: some;- Americair.leaders..persist in believing.
Iins.i7.ead,. the; Uhitedi Slates; faces . in Asia a "variety of
aammunisms.;,. whose- relationszwithlthe Soviet Union and China
change from.country, to country, and from time to time and
whose, bearing.upon .the interests of the United States re-
7
quires: empiri'cal_ examihat ionr.in each concrete instance."
W rilB containment:in..Asia has evolved into an open- 
eanieai coanmitment: tec resisttCdmmunism at all cost,• President 
JUdin son. has madee i±t clearrthat;the maintenance of a balance 
of.' power: in. Asia ..has; been., the-continuing fundamental objec­
tive: off the^ American .Asian;. p o 1 i cy,; In October, 1966,
Jfedxnsou; slated::: "Nbc sihgleenatidn. can or should be permitted
O  1
tto dmnihate: the; Paeific:Regiono1.' “ Johnson's statement
''Ifens; JJ.. Morgenthau,..A. hew foreign Policy Por The 
Uhfted States,. (New;Tork,, 1969), ■ P• 124.
O p
Por full text see Department of State Bulletin, 
November 28, 1966, pp. 812-816.
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explicity brings out what was implicit in the domino 
theory of President Eisenhower and in President Kennedy's 
policies.
If the United States is ever to achieve this balance 
in Asia,^ it must first decide and clearly state who is to
be balanced in Asia. No longer is it sufficient to say the
enemy is Asian Communism, for since Communism has become 
polycentric, such an ambiguous enemy can never be balanced. 
If, indeed, the United States wishes to balance the growing 
power of China in Asia, then it should state so. As Inis 
Claude Jr. has pointed out, "the balance principle states 
that a state should join ... only if its own security is 
affected."'1'® Therefore, to achieve an Asian balance the 
U.S. must pursue a policy that is determined in terms not 
of Communist ideology but of the compatibility of a nation's 
security interest with the interest of the United States.'1'1' 
Por example, both a Communist and a non-Communist Asian 
nation could share the common interest of balancing the 
power of Communist China in Asia.
In Asia it is quite apparent that the United States
^It must be noted that while in declaratory policy,., 
balance of power, connotes the idea of equilibrium, in 
operation a preponderance of power is sought, or in other
words, a favorable balance. See Inis L. Claude, Jr.,
Power And International Relations, (New York, 1965), Chap. 2.
10Ibid., p. 147.
■^Morgenthau, 0£. cit., p. 124.
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has concentrated on the secondary objectives of the contain­
ment policy - the preservation of the network of military 
alliance and the suppression of "Communist" insurrections - 
at the expense of the primary objective of that policy - 
the maintenance of the balance of power. Believing that 
every Communist threat was equal and thus deserving of an 
automatic American reply, the United States has found 
itself in a catastrophic situation in Vietnam which ha3 
been both morally compromising and militarily frustrating. 
The United States thus has become the true victim of its 
own obsession.
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